6th NATIONAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT 2025

ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION
THIMPHU: BHUTAN
June 2026

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ACC
ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION

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ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION (ACC) BHUTAN

The Anti-Corruption Commission is a constitutional body, mandated to prevent and fight corruption in Bhutan. Established on 31st December 2005 by Royal Decree, its mission is to tackle corruption through leading by example, achieving excellence in partnership, and mainstreaming anti-corruption measures in public or private organisations.

Contact Address:

ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION (ACC)
LHADRO LAM, KAWAJANGSA
POST BOX NO. 1113

THIMPHU, 11001, BHUTAN
Tel: +975-2-334863/64/66/67/68
Fax: + 975-2-334865
Website: www.acc.org.bt

About this Report

The NIA 2025 was jointly conducted by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and the National Statistics Bureau (NSB) of Bhutan. The NIA was adapted from the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) of South Korea in 2009. ACRC provided professional support in methodology and analysis by training researchers in the initial conduct of the NIA.

Every effort was made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of May 2026.

The researchers of this report are:

- ACC: Kinley Yangzom (Lead), Pema Tenzin, Bhawana Darjee, Harka Bdr Chuwan, Nima Tshering
- NSB: Ratu Yoezer (Coordinator), Karma Thinley, Sonam Gyeltshen

Contributors:

- Kin Dorji, ACC and Kinzang Gyeltshen, ACC

Layout & Format:

- Sonam Phuntsho, ACC

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FOREWORD

The National Integrity Assessment (NIA) 2025 is the sixth since its launch in 2009. It underscores Bhutan's continued commitment to transparency, accountability, and ethical governance. The assessment serves as both a diagnostic and a strategic tool, providing evidence-based as well as perceived insights into the integrity landscape across public-sector institutions, including the judiciary and parliament.

This study marks a significant advancement in Bhutan's integrity assessment framework. The framework and methodology have been refined to remain relevant to the evolving governance context. By applying rigorous methods and innovative data collection, including Computer-Aided Personal Interview (CAPI) systems, the assessment provides a comprehensive and credible analysis of integrity-related experiences and perceptions among both service providers and users. The findings highlight institutional strengths and identify critical gaps that require targeted policy attention and reform.

The partnership between the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and the National Statistics Bureau (NSB) underscores the value of interagency cooperation in strengthening the credibility and reliability of national assessments. Guidance from the Research Steering Committee and support from stakeholders have also ensured the study's analytical rigour and practical relevance.

This report is intended to serve as a valuable resource for policymakers, practitioners, researchers, and the public, contributing meaningfully to Bhutan's efforts to build a transparent, accountable, and integrity-driven public sector.

Strengthening integrity is a shared responsibility that requires ongoing commitment from citizens, public officials, and civil society to move beyond mere compliance towards a deeper enhancement of institutional culture and leadership integrity.

Pema Choden
Chairperson

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
ACAB	Anti-Corruption Act of Bhutan
ACRC	Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission
AFD	Administrative and Finance Division
BTI	Bhutan Transparency Initiative
CAPI	Computer-Assisted Personal Interviews
CAWI	Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing
CoI	Conflict of Interest
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
FY	Financial Year
HR	Human Resource
IA	Integrity Assessment
IOA	Integrated Organisation Assessment
MoAL	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
MoESD	Ministry of Education and Skills Development
MoICE	Ministry of Industry Commerce and Employment
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoFAET	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MoIT	Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport
MoENR	Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
NAB	National Assembly of Bhutan
NCB	National Council of Bhutan
NIA	National Integrity Assessment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSB	National Statistics Bureau
OIP	Organisational Integrity Plan
PII	Parliamentarians' Integrity Index
RAA	Royal Audit Authority
UCP	Upper Cut-Point

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The **National Integrity Assessment (NIA) 2025** is Bhutan's sixth national assessment of integrity in public service delivery. Adapted from the model of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) of the Republic of Korea, the NIA evaluates the extent to which public institutions and officials deliver services fairly, transparently, and without corruption. Since its introduction in 2009, the NIA has evolved into a key diagnostic tool for identifying corruption risks and informing governance reforms.

NIA 2025 covers **1,498 services across 191 agencies (99 consolidated)** in 13 categories, including ministries, local governments, constitutional bodies, corporations, financial institutions, and service sectors such as health and education. The assessment is based on responses from 17,896 participants, comprising service users (11,422), service providers (4,969), and parliamentarians and voters (1,505), supplemented by an analysis of 364 corruption reports received by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) during Financial Year (FY) 2024–2025.

Integrity is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, where higher scores indicate stronger integrity. After adjusting for factors affecting reliability, the **National Integrity Score is 8.16 (Good level)**. The **Public Sector Integrity score is 8.41 (Very Good level)**, while the **Parliamentarians' Integrity Index (PII) is 7.15 (Satisfactory level)**.

External Integrity scored 8.57 (Very Good level), reflecting relatively transparent procedures and minimal direct corruption. Reported experiences of corruption in service delivery are extremely low (9.97, Outstanding level), indicating that most citizens can access services without making illicit payments. However, perceptions of corruption remain lower (7.98, Good level), driven largely by concerns about favouritism and informal influence. A notable proportion of service users believe that personal relationships, such as friendships, family ties, or influential connections, affect service outcomes. This perception gap suggests that while actual corruption is limited, trust in fairness and impartiality remains uneven. Instances of informal payments are rare but not absent. A small proportion of users reported providing cash, in-kind benefits, or entertainment to obtain services, indicating the persistence of low-level or "soft" corruption. **Accountability** remains a relatively weaker area (**7.44, Satisfactory level**), particularly in grievance redress and awareness of complaint mechanisms, highlighting the need to strengthen responsiveness and feedback systems.

The **Internal Integrity score of 7.98 (Good level)** reflects generally sound organisational practices, supported by strong performance in Work Integrity (8.98, Outstanding level). Experiences of corruption within personnel management, budget execution, and work assignments are minimal, with very few reported instances of illicit payments or manipulation. However, vulnerabilities persist in **Integrity Culture and Corruption Control Systems**, including:

- Weak protection for whistleblowers
- Limited enforcement of disciplinary actions
- Instances of officials prioritising private interests over official duties

Ethical Leadership (7.62, Good level) emerges as a critical area of concern. Perceptions of fairness in human resource management and professional development remain moderate, with evidence of hierarchical pressure within organisations. Notably, employees report increasing frequency of unreasonable instructions, along with perceived risks associated with non-compliance. These trends point to underlying challenges in organisational culture and leadership accountability.

The **Parliamentarians' Integrity Index (PII) score of 7.15 (Satisfactory level)** indicates moderate performance with notable gaps. A key finding is a significant perception gap between parliamentarians and the public: lawmakers tend to rate their performance higher, while public assessments are consistently lower across all components. While direct corruption appears limited (Corruption Index: 9.38, Outstanding level), concerns are shifting toward informal influence, favouritism, and perceived vote-buying. Core parliamentary functions show weaknesses, particularly in:

- Oversight
- Limited use of proactive motions
- Gaps in transparency and communication with citizens

A persistent **transparency–accountability gap** is evident, with concerns over weak constituency engagement and limited monitoring of development activities. Importantly, scepticism toward parliamentary integrity is consistent across education levels, indicating a broader trust deficit.

Across the NIA series (2009–2025), Bhutan has maintained consistently strong integrity scores, with 2025 recording the second-highest national score. External integrity has shown steady improvement, while internal integrity, after gradual gains, has declined slightly in 2025 due to emerging concerns in organisational culture and leadership.

Parliamentarian integrity has improved since 2022, but continues to lag behind public sector performance. Overall, the findings suggest that while systems and procedures have strengthened, perceptions and institutional trust have not improved at the same pace.

Corruption continues to be viewed as a serious issue, with 40% of respondents perceiving an increase over the past five years. The nature of corruption is evolving from direct bribery to nepotism, favouritism, and misuse of authority. Public perception of the ACC is influenced by a visibility bias, where enforcement actions are more visible than prevention and education efforts. While overall perceptions remain positive, this imbalance contributes to a less comprehensive understanding of anti-corruption efforts. Respondents prioritise prevention, followed by investigation and public education, underscoring the need for stronger outreach and communication strategies.

To sustain and strengthen integrity gains, the NIA 2025 highlights the need to:

Strengthen internal governance systems

- Enhance checks and balances
- Improve complaint and feedback mechanisms
- Strengthen whistleblower protection
- Conduct regular audits and compliance checks

Reinforce accountability mechanisms

- Clarify roles and responsibilities
- Link accountability to performance systems
- Enforce consequences for misconduct

Address emerging forms of "soft corruption"

- Expand digital service delivery ("Digital First")
- Improve transparency and proactive disclosure
- Strengthen communication and citizen engagement
- Promote ethics and integrity training

Bhutan continues to demonstrate **strong overall integrity in public service delivery**, with very low levels of direct corruption. However, **perceptions of favouritism, gaps in accountability, and weaknesses in organisational culture and leadership** present emerging risks.

Addressing these challenges will require a shift from compliance-based approaches toward **strengthening institutional culture, leadership integrity, and public trust**. The findings of NIA 2025 provide a critical evidence base to guide targeted reforms and sustain Bhutan's progress in promoting integrity and good governance.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Integrity Assessment (IA) framework was developed by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) of South Korea in 1999 and has since evolved to better reflect the realities of corruption in the public sector. Grounded in empirical analysis, the IA is a practical tool for measuring institutional integrity, identifying corruption risks, and assessing performance across agencies. Its methodological strength has led to its adoption and adaptation by several countries. In Bhutan, the IA framework has guided successive National Integrity Assessments (NIAs), with NIA 2025 representing the sixth assessment in the series.

Public integrity is a core element of good governance. It refers to the extent to which public institutions and officials perform their duties ethically, transparently, and in compliance with established laws and standards. Strong public integrity systems enhance public trust, reinforce the rule of law, improve service delivery, and support socio-economic development. Conversely, integrity breaches, such as corruption, fraud, and misconduct, can erode public confidence and undermine institutional effectiveness.

For the purpose of the National Integrity Assessment (NIA), integrity is defined as the degree to which public officials discharge their responsibilities fairly, transparently, and without engaging in corruption or misconduct. This definition underpins the assessment framework used in Bhutan. Building on this conceptualisation, the NIA 2025 framework operationalises integrity through a set of clearly defined concepts and measurable components that guide the assessment process.

1.1 CONCEPTS & COMPONENTS OF NIA 2025

The National Integrity Assessment (NIA) 2025 provides a systematic evaluation of Bhutan's integrity landscape, focusing on ethical conduct, transparency, and accountability across the public sector and among parliamentarians. It offers a comprehensive perspective on governance by examining both the prevalence of corruption and the impact of integrity-related challenges. As a longitudinal cross-sectional study, it assesses how effectively public services are delivered, particularly in terms of accountability and transparency, building on earlier assessments conducted over time. The NIA captures the perceptions and experiences of both service users and providers.

A key development introduced in NIA 2022 is the Parliamentarians' Integrity Index, which evaluates the performance and integrity of elected representatives across seven dimensions. This addition strengthens the framework by explicitly incorporating the role of parliamentary institutions in upholding national integrity.

Beyond measurement, the NIA serves as a tool for strengthening governance. It highlights gaps in integrity systems and encourages public institutions to adopt proactive measures to enhance accountability, improve service delivery, and prevent corruption across both administrative and legislative domains.

1.1.1 PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY

The **Public Sector Integrity Index** evaluates how well public institutions uphold ethical values, governance principles, and corruption-control mechanisms, comprising two key dimensions: **Internal Integrity** and **External Integrity**.

External Integrity refers to service users' (external clients') perceptions and experiences of service providers' integrity in delivering public services. It is assessed based on how the public perceives and experiences the ethical conduct of these institutions. External Integrity is categorised into the Corruption Index and the Corruption Risk Index. The Corruption Index measures the actual instances of corruption, including cash or kind payments, entertainment, gratitudes, and undue benefits experienced or perceived by public officials and citizens. The Corruption Risk Index, on the other hand, evaluates the likelihood of corruption as perceived by citizens and public officials, focusing on factors such as the openness of service procedures, the practicality of standard procedures, and accountability mechanisms.

Internal Integrity refers to the level of integrity of public agencies, as assessed by their own employees or public officials (internal clients). It consists of three key components: the Work Integrity Index, Integrity Culture Index, and Ethical Leadership Index. The Work Integrity Index evaluates internal affairs, including personnel management, budget execution, and the fairness of work assignments by supervisors or agency heads. The Ethical Leadership Index assesses leadership qualities such as integrity, ethics, trust, transparency, accountability, and fairness. Lastly, the Integrity Culture Index measures the prevalence of corrupt practices within an agency and the effectiveness of its corruption control systems. Together, External and Internal Integrity provide a comprehensive assessment of integrity within public institutions.

1.1.2 PARLIAMENTARIANS' INTEGRITY

The **Parliamentarians' Integrity Index (PII**) measures the integrity of parliamentarians as evaluated by both voters and parliamentarians themselves. It comprises several key components: Representativeness, Oversight, Legislative, Transparency, Accountability, Integrity, and Corruption. Representativeness assesses how well Members of Parliament (MPs) engage with citizens, understand their concerns, and ensure parliamentary work reflects the realities of people's lives. **Oversight** evaluates the parliament's role in monitoring government plans, policies, and actions, ensuring resources are appropriately allocated and holding the executive accountable. **Legislative** integrity examines whether parliamentarians protect national interests and fulfil public aspirations through policy reviews, scrutiny of state functions, and legislative processes. **Transparency** measures the openness of parliamentarians, ensuring citizens have access to parliamentary information, engage in legislative processes, and can hold them accountable for decisions on budget allocation and resource distribution. **Accountability** emphasises that MPs must remain answerable to the citizens they represent, ensuring oversight is continuous, evidence-based, and held to the highest parliamentary standards. **Integrity** ensures that parliamentary business remains free from integrity violations or dishonesty, maintaining trust in legislative and executive functions. Lastly, **Corruption** assesses parliamentarians' role in preventing and deterring corrupt practices, reinforcing their responsibility in upholding ethical governance. Together, these components provide a comprehensive measure of parliamentary integrity.

1.1.3 ACTS LOWERING ASSESSMENT RELIABILITY

The Acts Lowering Assessment Reliability refers to improper actions by public agencies undergoing integrity assessments that may influence or distort the results of those assessments. These acts are identified through surveys and on-site inspections, resulting in deductions from the overall **National Integrity Score**. For example, survey questionnaires have specific questions to detect whether public organisations attempted to influence respondents to provide favourable responses. Similarly, on-site inspections help uncover efforts to manipulate survey outcomes, such as prior contact with respondents or violations of the criteria for conducting an independent integrity assessment.

1.2 NIA 2025 MODEL

Over the years, the National Integrity Assessment (NIA) has evolved to enhance its methodology and scope. Initially, NIA 2009 focused solely on External Integrity, assessing only public service users' perceptions. In NIA 2012, the assessment was expanded to include both service providers and users. NIA 2016 introduced new components, such as Acts Lowering Assessment Reliability, and piloted a policy customer evaluation component as a separate study. By NIA 2019, the Ethical Leadership Index under internal integrity and reliability tests was incorporated to improve data credibility and authenticity. The NIA 2022 further expanded the framework by adding the Parliamentarians' Integrity Index (previously piloted as a policy customer evaluation component in 2016) for a more comprehensive evaluation. Now, in NIA 2025, integrity scores from 12 Indexes, along with Acts Lowering Assessment Reliability, have been integrated to derive the **National Integrity** Score. The NIA 2025 model is shown in **Figure 1**.



Figure 1 *National Integrity Assessment 2025 Model*

1.3 OBJECTIVES, SCOPE OF THE STUDY, AND LIMITATIONS

1.3.1 OBJECTIVES

I. To assess the level of integrity in public service delivery based on the perceptions and experiences of service users and providers;

II. To identify corruption risks, vulnerabilities, and systemic gaps within public institutions and services;

III. Assess Parliament's transparency, accountability, corruption risk, and effectiveness in legislation, oversight, and representation;

IV. Evaluate the perceptions held by service users and providers concerning the Anti-Corruption Commission's efficacy, performance, and overall impact in combating corruption;

V. To provide evidence-based insights to support policy decisions, reforms, and targeted anti-corruption interventions; and

VI. To promote a culture of integrity and encourage agencies to adopt preventive and corrective measures.

1.3.2 SCOPE OF THE NIA 2025

The NIA 2025 evaluates the integrity of public agencies based on the perceptions and experiences of service users and providers. Public agencies are categorised into Ministries, Constitutional Offices, *Dzongkhag* Administration, *Thromde* Administration, *Gewog* Administration, Corporations, Autonomous Agencies, the Judiciary, Financial Institutions, Schools, and Colleges under the Royal University of Bhutan, Civil Society Organisations, and Hospitals/BHUs. The level of integrity and corruption within these agencies is assessed by evaluating selected services, focusing on accountability, transparency, and corruption, by gathering feedback from both service users and employees. Parliament is assessed separately due to its distinct mandates and responsibilities. The integrity of parliamentarians is evaluated based on perceptions from both constituents/voters and parliamentarians themselves.

For the NIA 2025, 191 agencies and 1,498 services were covered (*refer* **Annexure 1**) under the public sector integrity index.

1.3.3 LIMITATIONS

A direct comparison of integrity scores across services and agencies is not possible due to the diversity of services, nature, size and varying mandates, standards, and procedures followed by each agency. Additionally, the number of public agencies and services assessed can vary depending on whether specific criteria are met, resulting in differences across agencies.

The NIA considers a specific reference period: one year before the actual assessment. Therefore, for NIA 2025, the evaluation pertains to services provided and availed during the Financial Year (FY) 2024-2025.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

2.1 RESEARCH APPROACHES AND METHODS

The research approaches and methods adopted in this study are designed to systematically assess integrity through structured, evidence-based frameworks. In this regard, the methodology incorporates two key measurement tools: the Public Sector Integrity Index and the Parliamentarian Integrity Index. These indexes provide a comprehensive and comparative basis for evaluating integrity by capturing multiple dimensions such as transparency, accountability, ethical conduct, and institutional effectiveness. By integrating both quantitative indicators and perception-based data, the approach ensures a balanced assessment that reflects both institutional performance and stakeholder experiences, thereby strengthening the reliability and analytical depth of the National Integrity Assessment.

2.1.1 PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY INDEX

The following stages of NIA for the Public Sector Integrity Index ensure the reliability of data collection:

Stage 1: Selection of Agencies

The assessment entailed selecting public agencies that provided services to the public. The public agencies, such as the Ministries, Constitutional Offices, *Dzongkhags, Thromdes, Gewogs,* Corporations, Autonomous Agencies, Judiciary, Financial Institutions, Schools, CSOs, Colleges under Royal University of Bhutan for uniformity and Hospitals/BHUs were selected for the assessment as shown in **Table 1.**

All the public agencies involved in public service delivery were listed for selection. The agencies were selected based on the following criteria.

- Number of corruption reports received and audit observations;
- Nature of mandates – the importance of services; and
- Prone to corruption risks – interface with the clients.

Considering the size of the organisation and its mandates, the final counts for agencies such as the Judiciary, Gewogs, RUB Colleges, Hospitals/BHUs, and Schools were treated as a single total, irrespective of the number of agencies assessed. One sub-agency from each category; school, gewog, and hospital/BHU was selected from every Dzongkhag. For the Judiciary, the sample covered 27 courts across the country, including the Supreme Court, the High Court, 20 Dzongkhag Courts, and 5 Dungkhag Courts across different regions.

The total number of agencies for NIA 2025 is considered 99, although 191 agencies were assessed (*refer* **Table 1**)

Table 1

Number of Services and Agencies Selected from Each Category of Public Agencies

Category of Agency	Agency Count	No. of Agencies Assessed	Type of Service	No. of Services
Autonomous Agencies	17	17	38	90
Corporations	23	23	17	72
Civil Society Organisations	10	10	8	28
Constitutional Offices	4	4	4	10
Financial Institutions	7	7	24	44
Ministries	9	9	149	163
Dzongkhags	20	20	59	534
Thromdes	4	4	32	82
Hospitals	1	*21 (2 Regional Hospitals and 19 Dzongkhag Hospitals)*	7	76
Judiciary	1	*28 (Supreme Court, High Court, 20 Dzongkhag Courts, 6 Dungkhag Courts)*	6	95
RUB Colleges	1	*8 (SC, PCE, GCIT, CNR, SCE, CST, GCBS, JNEC)*	1	41
Gewogs	1	*20 (One Gewog from each Dzongkhag)*	32	208
Schools	1	*20 (One School from each Dzongkhag)*	2	55
*HR and AFD Services			2	
	99	**191**	**381**	**1,498**

***Note**. Human Resources (HR) and the Administration and Finance Division (AFD) services are counted as two, regardless of the number of agencies assessed.*

Stage 2: Selection of Services

For public sector integrity, the agencies were mandated to maintain a list of services provided by each agency, specifically for NIA 2025. The agencies compiled the list for each service and submitted it for further screening. Depending on the fulfilment of the following criteria, the services were selected for assessment in NIA 2025:

- Services of importance to socio-economic development;
- Nature of services: complexity and number of clients;
- Availability of clients' information/details;
- Prone to corruption risks and wrongdoings; and
- Meet the minimum sample size.

Based on these criteria, 3658 service types were selected. However, only 1498 service types were assessed due to the unavailability of service user lists. The detailed list of agencies and services covered for the NIA 2025 is presented in **Annexure 1**.

Stage 3: Collection of Client List

The FY 2024-2025 was the reference period for the assessment. The list of service users and providers for a particular service was selected from the respective agencies' lists. The list of clients varied from service to service, depending on the frequency of services availed each year.

The agencies were notified to maintain a list of service users and the identified services for FY 2024-2025.

Stage 4: Sample Size and Response Rate

Depending on the availability of service user lists, different sampling methods were adopted to select respondents. Service user surveys were conducted in the field using a combination of probability and non-probability sampling techniques, adapted to practical field realities while maintaining rigour as far as possible.

- In several cases, simple random sampling (SRS) was applied to the service user list, with the first 70 respondents selected randomly for the survey.
- In other instances, service users from the largest chiwog under the relevant administrative unit were prioritised. This approach increased the probability of successfully locating and interviewing a higher number of respondents within the available field time.
- Snowball sampling was also employed where initial respondents who had used the service were asked if they knew other service users. This helped expand the sample through referrals, particularly in areas where official lists were difficult to operationalise fully in the field.

These mixed methods balanced statistical representativeness with logistical feasibility in a resource-constrained survey environment.

A separate survey was administered to service providers (employees) to capture the supply-side perspective. For this component, the complete employee list of the selected agencies was used as the sampling frame. Simple random sampling (SRS) was applied to select employees. The number of employees selected per agency ranged from 7 to 50, depending on the size of the agency, to ensure adequate representation while remaining proportionate to the institution's scale.

According to the standards of previous NIAs, the maximum number of respondents required was 50, and the minimum was seven per service. If there were more than 50 service users, simple random sampling was used to select at least 50 respondents from among all service users and providers for each service, ensuring representativeness. If the number of service users was less than 50 but more than seven, all were included in the sample. Services with fewer than seven users were not selected for the assessment.
In total, 16,391 respondents participated in the assessment, comprising 11,422 service users (external clients) and 4,969 service/public officials (internal clients). The demographic profile of the respondents is presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Demographic Profile of the Respondents

	Service Users	Service Providers	Parliamentarians	Voters
Sex				
Male	6,665	3,066	37	672
Female	4,757	1,888	2	794
Not Specified		15		
Total	**11,422**	**4,969**	**39**	**1,466**
Highest Grade				
Primary	716	76		197
Lower Secondary	1,026	146		91
Middle Secondary	1,470	390		176
Higher Secondary	1,967	668		132
Diploma/Certificate	814	1,373		21
Bachelors	2,311	1,401	12	63
PGD/PGC	172	223		
Masters	533	597	27	5
PHD	27	32		
Non-Formal	442	13		166
Monastic Education	228	10		44
No Formal Education	1,716	22		571
Not Specified		18		
Total	**11,422**	**4,969**	**39**	**1,466**
Age Group (in years)				
18 & Below	380	27		
19-29	2,363	1,314		192
30-39	3,714	1,821	6	360
40-49	2,981	1,263	11	382
50-59	1,388	486	18	259
60-69	451	21	4	168
70 & Above	145	3		105
Not Specified		34		
Total	**11,422**	**4,969**	**39**	**1,466**

Note. *(n=17,896, NIA 2025)*

2.1.2 PARLIAMENTARIANS' INTEGRITY INDEX (PII)

For the PII, all Members of Parliament from both legislative houses, the National Assembly and the National Council, were included in the survey. The PII questionnaire link was shared with all 46 parliamentarians of the National Assembly, including Cabinet members, and with all 25 members of the National Council, including the five eminent members. Of the 71 parliamentarians contacted, 42 responded to the survey (*refer* **Table 2**). However, three responses were excluded from the analysis due to incompleteness or blank submissions. Consequently, the effective response rate for this computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI) survey was 54.9%. This response rate exceeds the minimum threshold suggested by Wu et al. (2022), who note that surveys with relatively small sample sizes (i.e., fewer than 500 respondents) can yield reasonably reliable estimates with response rates of 20-25%.

To sample voters and general citizens, a structured sampling strategy was adopted to ensure adequate geographic representation and analytical robustness. For the National Assembly, a minimum of 20 respondents was selected from each constituency. This minimum threshold was established to balance statistical sufficiency with operational feasibility across constituencies with differing population sizes.

For the National Council, sampling was conducted at the Dzongkhag level, with a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 25 respondents selected from each Dzongkhag.

In aggregate, the total number of respondents across the PII voter or general citizen category was 1,466 (*refer* **Table 2**). Simple random sampling was employed within each constituency and Dzongkhag to reduce selection bias and enhance sample representativeness. While the use of fixed minimum thresholds may limit the extent to which population heterogeneity is fully captured in constituencies or Dzongkhags with substantially larger or smaller populations, the adopted methodology represents a pragmatic balance between methodological rigour and practical constraints, enabling comprehensive national coverage and comparability across administrative units.

2.2 DATA COLLECTION

For the Public sector Integrity, both face-to-face interviews and online surveys were conducted using a structured questionnaire. Two sets of structured survey questionnaires were developed: one for external integrity and one for internal integrity.

For Parliamentarians' Integrity also, both face-to-face interviews and online surveys were conducted using a structured questionnaire. For voters, face-to-face interviews were conducted, and for Parliamentarians, an online survey link was shared.
Questionnaires were pilot-tested in five *Dzongkhags* (Chhukha, Dagana, Gasa, Punakha, and Samtse), covering 52 face-to-face interviews (18 external clients, 16 internal clients, and 18 voters). The pilot test helped ensure that the questions or items were appropriate for the assessment and were interpreted uniformly by the enumerators. It also helped determine the average time required to administer each questionnaire, which helped in planning for the actual data collection.

To conduct the field data collection, 84 university graduates were recruited as enumerators. They were adequately trained on research ethics, survey procedures, and questionnaire interpretation. Twelve supervisors, comprising researchers from ACC and NSB, were deployed to oversee the survey administration and ensure data quality during collection. In addition, two monitoring officers were deployed to monitor the overall data collection process and conduct field observations in public agencies. The field survey was conducted from October 27 to November 29, 2025, using mobile tablets through the CAPI application.

2.3 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

Before undertaking data analysis and interpretation, 11 days were dedicated to data cleaning and screening. The integrity scores were generated using a formula for each component, with different weights assigned to each. Stata version 19 was used to clean, screen, and generate indexes, while the final integrity scores were generated using Microsoft Excel. A literature review was also undertaken to substantiate the findings.

2.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

Ethics constitutes a foundational pillar of all research endeavours, particularly those involving sensitive topics such as the National Integrity Assessment. To this end, all researchers, including enumerators, underwent comprehensive training on research ethics and professional codes of conduct. The survey questionnaire was administered with strict adherence to protocols, ensuring standardised delivery and data integrity. The principle of voluntary participation was rigorously upheld, guaranteeing informed, uncoerced engagement from every respondent.

2.5 RELIABILITY AND SCORE DEDUCTION

Any acts that reduce the reliability of the assessment may result in a deduction of scores from the **National Integrity**. All four sets of questionnaires on *Public Sector Integrity* and *PII* included a question asking whether respondents were asked to provide favourable responses regarding the public agencies subject to the assessment. If respondents gave favourable responses as requested by public officials, the score was deducted from the national score. For the score deduction, a constant was set, which was multiplied by the total favourable responses and divided by the square root of the total sampled responses. As per ACRC's standard, the maximum constant is 0.70. The formula presented below will be used to deduct from the comprehensive integrity score (Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, 2015).

$$Score\ Deduction = Constant * \frac{The\ number\ of\ requests\ for\ favourable\ responses\ (External+Internal+Parliamentarian\ Integrity)}{\sqrt{External+Internal+Parliamentarian\ Integrity\ Survey\ Samples}}$$

2.6 SCORE INTERPRETATION OF NIA 2025

For the NIA 2025, as in ACRC's Integrity Assessment, a floating score scale is used instead of a traditional fixed scale to determine the score. In other words, the scores are categorised into levels (Outstanding, Very Good, Good, Satisfactory, and Need Improvement). On a floating scale, the average and the standard deviation of the scores across all indexes are used to set the scale for level 'Good', and the other levels are defined accordingly. Further, this scale automatically sets higher benchmarks as the scores improve and address issues of complacency at least in terms of score levels.

Accordingly, for NIA 2025, the scores are interpreted as given in **Table 3**.

The full methodology, including assessment framework, weight distribution, score calculation, and score conversion, is provided in **Annexure 2- Annexure 5**.

Table 3

Score Interpretation for the NIA 2025

Score	level (ACRC)	level (Bhutan)
Above 8.96	I	Outstanding
8.26 - 8.96	II	Very Good
7.55 - 8.25	III	Good
6.83 - 7.54	IV	Satisfactory
Below 6.83	V	Need Improvement

CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL INTEGRITY

Chapter 3 presents the overall findings of the assessment, focusing on the two key integrity indexes of National Integrity, namely the Public Sector Integrity Index and the Parliamentarians' Integrity Index.

The **National Integrity** Score for the country stands at 8.16, after a deduction of 0.123 points, indicating a Good level of integrity, as presented in **Figure 2**. The **Public Sector Integrity** score of 8.41 (Very Good level) contributed to the national score. In contrast, the **Parliamentarians' Integrity Index (PII)** contributed the least, with a score of 7.15, corresponding to a Satisfactory level of integrity.

A Very Good level of integrity in the public sector implies that service users are generally able to access services in a more transparent and accountable manner with fewer incidences of corruption. This performance can be linked to initiatives undertaken by agencies to improve service delivery and reduce corruption risks, including follow-up on recommendations from previous NIAs by implementing Organisational Integrity Plans (OIPs) and related corruption-control mechanisms. Within public sector organisations, employees typically experience a reasonably strong integrity culture and work environment; however, the scores also signal that there remain specific areas for improvement in both service delivery and organisational culture, which are elaborated in subsequent sections.

In contrast, the PII score at a Satisfactory level of integrity suggests that parliamentarians are perceived as less effective in representing their constituents and in discharging their core oversight and accountability functions. This relatively lower performance underscores the need for stronger parliamentary engagement, more robust scrutiny of the executive, and improved responsiveness to citizen concerns to align parliamentary integrity with the higher standards observed in other sectors.

Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 17,896)*
Figure 2 *National Integrity Score*

Over time, the National Integrity score has remained consistently strong, with all overall scores staying above seven, as illustrated in **Figure 3.** The lowest score was recorded in 2009 at 7.44, while the highest was achieved in 2012 at 8.37, the peak across the six NIA series. The score then dipped to 7.95 in 2016, but has shown steady improvement since. It rose to 7.97 in 2019, increased further to 8.01 in 2022, and reached 8.16 in 2025. The 2025 score is 0.14 points higher than the NIA 2022 score, indicating progress within a relatively short timeframe. It is also the second-highest score across all National Integrity Assessments, highlighting sustained advances in integrity and reflecting continuing efforts to strengthen transparency and accountability.

Note. *(n=6,155 in NIA 2009; n=9,066 in NIA 2012; n=10,814 in 2016; n=13,869 in NIA 2019; n=12,641 in NIA 2022 and n=17,896 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 3 *National Integrity Scores for NIA 2009, 2012, 2016, 2019, 2022 & 2025*

CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY

Chapter 4 presents the findings of Public Sector Integrity from Public Sector Agencies (*refer* **Table 1**).

As illustrated in **Figure 4**, the overall Public Sector Integrity Score stands at **8.41**, indicating a Very Good level of integrity in public service delivery. The External Integrity Score is higher, at **8.57** (Very Good), suggesting that service procedures are generally transparent, and information is widely accessible through multiple channels. The Internal Integrity Score of **7.98** reflects a Good level of integrity, indicating that internal control mechanisms are relatively sound, organisational culture is supportive of integrity, and leadership plays an important role in promoting and upholding ethical conduct within agencies.

Despite the strong overall performance, a notable divergence exists between the high-performing external service interface and comparatively weaker internal governance systems. While public service delivery appears fair and largely free from direct corruption, internal processes, particularly in personnel management, budgeting, and decision-making, remain inconsistent. Notably, weak corruption-control systems and limited whistleblower protection highlight gaps in detecting and preventing misconduct. This divergence suggests that current external performance is being sustained despite fragile internal safeguards. Over time, these hidden weaknesses may undermine institutional integrity and affect the sustainability and quality of public service delivery.



Note*. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 16,391)*

Figure 4 *Public Sector Integrity and its Indexes*

When comparing the scores of the External and Internal Integrity over the years, the External Integrity scores (*refer* **Figure 5**) show an overall upward trend, rising from the lowest point of 7.44 in 2009 to the highest of 8.57 in 2025. After peaking in 2012 (8.50), the score declined in 2016 (7.89) but steadily improved thereafter.

Internal Integrity, introduced in 2012, showed gradual improvement up to 2022, reflecting stronger perceptions of integrity in work processes, management, and organisational culture. However, in 2025, the score declined by 0.36 points from 2022, indicating weakening in areas such as integrity culture, corruption control, and ethical leadership. This suggests emerging challenges in maintaining internal accountability and highlights the need to reinforce integrity systems and leadership.



***Note**. (n=6,155 in NIA 2009; n=9,066 in NIA 2012; n=10,814 in NIA 2016; n=13,869 in NIA 2019; n=12,641 in NIA 2022 and n=17,896 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 5 *External and Internal Integrity scores for NIA 2009, 2012, 2016, 2019, 2022 & 2025*

4.1 PUBLIC SECTOR EXTERNAL INTEGRITY AND ITS INDEXES AND COMPONENTS

As shown in **Figure 6**, the External Integrity score is 8.57, indicating a Very Good level of integrity. This overall score is derived from the Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption indexes, which recorded scores of 8.31, 7.44, and 9.20, respectively. The Transparency Index score of 8.31 reflects a Very Good level of integrity, largely attributed to the high level of openness in work practices. Similarly, the Accountability Index scored 7.44, indicating a Satisfactory level, primarily due to public officials' moderate performance in fulfilling their duties. In contrast, the Corruption Index achieved a score of 9.20, representing an Outstanding level of integrity. This high score was driven mainly by strong performance on the experienced corruption indicator, suggesting a low prevalence of corruption.

These results highlight a notable gap between transparency and accountability within public sector institutions. While external transparency is strong, accountability mechanisms are comparatively weaker. This indicates that, although procedures are clear, information is accessible, and service processes are openly communicated, these strengths have not fully translated into effective enforcement or accountability. Overall, while transparency has improved procedural visibility, the lack of corresponding accountability limits the system's capacity to detect and correct misconduct, posing risks to institutional integrity and the sustainability of ethical governance.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*
Figure 6 *External Integrity and Its Components*

Figure 7 illustrates fluctuations in the External Integrity Components over time. Across all dimensions of external integrity, the experienced corruption score is highest at 9.97 in 2025, a marginal increase of 0.01 points compared to NIA 2022 *(refer* **Figure 7***)*. This reflects an exceptionally low incidence of actual corrupt encounters and a slight improvement in how service users rate their direct experience, indicating a very high level of integrity in public service delivery. This result is consistent with the fact that only a small proportion of respondents reported providing cash, gifts, entertainment, or other forms of gratification to officials when accessing services.

At the same time, although the accountability score improved by 0.07 relative to NIA 2022, it remains lower than other external integrity dimensions. This suggests that some service users still perceive misuse of authority or insufficient accountability on the part of public officials, pointing to accountability as a comparatively weak spot that requires continued attention despite the overall strong integrity performance.



Note. *(n=6,155 in NIA 2009; n=6,969 in NIA 2012; n=8,706 in NIA 2016; n=9,861 in NIA 2019; n=6,761 in NIA 2022 and n=11,422 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 7 *Comparison of External Integrity Index and its Components*

4.1.1 TRANSPARENCY AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

Transparency and accountability are vital components in strengthening good governance and mitigating corruption risks and opportunities in public service delivery. Effective public service delivery requires transparency, as it reinforces public sector accountability and promotes fair, effective, and efficient governance.

As shown in **Figure 8,** the Transparency Score is 8.31, indicating a Very Good level of integrity in the openness of work and established service procedures, as well as the extent to which these procedures are made user-friendly by public agencies. The openness of work and established procedures for service recorded a score of 8.39, reflecting a Very Good level, as the procedures for availing services are transparently disclosed to users. On the other hand, the indicator for the user-friendliness of established procedures scored 8.21, indicating a Good level. This suggests that while procedures are generally accessible and understandable, there is scope to further improve ease of use.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*

Figure 8 *Transparency and its Survey Items*

Table 4 shows the percentage of respondents for transparency items. For Openness of work/ Established procedure for service, the highest proportion of responses falls under "Agree" (42.86%), followed by "Strongly Agree" (40.12%), indicating a high level of positive perception. The lowest proportion is observed for "Don't Know" (0.75%), while "Strongly Disagree" (1.73%) has the lowest proportion among the definitive response options. For the item, "Established procedures are made publicly available"; the most common response is "Agree" (46.45%), followed by "Strongly Agree" (33.94%). The minimum response is recorded under "Don't Know" (1.09%), while "Strongly Disagree" (1.67%) remains the lowest among opinion-based responses. Regarding "Procedures are user-friendly", the largest share of respondents selected "Agree" (47.96%), followed by "Strongly Agree" (32.59%), showing a clear positive skew. The lowest response category is "Don't Know" (0.34%), and among the scale options, "Strongly Disagree" (1.30%) records the minimum value.

Transparency in public service delivery is perceived positively, reflecting a high degree of institutional transparency and effective communication of procedures.

Table 4

Percentage of Respondents on Items of Transparency Component

Transparency Survey Items	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neutral	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
Openness of work/ Established procedure for service	1.73	2.06	2.02	3.52	6.94	42.86	40.12	0.75
Established procedures are made publicly available	1.67	2.36	2.28	4.32	7.91	46.45	33.94	1.09
Procedures are user-friendly	1.30	2.14	2.30	4.54	8.83	47.96	32.59	0.34

Note. *(n = 11,442, NIA 2025)*

One way to measure transparency is to assess the types of channels used to access information about services. As shown in **Table 5**, the primary source of information is word of mouth, with 5,521 respondents (25.21% of the total). This is followed by the Service Counter, which recorded 4,384 responses (20.02%), and Websites, with 3,044 responses (13.90%). Social media also represents a significant share, with 2,992 responses (13.66%). At the mid-range level, Public Meetings or Gatherings account for 2,183 responses (9.97%), while reminders or notifications from offices account for 1,755 responses (8.01%). Television and Newspapers account for relatively small proportions, with 992 responses (4.53%) and 537 responses (2.45%), respectively. Published materials, such as brochures and guidelines, accounted for 395 responses (1.80%). The least common sources of information were Radio, with 74 responses (0.34%), and Others, with the fewest responses at 20 (0.09%).

The reliance on word of mouth and service counters suggests that **access to information is not yet fully institutionalised or systematically disseminated**, which may affect consistency, accuracy, and equity in access. Strengthening official communication channels, particularly digital platforms and structured public information systems, would enhance transparency and ensure more reliable and widespread access to information.

Table 5

Sources of information used by external clients to get information on services

Sources of Information	Frequency	Percent
Website	3,044	13.9
Television	992	4.53
Newspaper	537	2.45
Radio	74	0.34
Published Materials (brochures, guidelines)	395	1.8
Public Meeting/Gathering	2,183	9.97
Social Media	2,992	13.66
Word of Mouth	5,521	25.21
Service Counter	4,384	20.02
Reminder/Notification by Office	1,755	8.01
Others	20	0.09
Total*	**21,897**	**100.00**

Note*. (n = 11,442, NIA 2025) *Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multiple-response item*

4.1.2 ACCOUNTABILITY COMPONENTS AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

Accountability is a key element of good governance and promotes due diligence in public service delivery. It refers to the relationship between the government or public agencies and citizens or service users, and the extent to which public institutions are answerable for their actions. Two accountability survey items, misuse of authority and efforts to accomplish duties, were used to generate the accountability score. As presented in **Figure 9**, the Accountability Component Score of 7.44 indicates a Satisfactory level. This overall score is lowered by the low score for efforts to accomplish duties (6.85) at the Satisfactory level. The results suggest that public officials are not putting in the desired effort to accomplish their official work, which is lower than in other accountability dimensions. Conversely, the misuse of authority indicator scored higher at 7.76, achieving a Good level of integrity. This comparatively high integrity score implies that public officials are generally perceived as exercising their authority appropriately and refraining from deliberate abuse of power, reflecting positive perceptions of ethical conduct and fairness in decision-making processes.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*
Figure 9 *Accountability and its Survey Items*

Table 6 displays varying response patterns across the three accountability survey items. For Misuse of Authority, the most common response is "Disagree" (41.90%), followed by "Strongly Disagree" (32.28%), indicating that a large share of respondents selected disagreement options. The minimum response category is "Strongly Agree" (2.87%), while "Don't Know" (2.75%) represents the lowest overall proportion. In the case of Efforts to Accomplish Duties, the highest proportion of responses is recorded under "Agree" (36.01%), followed by "Strongly Agree" (26.13%). The lowest response is "Don't Know" (0.59%), while among opinion-based responses, "Neutral" (4.88%) has the lowest percentage. For grievances addressed adequately, the most common response is "Agree" (37.27%), followed by "Strongly Agree" (17.97%). The minimum response is "Don't Know" (1.00%), while "Strongly Disagree" (7.32%) represents the lowest among the agreement–disagreement scale.

Accountability is generally perceived to be strong, particularly in limiting the misuse of authority and ensuring officials perform their duties. However, **grievance redressal mechanisms require further strengthening** to enhance responsiveness and public confidence.

Table 6

Percentage of Respondents on Items of the Accountability Component

Accountability Survey Items	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neutral	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
Misuse of authority	32.28	41.90	4.97	4.62	5 .21	5.39	2.87	2.75
Efforts to accomplish duties	7.24	10.69	5.67	4.88	8.79	36.01	26.13	0.59
The grievances are addressed adequately	7.32	9.98	6.16	9.15	11.15	37.27	17.97	1.00

***Note**. (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*

To further substantiate, the analysis of corruption reports received by ACC (FY 2024-2025) indicates that 52.2% were related to accountability, as shown in **Table 7.**

Table 7

Percentage of Corruption Reports by Issues

Issues in Complaint	Frequency	Percent
Accountability	190	52.20
Corruption	64	17.58
Transparency	49	13.46
Others	61	16.76
Total	**364**	**100.00**

***Note**. (n=364); Analysis of the corruption reports received in FY 2024-2025*

Table 8 presents the distribution of responses on the availability of a platform for submitting grievances. The largest share of responses is recorded under "Don't Know", with 4,343 respondents (38.02%). This is followed by "Yes, but did not submit any grievances/complaints", which accounts for 3,502 responses (30.66%). The category "No" represents 2,976 respondents (26.05%). The minimum proportion of responses is observed under "Yes and also submitted grievances/complaints", with 601 respondents (5.26%), making it the least reported category in the distribution.

Although formal complaint and reporting systems exist, their impact on accountability remains limited. The weak feedback mechanisms constrain the system's capacity to detect internal issues, enforce accountability, and validate external perceptions of integrity. Consequently, while external integrity scores appear strong, they may overstate actual institutional performance, masking underlying internal vulnerabilities. Over time, this could undermine both the sustainability of service quality and public trust in institutional integrity.

Table 8
Availability of a Platform to Submit Grievances

Platform to Submit Grievances	Frequency	Percent
Yes, and also submitted grievances/complaints	601	5.26
Yes, but did not submit any grievances/complaints	3,502	30.66
No	2,976	26.05
Don't Know	4,343	38.02
Total*	**11,422**	**100.00**

Note. *(n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*

4.1.3 CORRUPTION INDEX AND ITS COMPONENTS

The corruption index measures whether respondents, while availing services from a particular agency, perceived corruption within that agency. It also assesses whether respondents made payments in cash, kind, entertainment, or other forms of gratification to public officials during the service delivery process. The corruption index comprises two components: experienced corruption and perceived corruption.

As shown in **Figure 10**, the Corruption Index recorded a score of 9.20, indicating an Outstanding level of integrity. The experienced corruption score of 9.97, also at an Outstanding level, indicates that actual instances of bribery, gifts, or other forms of gratification to public officials are extremely rare, highlighting strong ethical conduct in service interactions. In contrast, the perceived corruption score of 7.98, which falls within the Good level of integrity, suggests that some respondents still perceive the possibility of corruption within agencies.

This gap between experience and perception indicates that while integrity practices are robust, public confidence could be further strengthened through enhanced transparency, communication, and citizen engagement.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*
Figure 10 *Corruption and Its Components*

4.1.3.1 EXPERIENCE OF CORRUPTION BY EXTERNAL CLIENTS OR SERVICE USERS

Figure 11 presents the scores of experienced corruption and its survey items. The results indicate that very few service users had to make payments in cash or kind, as reflected in the highest scores on items measuring experienced corruption. Similar patterns are observed in the amount and frequency of entertainment and the gratifications offered, indicating minimal prevalence of experienced corruption among service users.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*

Figure 11 *Experienced Corruption Index and its Survey Items*

4.1.3.1.1 Average Frequency, Amount, and Ratio of Payments in Cash or Kind, Entertainment, and Other Forms of Gratification

Experience of corruption is assessed through the frequency and amount of payments made by external clients to public officials involved in processing services. These payments include cash or kind, entertainment, and other forms of gratification. **Table 9** presents the average frequency, amount, and ratio of such payments reported by service users.

Table 9 compares the experiences of corruption among external clients in NIA 2022 and NIA 2025, revealing notable changes in the pattern of corruption in public service delivery. In NIA 2025, the average frequency of cash or in-kind payments increased to 2.50 among 78 respondents who reported making such payments, compared with an average of 2.09 reported by 90 respondents in NIA 2022. Furthermore, the average amount paid more than doubled, rising from Nu. 14,608.21 in 2022 to Nu. 32,685.90 in 2025. At the same time, the proportion of service users who reported being required to make these payments fell from 1 in 74 to 1 in 146, suggesting that although fewer individuals are subjected to demands for illicit payments, those who are involved experience more frequent demands and at much higher monetary values. This points to a worrying intensification and concentration of corruption within a smaller segment of service users, indicating that corrupt practices may be becoming more targeted, higher stakes, and potentially more entrenched, rather than broad-based or diffuse.

In the case of entertainment-related payments, such as food and drinks, the average frequency rose marginally from 2.95 (77 respondents) in NIA 2022 to 3.06 (149 respondents) in NIA 2025, while the average amounts remained broadly stable (Nu. 4,723.98 vs. Nu. 4,284.23). The ratio of service users providing such entertainment changed from 1 in 88 to 1 in 77, indicating a slight increase in the prevalence of these practices. Although the financial scale is lower than that of cash or kind payments, the results point to a persistent expectation of supplementary benefits beyond formal procedures, which, over time, can subtly weaken integrity norms and normalise informal advantage-seeking within public service delivery.

For other forms of gratification, the average frequency increased from 2.68 (19 respondents) in NIA 2022 to 3.33 (30 respondents) in NIA 2025. Similarly, the ratio of service users reporting such practices decreased modestly from 1 in 356 to 1 in 381. Although these practices involve a comparatively small subset of users, their repeated nature suggests that informal channels of influence are being maintained over time. This persistence suggests that such gratifications may serve as hidden enablers of corruption within public services, reinforcing personalised exchanges and undermining formal, rule-based procedures.

The results point to a shift in corruption practices, moving away from explicit monetary exchanges toward more subtle, relational forms. Corruption is increasingly expressed through gratifications (gifts and hospitality), favours, and informal reciprocation, and through relationship-based influence practices, often embedded in social norms and not always recognised or reported as corruption.

The comparison between NIA 2022 and NIA 2025 shows a paradoxical pattern. While the overall prevalence of reported corruption has declined slightly in some areas, the intensity, frequency, and financial size of payments among those still affected have increased. This suggests that corruption is becoming more concentrated and higher value rather than broadly dispersed. The trend raises concerns about the effectiveness of current anti-corruption measures in disrupting entrenched practices and highlights the need for more targeted, risk-based interventions. Strengthening monitoring, improving transparency in service delivery, and raising awareness among both service users and providers remain essential to reducing the incidence and impact of corruption.

Table 9

Average Frequency, Amount, and Ratio of Payments in Cash or Kind, Entertainment, and Other Forms of Gratification

Payments Made in Cash or Kind, Entertainment and Other Forms of Gratification	NIA 2022	NIA 2025
The average frequency of payments in cash or kind	2.09	2.50
The average amount of payments in cash or kind	Nu. 14,608.21	Nu. 32,685.90
The ratio of payments made in cash or kind	1:74	1:146
The average frequency of entertainments offered (such as food and drinks)	2.95	3.06
The average amount of entertainments offered (such as food and drinks)	Nu. 4,723.98	Nu. 4,284.23
The ratio of entertainments offered (such as food and drinks)	1:88	1:77
The average frequency of other forms of gratifications offered	2.68	3.33
The ratio of other forms of gratifications offered	1:356	1:381

Note. *(n=6,761, NIA 2022; n=11,422, NIA 2025)*

4.1.3.1.2 Other Forms of Gratification

Gratification may take various forms, including money, donations, gifts, loans, fees, rewards, valuable securities, property, employment, contracts of service, or any other undue advantage (Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, 2016). Consistent with this definition, the survey captured other forms of gratification such as accommodation, transportation, gifts, lending money (interest-free), and holiday trips.

As shown in **Table 10**, 68.75% of the respondents reported providing gifts, making it the most common form of gratification. This was followed by transportation (15.63%) and accommodation (9.38%), while 6.25% of respondents reported lending money interest-free. No respondents reported providing holiday trips or other forms of gratification.

Table 10

Other Forms of Gratification

Forms of Gratification	Responses	Percent
Accommodation	3	9.38
Transportation	5	15.63
Gifts	22	68.75
Lending money (interest-free)	2	6.25
Total	**32**	**100.00**

Note. *(n=30, NIA 2025) * Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multi-response item*

4.1.4.1.3 Timing of Payments Made in Cash or Kind, Entertainment, and Other Forms of Gratifications

To better understand the timing of payments made in cash or kind, for entertainment, and for other forms of gratification, these payments have been classified into five distinct categories, as shown in **Table 11**.

Table 11

Timing for Payments in Cash or Kind, Entertainment, and Gratification (in Percentage)

Timing	Cash/Kind	Entertainment	Gratification
Before processing of the work	25.25	17.95	17.39
During the processing of the work	29.29	37.44	15.22
After processing of the work	34.34	33.33	52.17
During the payment of bills	9.09	4.10	8.70
On occasions such as festive events, bereavement, and sickness, etc.	2.02	7.18	6.52
Total	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

Note. *(n=99 Cash/Kind, n=195 Entertainment, n=46 Other Forms of Gratification, NIA 2025) *Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multi-response item*

For cash or kind, the majority of payments occur during processing (29.29%) or after processing (34.34%), with a quarter (25.25%) occurring even before work begins, indicating their use both as inducements and post-hoc rewards. Entertainment-related payments are concentrated during (37.44%) and after processing (33.3%), suggesting they are often used to maintain or reinforce favourable relations while the service is being delivered or immediately afterwards. Other forms of gratification are predominantly provided after the completion of work (52.17%), highlighting their role as retrospective rewards that may create ongoing expectations and obligations rather than influence a single transaction.

4.1.3.1.4 Reasons for Making Payments in Cash or Kind, Entertainment, and Other Forms of Gratifications

There are many reasons why people make payments in cash or kind, including entertainment and other forms of gratification, as presented in **Table 12**.

Table 12

Reasons for Making Payments in Cash or Kind, Entertainment, and Other Forms of Gratifications

Reasons	Cash/Kind	Entertainments	Gratifications
Requested by the public official on duty	46.08	5.08	14.63
To expedite the work process	15.69	13.20	17.07
To avoid paying penalty	4.90	2.03	7.32
As an appreciation for the service	15.69	51.78	41.46
As a customary practice	17.65	27.92	17.07
Others (specify)	0.00	0.00	2.44
Total	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

Note. *(n=102 Cash/Kind, n=197 Entertainment, n=41 Other Forms of Gratification, NIA 2025) *Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multi-response item*

As shown in **Table 12**, the largest proportion of respondents (46.08%) reported making payments in cash or kind upon request by the public official on duty. In contrast, the primary reason for providing entertainment was as an appreciation for the service (51.78%), followed by customary practice (27.92%). Similarly, other forms of gratification were most commonly provided as an appreciation for the service (41.46%), with additional instances attributed to expediting the work process (17.07%) and customary practice (17.07%).

Only a small proportion of respondents indicated that payments were made to avoid paying penalties, accounting for 4.90% of cash or kind, 2.03% of entertainment, and 7.32% of other forms of gratification. Likewise, relatively few respondents reported providing entertainment following a request by public officials on duty (5.08%). Overall, the findings suggest that there is a growing normalisation of non-monetary gratifications, with gifts being the most common form (68.75%), and approximately 41.46% of gratifications and 51.78% of entertainment offered as “appreciation for service.” This trend risks embedding informal advantage-seeking into everyday interactions.

4.1.3.1.5 Payment Made in Cash by Service Users of Public Sectors to avail the Services

As shown in **Table 13**, of 11,422 respondents, 78 reported making cash payments to access public services, representing approximately 1 in 146 service users. Most payments were low-value, with 76% below Nu. 10,000, followed by 15% between Nu. 10,001–50,000. Higher-value payments were rare. Cash payments were reported across multiple services, though typically in isolated cases, indicating that such practices remain limited and non-systemic.

Table 13

Percentage of Payment Made in Cash to Avail the Services

Services	Nu.10,000 & below	Nu. 10,001 - Nu. 50,000	Nu. 50,001 - Nu. 500,000	Nu. 50,000 & above
HR services	12	0	0	0
Admission in schools	6	1	0	0
AFD services	6	1	0	0
Issuance of vehicle ownership change loan clearance certificates mostly through online	6	0	0	0
Appeal services	0	1	1	1
Issuance of marriage certificate	4	0	0	0
Issuance of national payment gateway license and e-money	4	0	0	0
Replacement of learner license	4	0	0	0
Administration of justice: case adjudication of the original/territorial jurisdiction	3	0	0	0
Advertisement	3	0	0	0
Conduct driving test	1	1	0	0
Debit card	1	0	1	0
Execution of judgment	1	1	0	0
Land conversion	1	1	0	0
Rural tax collection	1	1	0	0
Stock exchange	1	1	0	0
Approval and lease of urban land	0	1	0	0
Approval for fire wood collection	1	0	0	0
Assessment and refund of tax services	1	0	0	0
Birth registration	0	0	1	0
Credit services (fund-based and non-fund-based)	1	0	0	0

Services	Nu.10,000 & below	Nu. 10,001 - Nu. 50,000	Nu. 50,001 - Nu. 500,000	Nu. 50,000 & above
Deposit services	0	1	0	0
Entrepreneurship trainings provided	1	0	0	0
Extension services	1	0	0	0
Government clearance	1	0	0	0
Issuance of credit report	0	1	0	0
Issuance of learner license	1	0	0	0
Issuance of medical certificate	1	0	0	0
Issuance of provisional letter of interest	0	1	0	0
Loan assessment and approval	1	0	0	0
Maintenance of houses	1	0	0	0
Obtaining environmental clearance (EC)	0	0	1	0
Other veterinary services	1	0	0	0
Printing and issuance of driving license	1	0	0	0
Priority sector lending credit application	0	0	1	0
Produce and supply planting materials on an affordable price	1	0	0	0
Provide technical advices and services related to pests and diseases management	1	0	0	0
Reviewing of the projects and issuance of environmental clearances	0	0	1	0
Surface collection and degraded sand	1	0	0	0
Timber related services	1	0	0	0
Total	**76**	**15**	**8**	**1**

Note. *(n=11,422, NIA 2025)*

4.1.3.1.6 Payment Made in Kind or Services by Service Users of Public Sectors to Avail the Services

As illustrated in **Table 14**, 149 respondents reported making payments in kind or services to avail public services out of a total of 11,422 respondents, accounting for about one percent of service users. In ratio terms, this indicates that approximately one in 77 service users made payments in kind or services to obtain services.

Most of these payments were low-value, with 92% below Nu. 10,000, while only a small proportion involved higher-value transactions. Overall, the continued occurrence of payments in kind or services, even at low levels, suggests persistent bribery risks and underscores the need for strengthened anti-bribery and preventive intervention strategies.

Table 14

Percentage of Payment Made in Kind or Services to Avail the Services

Services	Nu.10,000 & below	Nu. 10,001 - Nu. 50,000	Nu. 50,000 & above
HR services	19	1	0
AFD services	13	0	0
Land conversion	3	0	0
Rural timber permit for new house construction	3	0	0
Admission in schools	2	0	0
Appeal services	2	0	0
Motor insurance	2	0	0
Permit for firewood in a rural area	2	0	0
Reviewing of the projects and issuance of environmental clearances	1	1	0
Rural timber permit for renovation of house	2	0	0
Approval and referral of patient outside	1	0	0
Forestry clearance	1	0	0
Issuance of provisional letter of interest	1	1	0
Issuance of credit report	1	0	1
Permit for fencing posts	1	0	0
Renewal of vehicle registration certificate	1	1	0
Sand (surface collection and degraded sand)	1	0	0
Opening of account	1	0	0
Annual tendering (EGP) for quotation	1	0	0
Approval and license issuance for new medium and large Industrial project proposals	0	1	0
Approval for fire wood collection	1	0	0

Service	Nu.10,000 & below	Nu. 10,001 - Nu. 50,000	Nu. 50,000 & above
Approval of house construction	1	0	0
Approval of rural timber	1	0	0
Assessment and refund of tax services	1	0	0
Banking services	1	0	0
Capacity building of the CSIs	1	0	0
Census appeal cases	1	0	0
Change in object clause	1	0	0
College mess management services	1	0	0
Community centre services (loan processing, loan repayment, etc.)	1	0	0
Conduct driving test	0	1	0
Contract bills verification	1	0	0
Credit services	1	0	0
Death reporting	1	0	0
Debit card	0	1	0
Ease of doing business through issuance of business licenses with support from regional offices	1	0	0
Emergency ambulance services	0	0	1
Execution of judgment	1	0	0
Export approval of timber	1	0	0
General insurance claims	1	0	0
Geospatial and mapping services	1	0	0
Import permit for HFC	1	0	0
Incorporation services	1	0	0
Issuance of occupancy certificates	1	0	0
Issuance of technical authorisation for private selective healthcare services	1	0	0
Issuance of permit for short-term quarry lease/mining	1	0	0
Issuance of permit for stock lifting and export of minerals	1	0	0
Land acquisition and substitution of registered land	1	0	0
Land exchange services	1	0	0
Maintenance of houses	1	0	0

Service	Nu.10,000 & below	Nu. 10,001 - Nu. 50,000	Nu. 50,000 & above
Mobilisation of medical supplies	0	1	0
Name change of the company	1	0	0
Non-wood forest produce (NWFP) permit	1	0	0
OPD services	1	0	0
Obtain approval for rural house construction	1	0	0
Obtaining environmental clearance	1	0	0
Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage	1	0	0
Obtaining ownership certificate	1	0	0
Patient diet service	1	0	0
Permit for construction in rural areas	1	0	0
Process for business guest visa/Permit approval	1	0	0
Product certification	1	0	0
Program grant disbursement	1	0	0
Renewal of environmental clearance	1	0	0
Replacement of timber	1	0	0
Research grant services	0	1	0
Rural water supply and sanitation services	1	0	0
Rural tax collection	1	0	0
School admission services (new admissions and transfers)	1	0	0
School mess management services	1	0	0
Support establishment of peri-urban and urban farms	1	0	0
Tax appeal services	1	0	0
Timber-related service	1	0	0
Veterinary clinical services	1	0	0
Total	**92**	**7**	**1**

Note. *(n=11,422, NIA 2025)*

4.1.3.2 PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION BY EXTERNAL CLIENTS OR SERVICE USERS

Another approach to assessing the existence of corruption is to measure perceived corruption, which was evaluated using four survey items: favours for specific individuals, mediation or solicitation for undue advantage, pursuing private interests while ignoring public interests, and engaging in sexual favours, as shown in **Figure 12**. The overall perceived corruption score of 7.98, corresponding to a Good level of integrity, contributed relatively less to the Corruption Index score compared to experienced corruption. Among the indicators, favours for specific individuals recorded a Satisfactory level of integrity score of 7.42, suggesting that some respondents perceived the presence of favouritism in service delivery. The scores for mediation or solicitation for undue advantage (8.41) and engaging in sexual favours (8.88) indicate Very Good levels of integrity, while pursuing private interests over public interests scored 7.79, reflecting a Good level of integrity.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*

Figure 12 *Perceived Corruption and its Survey Items*

Table 15 presents the different types of relationships that respondents perceived as influencing the delivery of public services. The findings suggest that informal social connections play a significant role in how quickly or efficiently services are accessed.

Among the respondents, 27.45% reported that friendship was a key factor in expediting services. This indicates that knowing someone personally within the system can provide an advantage, potentially allowing individuals to bypass regular procedures or reduce waiting times. Close social ties appear to create channels through which services can be accessed more quickly. Family relationships were the second most commonly cited factor, with 25.82% of respondents indicating that having relatives involved in the process or working in relevant offices helped speed up service delivery. This suggests that kinship networks remain an important source of influence, reinforcing the role of familial connections in navigating public institutions. In addition, 12.81% of respondents identified the involvement of an influential person as a factor that could affect how services are delivered. Such individuals may include local leaders, senior officials, or other socially or politically powerful actors whose recommendations or interventions can shape outcomes.

Other forms of social connections were also noted. 12.48% of respondents mentioned school, college, or training mates as influential, indicating that past educational or professional networks continue to function as important sources of support and leverage within the public sector. Similarly, 10.74% pointed to being from the same region or *Dzongkhag* as a factor, suggesting that shared geographic origin can foster a sense of solidarity or preferential treatment. Finally, 10.70% of respondents cited instructions from supervisors as influencing how services are delivered. This highlights the role of hierarchical authority within public institutions, where directives from superiors can shape the prioritisation or handling of particular cases.

These findings indicate that, while these practices may be socially tolerated and culturally embedded, they undermine equity and fairness, as individuals without such connections may face delays or barriers. Informal influence-based corruption also makes regulation and detection difficult, since it is often subtle, non-monetary, and embedded in routine social interactions. Over time, reliance on personal networks can erode public trust, normalise favouritism, and institutionalise informal channels as an accepted way to navigate public services.

Table 15

Types of Relationship Affecting Public Service Delivery as Perceived by Service Users

Types of Personal Relationships	Frequency	Percent
Friendship	4,949	27.45
Same Region/Dzongkhag	1,936	10.74
School/College/Training Mates	2,251	12.48
Family Relationship	4,656	25.82
Instruction from Supervisors	1,929	10.70
Influential Person	2,310	12.81
Total*	**18,031**	100.00

Note. *(n = 11,422, NIA 2025) *Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multiple-response item*

4.1.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL INTEGRITY SCORES ACROSS DIFFERENT SERVICE CHANNELS

The services provided by the public agencies are either Online, Walk-In, or in a Mixed (hybrid) Mode. The three types of service channels are compared to examine the differences in terms of transparency, accountability, efficiency, and corruption as assessed by the service users. This comparative analysis reveals how integrity performance differs across service delivery channels, identifies which modalities are relatively stronger or weaker, and pinpoints where targeted improvements are most needed. The findings indicate that when services are delivered purely online or purely face-to-face, integrity levels are generally high. In contrast, hybrid processes introduce vulnerabilities that lower the overall integrity score.

Across service channels, integrity levels range from Very Good to Satisfactory, with Mixed-Mode emerging as the weakest link, as illustrated in **Figure 13**. The National Integrity Score is at a Good level for Online (8.20) and Very Good for Walk-In (8.33), but drops to a Good level for Mixed-Mode (7.63). This indicates that when services are delivered purely online or purely face-to-face, integrity levels are generally high, whereas hybrid processes introduce vulnerabilities that lower the overall integrity score.

External Integrity is at a Very Good level for both Online (8.58) and Walk-In (8.64), meaning that procedures are largely transparent, information is accessible, and grievance or complaint mechanisms are functioning reasonably well. However, in Mixed-Mode, External Integrity drops to a Good level (7.74), suggesting that users experience inconsistency and uncertainty when their service journey moves between digital and physical touchpoints. This gap implies that the design and coordination of hybrid workflows, rather than the fundamental integrity of institutions, is undermining user experience and trust.

In terms of transparency, all three channels perform relatively well, but Online (8.40) and Walk-In (8.36) services score slightly higher than Mixed Mode (8.10). The same pattern is observed in the survey items measuring openness of work and established procedures, as well as the user-friendliness of procedures (*refer* **Annexure 6**). Mixed-Mode services consistently score lower, indicating that when services involve both digital and physical components, procedures may appear less clear or more complicated to service users. This could stem from fragmented processes, unclear communication, or multiple steps that reduce perceived efficiency and transparency.

Accountability scores show moderate performance across all channels, with Walk-In services again leading (7.59), followed by Online (7.37) and Mixed-Mode (7.09). The Survey Item "Misuse of authority" receives relatively stronger ratings than efforts to accomplish duties across all service types, suggesting that abuse of power is not widely perceived as a major concern. However, the lower scores for efforts to accomplish duties, particularly in Mixed-Mode (6.64), indicate concerns regarding responsiveness, timeliness, and diligence (*refer* **Annexure 6**). This pattern suggests that integrity challenges may be more closely linked to performance and service efficiency than to deliberate misconduct.

The most significant differences emerge in the corruption component. Walk-In (9.26) and Online (9.20) services show very high scores, indicating minimal direct experience of corruption.

Survey Items, such as frequency and amount of cash, entertainment, or gratification offered, score extremely high across channels, reflecting low reported incidents of direct payments in cash, kind or services. However, Mixed-Mode recorded a considerably lower overall corruption score (7.77) and experienced corruption score (7.89). This suggests that hybrid systems may create more opportunities for perceived discretionary influence or weaker oversight at transition points between digital and physical processes.

Perceived corruption indicators further reinforce this trend. Walk-In services score highest (8.12), followed by Online (8.00), while Mixed-Mode scores lowest (7.57). Areas such as favouritism, mediation for undue advantage, and pursuing private interests show weaker performance in Mixed-Mode arrangements. This indicates that although overt corruption may not be prevalent, public perception of unfair advantage or influence is stronger in hybrid service models.

Overall, the findings suggest that while both Walk-In and Online service channels demonstrate relatively strong integrity performance, Mixed-Mode services consistently underperform across most dimensions. The results point to possible structural issues in hybrid delivery systems, including unclear accountability lines, fragmented procedures, and weaker integration between digital and physical components. Strengthening coordination, clarifying responsibilities, and enhancing monitoring mechanisms within Mixed-Mode services would likely improve perceptions of integrity and overall governance performance across service channels.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*
Figure 13 *Integrity Scores of Different Components of External Integrity among Different Modes of Service Delivery*

4.1.5 SUMMARY OF THE SCORES FOR EXTERNAL INTEGRITY

The findings of External Integrity indicate that Bhutan's public sector has achieved notable progress in curbing visible and transactional forms of corruption, particularly direct bribery and overt misconduct. Public-facing services are largely transparent, accessible, and fair, reflecting strong external integrity. However, the nature of corruption risks is evolving, moving from easily detectable transactions toward more informal, relational, and influence-based practices that are subtler and harder to regulate.

Several key dynamics underpin this shift. First, there is a widening gap between transparency and accountability, where procedures and information may be clear, but enforcement and corrective action remain inconsistent. Second, high external performance is maintained despite systemic weaknesses within the organisations, including gaps in internal controls, personnel management, and whistleblower protection.

Table 16 presents the Public External Integrity scores generated from 13 survey items. Overall, almost all survey items recorded scores above 7.42, indicating a Satisfactory level of integrity, except for efforts to accomplish duties (6.85) and favouritism towards specific individuals, which scored comparatively lower. These results highlight areas requiring attention, particularly the need to address integrity concerns related to favouritism and insufficient effort in performing professional duties by public officials. At the same time, the high corruption index score indicates a Very Low level of corruption across agencies, particularly in experienced corruption.

Table 16

Overview of Survey Items for External Integrity

Components & Survey Items for Public External Integrity	Score	level
Public External Integrity	**8.57**	**Very Good**
Transparency	**8.31**	**Very Good**
Openness of work/ established procedure for service	8.39	Very Good
Established procedures are user-friendly	8.21	Good
Accountability	**7.44**	**Satisfactory**
Misuse of authority	7.76	Good
Efforts to accomplish duties	6.85	Satisfactory
Corruption	**9.20**	**Outstanding**
Experienced Corruption	**9.97**	**Outstanding**
Frequency of cash or kind offered	9.97	Outstanding
Amount of cash or kind offered	9.99	Outstanding
Frequency of entertainment offered	9.93	Outstanding
Amount of entertainment offered	9.98	Outstanding
Frequency of gratification offered	9.99	Outstanding

Perceived Corruption	**7.98**	**Good**
Favours for specific individuals/Favouritism	7.42	Satisfactory
Mediation/Solicitation for undue advantage (seeking favour/bribe)	8.41	Very Good
Pursuing private interest, ignoring public ones	7.79	Good
Engaging in sexual favours	8.88	Very Good

***Note.** (n=11,422, NIA 2025)*

As shown in **Table 17***,* since NIA 2022, recent improvements show a slight increase in experiences of corruption (+0.01), with modest gains in accountability (+0.07) and transparency (+0.10). These changes are accompanied by a more notable rise in the corruption index (+0.53) and a substantial increase in perceived corruption (+1.36).

While these trends suggest a strengthened culture of openness, the uneven progress, particularly the minimal change in actual experiences of corruption, indicates that improvements in perception may be outpacing tangible reductions in corrupt practices. Greater transparency and accountability, coupled with better dissemination of information about public services, have likely enhanced public awareness. However, sustained and meaningful change will require more consistent enforcement and institutional measures to translate these perceptions into real reductions in corruption and more accountable service delivery.

Table 17

Integrity Scores of External Integrity Components

Integrity Scores of External Integrity Components						
External Components	**2009**	**2012**	**2016**	**2019**	**2022**	**2025**
Transparency	7.37	8.35	7.68	7.89	8.21	8.31
Accountability	6.88	7.66	6.86	7.22	7.36	7.44
Corruption	8.60	8.95	8.46	8.56	8.67	9.20
Experienced Corruption	9.89	9.91	9.90	9.98	9.96	9.97
Perceived Corruption	7.28	7.43	6.18	6.31	6.63	7.99

***Note**. (n=6,155 in NIA 2009; n=6,969 in NIA 2012; n=8,706 in 2016; n=9,861 in NIA 2019; n=6,761 in NIA 2022 and n=11,422 in NIA 2025).*

4.2 PUBLIC SECTOR INTERNAL INTEGRITY AND ITS INDEXES AND COMPONENTS

Internal Integrity comprises Integrity Culture, Work Integrity, and Ethical Leadership. It is assessed from employees' perceptions and experiences in public agencies and measures the level of organisational integrity. As shown in **Figure 14**, Internal Integrity scored 7.98, which falls within the Good level. The score is mainly contributed to by the Work Integrity Index of 8.98, which is at a Very Good level. Integrity Culture contributed the least with a score of 7.36, which is at a Satisfactory level. The Ethical Leadership Index scored a Good level of integrity, with a score of 7.62 (Good level).

The results of internal integrity highlight concerns regarding fairness and consistency in human resource decisions, resource allocation, and work distribution. While these issues have not yet significantly impacted external service delivery, they serve as early warning signs of discretionary bias, informal influence, and perceived inequities within institutions. These findings imply that internal integrity functions as a leading indicator of potential corruption. If internal weaknesses persist unaddressed, they are likely to manifest in external service delivery, ultimately affecting institutional integrity, fairness, and the quality of public services.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 14 *Internal Integrity Score*

As shown in **Figure 15,** the Internal Integrity components have exhibited mixed trends over the years. Integrity Culture improved steadily from 7.21 in 2012 to a peak of 7.94 in 2022, but declined to 7.36 in 2025, suggesting a weakening in organisational culture and corruption control systems. Work Integrity has remained consistently strong, increasing slightly and stabilising at 8.98 in both 2022 and 2025, indicating sustained adherence to procedures and work standards. In contrast, Ethical Leadership, introduced in NIA 2019, rose from 7.82 in 2019 to 8.11 in 2022, but dropped to 7.62 in 2025, pointing to concerns around leadership influence and tone at the top. Overall, while work-related integrity remains robust, declines in culture and leadership highlight emerging risks to the internal integrity environment.



***Note**. (n=2,098 in NIA 2012; n=2,108 in NIA 2016; n=4,008 in NIA 2019; n=4,381 in NIA 2022 and n= 4,969 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 15 *Comparison of Internal Integrity Index and its Components*

4.2.1 INTEGRITY CULTURE INDEX

The Integrity Culture Index is at a Satisfactory level, with a score of 7.36, as indicated in **Figure 16**. This score is primarily driven by the Good level of Organisational Culture (7.74). In the same manner, the Corruption Control System also scored at a Need Improvement level (6.70), indicating that public agencies need to strengthen internal control mechanisms to prevent corruption.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 16 *Integrity Culture Index and its Components*

When comparing different NIA series, Integrity Culture shows a steady improvement over the years, rising from 7.21 in 2012 to a peak of 7.94 in 2022, before declining to 7.36 in 2025 (*refer* **Figure 17**). Similarly, organisational culture improved consistently from 7.56 in 2012 to 8.19 in 2022, reflecting stronger internal values and workplace practices. However, the drop to 7.74 in 2025 indicates a partial reversal and highlights emerging challenges in sustaining these gains.

Although the Corruption Control System demonstrated overall improvement relative to 2012, it remained the weakest component, peaking at 7.52 in 2022 before declining to 6.99 in 2025. The system's performance has fluctuated, with intermittent ups and downs, indicating instability in the organisation's corruption control systems.



***Note**. (n=2,098 in NIA 2012; n=2,108 in NIA 2016; n=4,008 in NIA 2019; n=4,381 in NIA 2022 and n=4,969 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 17 *Comparison of Integrity Culture Index and its Components*

4.2.1.1 ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Organisational culture refers to the cultural characteristics within an organisation that support performing one's duties transparently, without pursuing private interests, accepting or soliciting bribes, favouring certain sections of society, or engaging in corruption. It is fundamental in guiding and determining employee conduct. Any weakness or vulnerabilities tends to encourage employees to be involved in corrupt practices.

Figure 18 displays the scores of Organisational Culture and its indexes. The Organisational Culture scored 7.74, which falls within the Good level. The score is contributed by the Good and Very Good levels in its survey items, such as accepting payment in cash or kind or gratifications (8.30), mediation and undue solicitation within the organisation (8.11), misuse of privileged information for personal gain (7.95), and performing duties based on personal relationships (7.77). However, the survey items such as transparency in the performance of duties (7.34) and ignoring official duties to pursue private interests (7.46) received Satisfactory level scores. This contrasts with the External Integrity findings *(refer* **Figure 8**), where openness of work and adherence to established procedures scored Very Good (8.39), and user-friendliness of procedures remained at a Good level (8.21). While formal procedures appear transparent and publicly accessible, the lower internal transparency scores suggest that these systems may be robust on paper but are not consistently reflected in everyday organisational practices. This highlights a gap between documented procedures and their practical implementation.

Moreover, as shown in **Figure 9,** the low score for efforts to accomplish duties (6.85) at the Satisfactory level in the external assessment contrasts with internal integrity perceptions, suggesting that service users perceive public officials as not consistently putting forth the expected effort to carry out their official responsibilities.



Note*. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 18 *Organisational Culture and its Survey Items*

As shown in **Table 18**, the factors most commonly perceived to influence service delivery were formal hierarchical directives, specifically directives from higher authorities or other sources of influence (20.57%; n=2,295) and instructions from supervisors (19.99%; n=2,231). These were closely followed by personal ties such as friendship (18.68%; n=2,085) and family relationships (17.00%; n=1,897). At the lower end, shared regional origin (same region/*Dzongkhag*) was cited by 10.41% of respondents (n=1,162), while other unspecified factors were almost negligible (0.13%; n=15). Other reasons specified by the respondents were popularity. Interestingly, this contrasts with service users' perceptions, which emphasise friendship and family as key determinants, suggesting a **mismatch between institutional explanations and public expectations** (*refer* **Table 12**).

These findings reflect **both cultural and institutional dynamics**: formal hierarchical influence dominates, but social ties and local identity also shape service delivery. While there is no direct evidence of misuse of authority, it highlights how **authority and personal networks interact in decision-making**, which can create **perceived inequalities or favouritism** even when procedural rules are followed.

Table 18

Factors Influencing Service Delivery

Factors Influencing Service Delivery	Frequency	Percent
Directives from Higher Authorities/ Influence	2,295	20.57
Instruction from Supervisors	2,231	19.99
Friendship	2,085	18.68
Family Relationship	1,897	17.00
School/College/Training Mates	1,474	13.21
Same Region/Dzongkhag	1,162	10.41
Others	15	0.13
Total	**11,159**	**100.00**

Note. *(n=4,969, NIA 2025) * Total indicates the sum of all the response items.*

4.2.1.2 Corruption Control System

The Corruption Control System assesses whether agencies have implemented anti-corruption measures, such as whistleblowing and internal control systems, and whether those involved in corrupt acts are appropriately addressed.

Figure 19 displays the scores of the Corruption-Control System and its survey items. The Corruption-Control System scored 6.70, which falls in the Need Improvement level. The overall score is contributed by the Satisfactory level achieved in appropriateness of disciplinary actions against corrupt acts (7.33) and in adequate checks and balances to control corruption (7.27). However, the survey item on protection of whistleblowers received a markedly lower score of 5.44, placing it in the Need Improvement level, which mainly contributed to the low score in the Corruption Control System. This indicates that employees may be reluctant to report misconduct due to fear of retaliation or lack of safeguards. As a result, systemic issues can remain undetected for extended periods, potentially escalating into major scandals before they are addressed. Strengthening whistleblower protection is therefore critical to ensuring early detection, reinforcing accountability, and maintaining institutional integrity.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 19 *Corruption Control System and its Survey Items*

4.2.2 WORK INTEGRITY INDEX

Figure 20 displays the scores of the Work Integrity Index and its survey items. It scored 8.98, placing it within the Outstanding level. The strong overall performance is attributable to the Outstanding level achieved in budget execution (9.23), complemented by Outstanding level score in personnel management (8.99) and Very Good level score in fairness in the assignment of work (8.60). Overall, these scores indicate that public officials have experienced fewer incidences of corruption in human resource management, budget execution, and fairness in work assignment.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 20 *Work Integrity Index and Its Components*

Over the years, Work Integrity and its sub-components consistently achieved high scores and demonstrated strong upward trends, with overall Work Integrity score reaching 8.98; however, Personnel Management has decreased from 9.20 in NIA 2022 to 8.99 by 2025 (refer Figure 21). Similarly, budget execution also improved steadily, going from 8.45 in 2012 to 9.23 in 2025. This demonstrates improved fiscal discipline and more effective use of approved budgets, leading to stronger financial management and more efficient expenditure of the allocated budget. The integrity of Fairness in the assignment of Work declined slightly between 2012 and 2019, then recovered and continued to improve in 2022, reaching 8.60 in 2025, indicating renewed progress in equitable work distribution within the organisation.



***Note**. (n=2,098 in NIA 2012; n=2,108 in NIA 2016; n=4,008 in NIA 2019; n=4,381 in NIA 2022 and n=4,969 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 21 *Comparison of Work Integrity Index and its Components*

4.2.2.1 Personnel Management: Perceived and Experienced Corruption

Personnel management encompasses human resource functions, including recruitment, training, promotion, and transfers. This domain assesses the integrity of these services based on public officials' perceptions and experiences. As illustrated in **Figure 22**, Personnel Management scored 9.07, placing it in the Outstanding level. The Experience of Corruption earned an exceptional score of 9.97 (Outstanding level), indicating that there were only a few instances in which service users had to make payments in cash, kind, entertainment, or gratifications in relation to HR matters. However, the Perception of Corruption scored 7.46 (Satisfactory level). The score is primarily affected by perceptions of unfairness in decisions on HR matters, such as recruitment, transfers, promotions, leaves, and training and the perception of paying in cash, in kind, or in services to avail HR services.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 22 *Personnel Management and its Survey Items*

4.2.2.1.1 Experience of Corruption by Internal Clients or Service Providers in Personnel Management

Table 19 illustrates the average frequency and amount of payments in cash or kind, entertainment, and other forms of gratification provided by internal clients in relation to availing HR services such as recruitment, training, promotion, and transfer between NIA 2022 and NIA 2025. While the average frequency of payments in cash or kind decreased from 2.00 to 1.56, the average amount per payment rose sharply from Nu. 1,728.11 to Nu. 16,244.75. However, the ratio deteriorated from 1 in 487 employees in NIA 2022 to 1 in 310 employees in NIA 2025, indicating that although payments may occur slightly less often per person involved, a larger share of employees now report having to make such payments, and at much higher values.

A similar mixed pattern is observed for entertainment. The average frequency declined from 2.95 in NIA 2022 to 2.23 in NIA 2025, and the average amount decreased from Nu. 7,595.20 to Nu. 4,294.68, suggesting some reduction in both intensity and financial scale at the individual level. However, the ratio of employees providing entertainment worsened markedly, from roughly 1 in 438 in NIA 2022 to about 1 in 104 in NIA 2025. Similarly, the ratio of other forms of gratifications almost doubled from 1 in 438 to 1 in 262 in NIA 2025, with the average frequency of payments in these forms at 1.68. This implies that such practices have become more widespread among staff, even if each individual episode tends to involve smaller or less frequent payments, pointing to a broader normalisation of low-to-medium value informal exchanges in HR-related processes.

Table 19

Average Frequency, Ratio, and Amount of Payments in Cash or Kind, Entertainment, and Other Forms of Gratification Provided in Relation to Personnel Management

Payments made in Cash or Kind, Entertainment and Other Forms of Gratification in Relation to HR Matters		
	NIA 2022	**NIA 2025**
The average frequency of payments in cash or kind	2.00	1.56
The average amount of payments in cash or kind	Nu. 1,728.11	Nu. 16,244.75
The ratio of payments made in cash or kind	1:487	1:310
The average frequency of entertainment	2.95	2.23
The average amount of entertainment	Nu. 7,595.20	Nu. 4,294.68
The ratio of entertainment	1:438	1:104
The average frequency of other forms of gratification	-	1.68
The ratio of other forms of gratification	1:438	1:262

***Note**. (n=4,381, NIA 2022; n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

4.2.2.1.2 Reasons for Making Payments in Cash or Kind, Entertainment and Other Gratifications in Relation to HR Matters

There are many reasons why respondents resort to making cash or kind, entertainment, and other forms of gratification to avail of HR services. As shown in **Table 20**, the most common reason was as an appreciation for the processing of HR services (24.50%), followed by to expedite the HR services (20.59%), to get HR services unlawfully (in violation of the rules and regulations) (19.58%), as a customary practice (13.52%), and to get access to confidential information (12.03%). A significant proportion (9.79%) indicated that the HR official solicited the payment.

Table 20

Reasons for Making Payments in Cash or Kind, Entertainment, and Other Forms of Gratification in Relation to Personnel Management

Reasons	Frequency	Percent
Solicited by the HR official	223	9.79
To expedite the HR services	469	20.59
As an appreciation for the processing of HR services	558	24.50
To get HR services unlawfully (in violation of the rules and regulations)	446	19.58
To get access to confidential information	274	12.03
It is a customary practice	308	13.52
Total	**2,278**	**100.00**

***Note**. (n=149, NIA 2025) * Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multi-response item*

4.2.2.2 BUDGET EXECUTION: PERCEIVED AND EXPERIENCED CORRUPTION

Budget execution refers to the utilisation of budgets, including capital, recurrent, and travel expenditures, by agency heads and public officials. As depicted in **Figure 23**, the overall Budget Execution score stands at 9.23 (Outstanding level), indicating that budget manipulation by agency heads or other public officials is less.

The Experience of Corruption scored 9.96 (Outstanding level), indicating fewer incidences of budget manipulation by agency heads or other public officials. However, the Perception of Corruption scored 8.12 (Good level). This is mainly due to respondents' perception that some of their colleagues/public officials have misused the budget for personal/family/friend's benefit.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 23 *Budget Execution and its Survey Items*

Further, **Figure 24** presents the percentage of budget manipulation for personal benefit, for family and friends, or for both. Although 98.57% of the respondents believed that employees/ public officials do not misuse the budget for personal gain. Yet 1.66% of respondents reported observing manipulation in the execution of the budget, either by agency heads or by other public officials.

Among those who reported observing manipulation for personal gain, most cases occurred at low frequencies. The highest proportion of respondents indicated two instances (33.3%), followed by one instance (27.3%) and three instances (27.3%). A smaller share reported higher frequencies, including five times (7.6%), four times (3%), and eight times (1.5%). This indicates that manipulation for personal gain is generally occasional rather than frequent, with only a small minority reporting repeated occurrences.

A similar pattern is observed for benefits to family and friends. The majority also reported observing low-frequency incidents, with two instances again being the most common (31.3%), followed by three instances (28.1%) and one instance (21.9%). Fewer respondents reported five instances (12.5%) and four instances (6.3%), while no respondents reported eight instances in this category. This suggests that manipulation linked to family and friends also occurs sporadically, with limited cases of repeated behavior. While not widespread at high levels, even occasional manipulation poses serious risks to fiscal integrity and accountability.



Note. *(n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 24 *Percentage of Frequency of Manipulation of Budget Execution*

4.2.2.2.1 Experience of Corruption by Internal Clients or Service Providers in Budget Execution

Table 21 compares manipulation in budget execution for personal gain and to favour family and friends between NIA 2022 and NIA 2025. While the average frequency of manipulation for personal gain declined from 3.49 in NIA 2022 to 1.89 in NIA 2025, the average amount involved increased sharply from Nu. 254,121.20 to Nu. 430,492.80, based on reports from 25 employees who knew the amount. This pattern suggests that such cases are being reported as occurring less often, but when they do occur, they tend to involve substantially larger sums, indicating a shift toward fewer but higher-value instances of budget misuse for personal enrichment.

Table 21

Average Frequency and Amount of Manipulation in the Execution of the Budget for Personal Gain and to Favour Family and Friends (NIA 2025 and NIA 2022)

Manipulation in the Execution of the Budget for Personal Gain and to Favour Family and Friends		
	NIA 2022	NIA 2025
The average frequency of manipulation in the execution of the budget for personal gain	3.49	1.89
The average amount of manipulation in the execution of the budget for personal gain (Only 25 employees knew the amount)	Nu. 254,121.20	Nu. 430,492.80
The average frequency of manipulation in the execution of the budget to favour family & friends	4.84	2.56
The average amount of manipulation in the execution of the budget to favour family & friends (Only 9 employees knew the amount)	Nu. 60,083.33	Nu. 205,044.40

Note. *(n=4,381, NIA 2022; n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

A similar mixed trend is observed for manipulation to favour family and friends. The average frequency decreased from 4.84 in NIA 2022 to 2.56 in NIA 2025, yet the average amount per case rose markedly from Nu. 60,083.33 to Nu. 205,044.40, with the NIA 2025 figure based on information from only 9 employees who knew the amount. This indicates that while such manipulations may be less frequent, they are financially more significant when they occur. Together, these findings point to a worrying shift from more routine, lower-value budget manipulation toward fewer, higher-impact cases, suggesting that budget-related corruption may be becoming more concentrated and potentially more sophisticated within public agencies.

This finding is reinforced by audit evidence. The Royal Audit Authority's last five Annual Audit Reports indicate a substantial rise in unresolved irregularities, increasing from Nu. 4,002.448 million in FY 2020–2021 to Nu. 9,987.24 million in FY 2024–2025. This sharp escalation lends empirical support to concerns regarding the misuse or manipulation of public funds for personal benefit or preferential treatment (RAA, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, & 2025).

4.2.2.2.2 Reasons for Manipulation in the Execution of the Budget

Table 22 provides insights into the reasons for manipulation in the execution of the budget. The results indicate that manipulation occurs due to poor management (31.1%), poor leadership (25.2%), insufficient pay and allowance (17.9%), and widespread practice (15.6%). Furthermore, respondents shared other reasons for manipulation, such as lack of individual integrity and moral values, misuse of power, intimate relationships, and situational pressures during visits by higher authorities.

Table 22
Reasons for Manipulation in the Execution of the Budget

Reasons	Number of responses	Percent of responses
Insufficient pay and allowance	54	17.90
Widespread practice	47	15.60
Poor leadership	76	25.20
Due to demand, solicitation, etc. from another party	25	8.30
Poor management	94	31.10
Others	6	2.00
Total	**302**	**100.00**

Note. *(n=66, NIA 2025) * Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multi-response item*

4.2.2.3 FAIRNESS IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF WORK: PERCEIVED AND EXPERIENCED CORRUPTION

One way to measure Work Integrity is to examine fairness in the assignment of work within an agency. A study on fairness in the assignment of work (Akech, 2011) found a significant loophole in the institutional framework, leaving public servants unable to resist illegal instructions from their senior officials, resulting in grand corruption. This is even more relevant to Bhutan, given the cultural acceptance of respecting and following seniors' instructions.

As shown in **Figure 25**, fairness in the assignment of work scored 8.60 and falls in the Very Good level of integrity. The score indicates that actual instances of unreasonable work instructions from supervisors are rare, as evidenced by the Outstanding level achieved in Experience of Corruption (9.90). However, Perceived Corruption scored 6.65, which falls in the Need Improvement level. The score is mainly due to the belief that public officials are at a disadvantage when they do not comply with unreasonable work instructions from the head/ supervisor (5.41, Need Improvement). Additionally, the perception of fair assignment of work scored 7.26 (Satisfactory level), indicating some degree of unfair assignment of work among staff, while the perception of employees being adequately tasked scored 7.45 (Satisfactory level).

These findings suggest that while actual integrity in work allocation is high, enhancing **transparency and communication in assigning duties** could further strengthen employees' confidence in the fairness of the system.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 25 *Fairness in the Assignment of Work and its Survey Items*

4.2.2.3.1 Experience of Corruption by Internal Clients or Service Providers in Fairness in Assignment of Work

As depicted in **Table 23**, the average frequency of unreasonable work instructions issued by heads or immediate supervisors has improved from 1:10 to 1:27, meaning that the overall proportion of employees exposed to unreasonable instructions has declined, from one in every 10 employees in 2022 to one in 27 in 2025. However, the incidence rate has risen sharply from 1.9 in NIA 2022 to 5.7 in NIA 2025, indicating that employees who experience such behaviour now face it more often over time.

This combination of trends suggests fewer employees are subjected to unreasonable instructions, but those who are affected experience them with much greater intensity and regularity. Such concentration of unreasonable instructions can have severe implications for staff morale, psychological safety, and integrity culture in those affected units, and calls for targeted interventions.

Table 23

Average Frequency and Ratio of Unreasonable Work Instructions from Heads/Supervisors

Unreasonable Work Instructions from Heads/Immediate Supervisors		
	NIA 2022	**NIA 2025**
The average frequency of unreasonable work instructions from heads/supervisors	1.90	5.70
The ratio of unreasonable work instructions from heads/supervisors	1:10	1:27

***Note**. (n=4,381, NIA 2022; n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

4.2.2.4 COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF WORK INTEGRITY INDEX

Figure 26 reveals that the Experience of Corruption attained the highest rating among all components of the Work Integrity Index, followed by the Perception of Corruption. The comparatively subdued scores for Perception of Corruption underscore public officials' recognition of persistent corruption risks within public agencies. Within the Work Integrity Index, perceptions of corruption in budget execution achieved the paramount score of 8.11 (Good level), outperforming personnel management (7.46, Satisfactory level) and fairness in work assignments (6.65, Need Improvement level).



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 26 *Summary of Experienced and Perceived Corruption for Work Integrity Index*

4.2.3 ETHICAL LEADERSHIP INDEX AND ITS COMPONENTS

The critical role of ethical leadership in fostering organisational and societal success is increasingly emphasised in contemporary literature. Proponents argue that organisational failures stemming from unethical or misconduct-ridden practices are invariably attributed to leadership's moral lapses (Trevino & Brown, 2014; Brown et al., 2005). Thus, ethical leadership provides a foundational normative framework that organisations must actively cultivate and uphold.

Ethical leadership is commonly defined drawing from Brown et al. (2005), who characterise it as "the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers via two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making" (p. 120). The Ethical Leadership Index, adapted from Brown et al. (2005) and Treviño & Brown (2014), was initially developed for the NIA 2019 survey. This index assesses key leadership dimensions: Integrity, Ethics, Trust, Transparency, Accountability, and Fairness.

As illustrated in **Figure 27**, the composite Ethical Leadership Index score of 7.62 reflects a Good level of integrity. Among its components, Ethics scored highest at 7.90 (Good level), followed by Integrity (7.78, Good level), Accountability (7.77, Good level), Trust (7.53, Satisfactory level), Transparency (7.48, Satisfactory level), and Fairness (7.25, Satisfactory level).



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 27 *Ethical Leadership Index and its Components*

Since its introduction in 2019, the ethical leadership and its components score increased from 7.82 in 2019 to 8.11 in 2022, reflecting notable progress, but declined to 7.62 in 2025 (*refer* **Figure 28**). A similar pattern is observed in Integrity, which rose from 7.98 in 2019 to 8.18 in 2022, before decreasing to 7.78 in 2025.

Overall, Ethics strengthened considerably, increasing from 7.83 in 2019 to 8.25 in 2022. Although it declined slightly to 7.90 in 2025, it remained relatively strong, indicating sustained attention to ethical standards. Trust and Transparency also improved significantly by 2022, rising from 7.74 to 8.02 and from 7.96 to 8.21, respectively. However, both indicators declined in 2025 to 7.53 and 7.48, suggesting reduced perceived confidence and openness. Accountability followed the same upward trend, reaching 8.23 in 2022 before falling to 7.77 in 2025. Fairness, consistently the lowest-scoring dimension, improved from 7.47 in 2019 to 7.80 in 2022, but declined to 7.25 in 2025. Overall, NIA 2022 marked the strongest performance across all ethical dimensions, while the NIA 2025 results indicate the need to reinforce trust, transparency, and fairness to sustain high ethical standards.



***Note**. (n=4,008 in NIA 2019; n=4,381 in NIA 2022 and n=4,969 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 28 *Comparison of Ethical Leadership Index and its Components*

4.2.3.1 INTEGRITY

Yukl (2013) defined integrity as 'trustworthiness and consistency between a person's espoused values and behaviour' (p.331). Moreover, Colquitt et al. (2007) defined integrity as a sense of justice and moral charisma that helps individuals navigate uncertainty and doubt. As integrity shapes and drives a leader's moral beliefs and behaviours, public authorities come to respect leaders' integrity, thereby improving the work environment and enhancing service delivery. In the NIA 2022, integrity in Ethical Leadership evaluates leaders' integrity in terms of their integrity practices, their concern for ethical and moral ideals, and their roles in enhancing organisational integrity.

Figure 29 shows that leadership integrity was relatively consistent across the survey items. The scores for Integrity (7.78), leaders' conduct (7.81), leaders' promotion of ethical and moral values (7.87), and leaders' role in taking serious action against rule/regulation violations (7.67) all indicate a Good level of leadership integrity.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 29 *Integrity and its Survey Items*

4.2.3.2 ETHICS

Leadership ethics refers to the moral principles and values that guide leaders' behaviour and decision-making in the workplace and other organisations. It encompasses the standards of integrity, responsibility, accountability, fairness, and respect that leaders are expected to uphold in their interactions with employees, stakeholders, and society. It also involves how leaders navigate ethical challenges and the methods they use to address such situations in alignment with both personal beliefs and organisational standards. Ultimately, its purpose is to foster a culture of ethical behaviour and ensure that responsibilities toward employees, stakeholders, and society are upheld.

As illustrated in **Figure 30**, survey questions such as 'leaders ensure that employees ethically conduct themselves' (8.08) and 'leaders educate the employees on consequences of unethical behaviour' (7.72) contribute to the leadership ethics score of 7.90 (Good level). This demonstrates that leaders ensure employees conduct themselves ethically and educate staff on the consequences of unethical behaviour.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*
Figure 30 *Ethics and its Survey Items*

4.2.3.3 TRUST

Trust is defined in numerous ways within the realm of ethical leadership. According to the definitions provided by Norman (2006) and Rousseau et al. (1998), trust is an agreement between two parties based on mutual regard and worth. Similarly, Doney et al. (1998) defined trust as "the willingness to rely on another party and to act in situations when such action makes one susceptible to that party." Various meanings of the term 'trust' have been proposed; however, for NIA 2025, trust is defined as an employee's general reliance on a leader's word, promise, verbal statement, written statement, or deeds (Rotter, 1971). Leadership's credibility is measured by leaders' adherence to their promises, both in word and deed.

As illustrated in **Figure 31**, survey questions such as 'leaders can be trusted to fulfil their commitments' (7.58) and 'leaders strive towards maintaining trust with the employees through consistency in their words and actions' (7.48) contribute to the leadership trust score of 7.53 (Satisfactory level). This demonstrates that leaders are generally seen as reliable in fulfilling commitments and making efforts to maintain trust through consistent words and actions.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*
Figure 31 *Trust and its Survey Items*

As shown in **Table 24**, a majority of respondents reported feeling safe expressing their opinions or concerns to leaders without fear of retaliation: 40.36% Agreed, and 16.73% Strongly Agreed. However, 12.44% remained Neutral, and 11.98% expressed varying levels of disagreement, indicating that a notable proportion of public officials may still hesitate to raise issues openly. This suggests the need to further strengthen trust-based leadership practices and to reinforce safeguards against retaliation.

Table 24

Confidence of Public Officials in Expressing Opinions without Fear of Retaliation

I feel safe expressing my opinions or concerns to my leaders/management without fear of retaliation.	Percent
Strongly Disagree	2.54
Disagree	4.91
Slightly Disagree	4.53
Neutral	12.44
Slightly Agree	8.25
Agree	40.36
Strongly Agree	16.73
Don't Know	2.15
Did Not Answer	8.09
Total	**100.00**

Note. *(n =4,969, NIA 2025)*

4.2.3.4 TRANSPARENCY

Leadership Transparency is a crucial characteristic of ethical leadership, even though the term is not expressly employed. Transparency in the context of moral leadership is characterised by clarity, accessibility, integration, logic, and reason (Kim, 2008). Therefore, public officials must have equitable access to information to participate actively in public decision-making. According to Hood (2010), transparency is 'the behaviour of business that makes choices, rules, and other information available to the outside world' (p. 989). Transparency refers to open decision-making based on appropriate information, allowing employees and the public to assess whether the relevant procedures are followed (ACC, 2020).

As shown in **Figure 32**, Transparency scored 7.48, indicating Satisfactory level leadership transparency, mainly because leaders were transparent in their decision-making, with a Satisfactory score (7.25). However, leaders communicating openly with employees scored 7.73, which is at a Good level of integrity.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Figure 32 *Transparency and its Survey Items*

Table 25 indicates that employees largely view leaders as open to suggestions and feedback. A strong majority expressed agreement (41.45% Agree, 19.28% Strongly Agree, and 10.04% Slightly Agree). Only a small share disagreed (9.66%), while 10.04% remained neutral and 8.23% did not respond. Overall, the results reflect a positive perception, with some scope to engage a smaller group of employees further.

Table 25

Rating of Transparency's Survey Items

Score level	Leaders in my organisation are open to the suggestions/ views/feedback of the employees.	Leaders in my organisation are transparent about their mistakes.	Leaders in my organisation are not influenced by the outside interests of third parties in decision-making.
Strongly Disagree	2.15	2.40	2.09
Disagree	3.52	4.95	4.71
Slightly Disagree	3.99	5.11	4.39
Neutral	10.04	17.23	14.69
Slightly Agree	10.04	10.31	6.50
Agree	41.45	34.34	33.86
Strongly Agree	19.28	9.50	13.22
Don't Know	1.29	7.89	12.16
Did Not Answer	8.23	8.27	8.37
Total	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**

Note. *(n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Table 25 shows a generally positive but somewhat mixed view of leaders' transparency about their mistakes. While 34.34% agreed, 9.50% strongly agreed, and 10.31% slightly agreed, a notable share remained neutral (17.23%) or uncertain (7.89% "Don't know"), and 12.46% expressed disagreement. Overall, the findings point to moderate transparency, with room to improve openness and communication around mistakes.

Further, **Table 25** also shows that employees generally perceive leaders as independent of third-party interests in decision-making. A majority of respondents selected "Agree" (33.86%) or "Strongly Agree" (13.22%), while 12.16% indicated "Don't Know." A smaller proportion expressed disagreement (9.19% combined), and 14.69% of respondents remained neutral. Overall, the results suggest that most employees view leadership decisions as free from external influence, although a notable minority expressed uncertainty. This finding is substantiated by complaint analysis, which shows that the substantive portion of corruption reports against heads and leaders concerned transparency issues, as shown in **Table 26.**

Table 26
Percentage of Corruption Reports against an Alleged Position by Issues

Position of Alleged	Accountability	Transparency	Corruption	Others	Grand Total
Head	51.39%	27.78%	11.11%	9.72%	100.00%
Head, Leader	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Head, Leader, Staff	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%	100.00%
Head, Staff	33.33%	66.67%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Leader	76.32%	9.21%	5.26%	9.21%	100.00%
Leader, Staff	50.00%	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Leader, Private Individual	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%	100.00%
Private Individual	21.15%	9.62%	9.62%	59.62%	100.00%
Staff	51.85%	12.96%	27.78%	7.41%	100.00%
Not Specified	52.00%	8.00%	31.00%	9.00%	100.00%
Total	**52.20%**	**13.46%**	**17.58%**	**16.76%**	**100.00%**

Note. *(n=364); Analysis of the corruption reports received in FY 2024-2025*

4.2.3.5 ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability refers to the moral obligation of ethical leaders to justify their decisions, ensure fairness, and accept responsibility for their actions and their execution. In addition, the leader must adhere to the standards and obligations established as regulations, guidelines, rules, procedures, and protocols (Hussmann, 2011). In a similar vein, Hunt (2016) defines accountability as the willingness to explain pertinent gatherings for one's evaluation, demonstrations, goals, and prohibition when it is reasonable to do so. For NIA 2025, leadership accountability refers to the extent to which leaders assume responsibility for their plans, actions, and results to strengthen accountability (ACC, 2020).

As shown in **Figure 33**, a leadership accountability score of 7.77 indicates a Good level of accountability. The findings show that leaders emphasise strengthening accountability within the organisation, as reflected in a Good score (7.89), and that leaders taking responsibility for their actions also recorded a Good score (7.64).



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*
Figure 33 *Accountability and its Survey Items*

Table 27 indicates a strongly positive perception of leaders' commitment to ensuring that the organisation operates in accordance with applicable laws, rules, and policies. A majority of respondents selected "Agree" (48.27%) or "Strongly Agree" (23.39%), while 6.50% slightly agreed. In contrast, only a small proportion reported disagreement (3.37% combined), and 7.53% remained neutral. Overall, the results reflect a high level of confidence in leaders' compliance with legal and organisational requirements.

Table 27
Rating of Accountability's Survey Items

Score level	Leaders in my organisation ensure that the organisation operates in accordance with all applicable laws, rules, and policies and procedures.	Leaders in my organisation misuse authority for personal gain.
Strongly Disagree	0.85	19.08
Disagree	1.21	38.73
Slightly Disagree	1.31	4.49
Neutral	7.53	11.07
Slightly Agree	6.50	3.46
Agree	48.27	3.26
Strongly Agree	23.39	1.33
Don't Know	2.25	9.80
Did Not Answer	8.70	8.78
Total	**100.00**	**100.00**

Note. *(n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

Table 27 indicates that most employees do not perceive leaders as misusing authority for personal gain. A majority of responses were categorised under *Disagree*, comprising 38.73%, followed by 19.08% who “Strongly Disagree” and 4.49% who “Slightly Disagree”. In contrast, only a small proportion of respondents selected “Agree” (8.05% combined), while 11.07% remained neutral. Overall, the findings suggest that perceptions of leaders’ misuse of authority within the organisation are generally low.

Analysis of corruption reports also indicates that 63% of accountability-related corruption reports are against the organisation’s head, leaders, and staff, as shown in **Table 28**.

Table 28

Percentage of Issues or Allegations in Corruption Reports by Position

Position of Alleged	Accountability	Transparency	Corruption	Others
Head	17.56%	36.11%	11.49%	10.75%
Head, Leader	0.36%	1.39%	1.15%	1.08%
Head, Leader, Staff	0.36%	0.00%	0.00%	2.15%
Head, Private Individual	0.72%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Head, Private Individual, Staff	0.36%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Head, Staff	0.36%	2.78%	0.00%	0.00%
Leader	28.32%	13.89%	5.75%	11.83%
Leader, Staff	2.51%	1.39%	3.45%	0.00%
Leader, Private Individual	1.08%	0.00%	0.00%	2.15%
Private Individual	9.32%	13.89%	11.49%	52.69%
Staff	17.56%	13.89%	28.74%	6.45%
Staff, Private Individual	0.36%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Not Specified	21.15%	16.67%	37.93%	12.90%
Total	**100.00%**	**100.00%**	**100.00%**	**100.00%**

Note. *(n=531; Analysis of the corruption reports received in FY 2024-2025). The total number of corruption reports in FY 2024-2025 was 364; however, the number of issues/allegations in the corruption reports was 531.*

4.2.3.6 FAIRNESS

An advocate of ethical leadership argues that fairness is a crucial aspect of how ethical leaders are perceived (Brown et al., 2005). Fairness in leadership is the demonstration of fair and just behaviour by leaders in their care, actions, and decisions regarding how to treat their employees.

The fairness scores and their survey items show a Satisfactory level, as shown in **Figure 34**. The survey item "Leaders give fair and equal importance to the professional growth of employees" scored the lowest (7.13), which slightly lowered the overall Fairness score. Meanwhile, "Leaders are fair in taking actions against misbehaving employees" scored the highest (7.46, Satisfactory level)), reflecting relative strength in this area.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*
Figure 34 *Fairness and its Survey Items*

This is supported by the complaint analysis, which shows that most corruption reports involved alleged abuse of authority by heads or leaders, as outlined in **Table 29**. Overall, despite some areas requiring improvement, the organisation's leaders are generally perceived as fair and ethical in their treatment of employees.

Table 29

Percentage of Corruption Reports against an alleged position by alleged offences

Position of Alleged	Abuse of Function	Misuse of Privileged Info	Bribery	CoI	Disproportionate Asset	Embezzlement	False Claim	Non Pursuable Complaint	Others	Grand Total
Head	29.17%	0.00%	1.39%	4.17%	0.00%	4.17%	0.00%	59.72%	1.39%	100.00%
Head, Leader	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Head, Leader, Staff	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Head, Staff	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	66.67%	0.00%	100.00%
Leader	31.58%	0.00%	1.32%	0.00%	0.00%	3.95%	0.00%	61.84%	1.32%	100.00%
Leader, Staff	50.00%	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Leader, Private Individual	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%	100.00%
Private Individual	13.46%	0.00%	1.92%	0.00%	0.00%	3.85%	1.92%	59.62%	19.23%	100.00%
Staff	18.52%	1.85%	3.70%	1.85%	0.00%	22.22%	0.00%	48.15%	3.70%	100.00%
Not Specified	22.00%	0.00%	13.00%	1.00%	1.00%	13.00%	2.00%	45.00%	3.00%	100.00%
Total	**25.00%**	**0.38%**	**2.27%**	**1.52%**	**0.00%**	**7.58%**	**0.38%**	**57.58%**	**5.30%**	**100.00%**

Note. *(n=364); Analysis of the corruption reports received in FY 2024-2025*

4.2.4 SUMMARY OF THE SCORES FOR INTERNAL INTEGRITY

As shown in **Table 30**, the Internal Integrity reflects a generally Good level of integrity, with an overall score of 7.98. Strong performance is evident in areas such as personnel management, budget execution, fairness in work assignments, and Organisational culture, with several indicators reaching Very Good to Outstanding levels, particularly those related to the frequency and amount of corrupt practices, suggesting low prevalence.

However, certain dimensions remain comparatively weaker, notably corruption-control systems, protection of whistleblowers, and aspects of ethical leadership, including transparency, accountability, trust, and fairness, which generally fall within the Satisfactory to Need Improvement range. These findings suggest that the current integrity landscape relies heavily on the ethical conduct of individual leaders rather than fully institutionalised systems, creating potential vulnerabilities to leadership changes or inconsistent rule application.

To sustain and strengthen public sector integrity, the next phase of anti-corruption efforts should focus on enhancing internal governance systems, embedding effective accountability mechanisms, and proactively addressing emerging forms of "soft corruption," such as favouritism, informal influence, and non-monetary inducements. By targeting these areas, Bhutan can ensure that the progress achieved in public sector integrity is institutionalised, resilient, and capable of reinforcing citizen trust and the long-term effectiveness of governance.

Table 30

Overview of Survey Items for Internal Integrity and its Score

Survey Items for Internal Integrity	National Score	National level
Internal Integrity Score	**7.98**	**Good**
Organisational Culture	**7.74**	**Good**
Transparency in the performance of duties	7.35	Satisfactory
Ignoring official duty to pursue private interest	7.46	Satisfactory
Accepting payment in cash or kind or gratifications	8.30	Very Good
Performing duties based on personal relationships	7.77	Good
Mediation and undue solicitation within the organisation	8.11	Good
Misuse of privileged information for personal gain	7.95	Good
Corruption-Control System	**6.70**	**Need Improvement**
Protection of whistleblowers	5.44	Need Improvement
Appropriateness of disciplinary actions against corrupt acts	7.33	Satisfactory
Adequate checks and balance to control corruption	7.27	Satisfactory
Personnel Management	**8.99**	**Outstanding**
Perception of payment in cash or kind or entertainment	7.94	Good
Fairness in decisions on HR matters (Recruitment, Transfer, Promotion, Training)	6.99	Satisfactory

Survey Items for Internal Integrity	National Score	National level
Frequency of payment in cash/kind offered in relation to HR matters	9.97	Outstanding
Amount of payment in cash/kind offered in relation to HR matters	10.00	Outstanding
Frequency of entertainment offered in relation to HR matters	9.93	Outstanding
Amount of entertainment offered in relation to HR matters	9.99	Outstanding
Frequency of gratification offered in relation to HR matters	9.95	Outstanding
Budget Execution	**9.23**	**Outstanding**
Perception of misuse of budget for personal gains	8.12	Good
Frequency of manipulation in the execution of budget for personal gains	9.90	Outstanding
Amount of manipulation in the execution of budget for personal gains	9.99	Outstanding
Frequency of manipulation in the execution of budget to favour family and friends	9.94	Outstanding
Amount of manipulation in the execution of budget to favour family and friends	9.99	Outstanding
Fairness in Assignment of Work	**8.60**	**Very Good**
Perception of employees being adequately tasked.	7.45	Satisfactory
Perception of fair assignment of work	7.26	Satisfactory
Perception of disadvantages of not complying to unreasonable work instructions	5.41	Need Improvement
Frequency of unreasonable work instructions	9.90	Outstanding
Ethical Leadership	***7.62***	***Good***
Integrity	**7.78**	Good
Demonstrating integrity in leaders conduct	7.81	Good
Promotion of ethical and moral values by leaders	7.87	Good
Role of leaders in taking serious action against rules/ regulations violations	7.67	Good
Ethics	**7.90**	**Good**
Leaders ensure that employees conduct in an ethical way.	8.08	Good
Leaders educate the employees on the consequences of unethical behaviour	7.72	Good
Trust	**7.53**	**Satisfactory**
Leaders can be trusted to fulfil their commitments	7.59	Good

Leaders strive towards maintaining trust with the employees through consistency in their words and actions	7.48	Satisfactory
Transparency	**7.48**	**Satisfactory**
Leaders communicate openly with the employees.	7.73	Good
Leaders are transparent in their decision-making	7.25	Satisfactory
Accountability	**7.48**	**Satisfactory**
Leaders emphasise strengthening accountability in the organisation	7.89	Good
Leaders take responsibility for their actions	7.64	Good
Fairness	**7.25**	**Satisfactory**
Employees in the organisation are fairly treated	7.17	Satisfactory
Leaders are fair in taking actions against misbehaving employees	7.46	Satisfactory
Leaders give fair and equal importance to the professional growth of employees	7.13	Satisfactory

***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=4,969, NIA 2025)*

4.3 CATEGORY OF PUBLIC AGENCIES UNDER PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY

Integrity score comparison among the categories of public agencies is aimed at determining the level of integrity and identifying areas for promoting integrity, transparency, accountability, and efficiency of public service delivery in the agencies. It compares the integrity level of the following categories of public agencies with the National Integrity Score: Ministry, Constitutional Office, *Dzongkhag, Thromde, Gewog,* Corporation, Autonomous Agency, Judiciary, Financial Institution, School, CSOs, and Hospitals.

Figure 35 presents the level of integrity by public agency category. For comparison purposes, the National Score, excluding the PII Score, stands at 8.29. Overall, *Gewogs* (8.59) and CSOs (8.58) achieved a Very Good level, while Financial Institutions recorded the lowest score at 8.12, which falls within the Good level. The higher scores of *Gewogs* and CSOs are largely driven by their Very Good performance in External Integrity. In contrast, the comparatively lower score of Financial Institutions is attributed to their External Integrity being rated at the Good level.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=16,391, NIA 2025). The figure presented excludes the PII score from the national and agency scores.*

Figure 35 *level of Integrity by the Category of Public Agencies*

4.3.1 EXTERNAL INTEGRITY SCORES BY CATEGORY OF PUBLIC AGENCIES

As depicted in **Figure 36**, the *Gewog* and CSOs scored the highest with 8.72 each in *External Integrity,* while the Financial Institutions scored the least (8.20) at Good level. This indicates that services provided by the *Gewog* and CSOs are better in terms of information dissemination related to services, transparency, fairness, and accountability than those of other categories of public agencies. On the contrary, the study suggests that Financial Institutions strengthen their transparency and accountability, as indicated by their transparency, accountability, and corruption scores (*refer* **Table 31**).



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=16,391, NIA 2025). The figure presented excludes the PII score from the national and agency scores.*

Figure 36 *External Integrity Scores by the Category of Public Agencies*

Table 31

External Integrity Scores for Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption Indexes

Category of Public Agencies	Transparency Index	Accountability Index	Corruption Index
Gewog	8.56	7.69	9.25
CSO	8.68	7.44	9.28
School	8.33	7.76	9.31
Ministry	8.44	7.56	9.25
Dzongkhag	8.39	7.45	9.24
Hospital	8.33	7.54	9.23
Thromde	8.21	7.55	9.26
Judiciary	8.24	7.28	9.16
Corporation	8.19	7.23	9.09
RUB Colleges	7.94	7.34	9.17
Constitutional Office	8.33	6.96	9.05
Autonomous Agency	8.01	7.21	9.02
Financial Institution	7.95	6.98	8.83

Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=16,391, NIA 2025).*

4.3.2 INTERNAL INTEGRITY SCORES BY CATEGORY OF PUBLIC AGENCIES

In internal integrity, the Judiciary scored 8.51 (Very Good level), the highest among the agency category, while the RUB Colleges scored 7.42 (Satisfactory level) *(refer* **Figure 37***)*. The Budget Execution of Judiciary has contributed most (9.49) to *Internal Integrity,* indicating a low level of misuse of the budget by the head or employees in the agency (*refer* **Table 32**).



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=16,391, NIA 2025). The figure presented excludes the PII score from the national and agency scores.*

Figure 37 *Internal Integrity Scores by the Category of Public Agencies*

Table 32

Internal Integrity Scores for Components of Integrity Culture, Work Integrity, and Ethical Leadership Indexes

	RUB Colleges	Hospital	Corporation	School	Dzongkhag	Financial Institution	Ministry	CSO	Autonomous Agency	Thromde	Gewog	Constitutional Office	Judiciary
Integrity Culture Index	**6.67**	**6.88**	**7.14**	**7.15**	**7.25**	**7.66**	**7.68**	**7.43**	**7.75**	**7.63**	**7.64**	**8.10**	**7.96**
Organisational Culture	7.09	7.36	7.37	7.57	7.61	7.95	8.10	7.59	8.08	7.95	8.13	8.37	8.52
Corruption-Control System	5.94	6.05	6.75	6.42	6.64	7.16	6.94	7.14	7.20	7.07	6.80	7.63	7.01
Work Integrity Index	**8.74**	**8.73**	**8.88**	**8.92**	**9.01**	**8.98**	**9.02**	**9.22**	**9.14**	**9.23**	**9.12**	**9.15**	**9.24**
Personnel Management	**8.88**	**8.72**	**8.91**	**8.98**	**9.04**	**9.02**	**8.95**	**9.39**	**9.24**	**9.38**	**9.05**	**9.27**	**9.22**
Perception	*7.14*	*6.83*	*7.28*	*7.41*	*7.65*	*7.48*	*7.40*	*8.43*	*8.07*	*8.42*	*7.64*	*8.14*	*7.99*
Experience	*10.00*	*9.94*	*9.96*	*9.98*	*9.94*	*10.00*	*9.95*	*10.00*	*9.99*	*10.00*	*9.96*	*10.00*	*10.00*
Budget Execution	**8.94**	**8.90**	**9.14**	**9.10**	**9.30**	**9.30**	**9.39**	**9.38**	**9.33**	**9.49**	**9.44**	**9.51**	**9.49**
Perception	*7.57*	*7.31*	*7.91*	*7.79*	*8.27*	*8.35*	*8.50*	*8.76*	*8.40*	*8.83*	*8.58*	*8.76*	*8.80*
Experience	*9.84*	*9.94*	*9.94*	*9.94*	*9.97*	*9.92*	*9.97*	*9.79*	*9.93*	*9.92*	*10.00*	*10.00*	*9.94*
Fairness in Assignment of Work	**8.22**	**8.49**	**8.44**	**8.58**	**8.53**	**8.44**	**8.61**	**8.70**	**8.68**	**8.58**	**8.76**	**8.41**	**8.91**
Perception	*6.05*	*6.34*	*6.57*	*6.61*	*6.63*	*6.31*	*6.81*	*7.12*	*6.99*	*6.73*	*7.25*	*6.68*	*7.55*
Experience	*9.66*	*9.91*	*9.68*	*9.89*	*9.81*	*9.86*	*9.81*	*9.74*	*9.81*	*9.81*	*9.76*	*9.56*	*9.82*
Ethical Leadership	**6.89**	**6.99**	**7.46**	**7.72**	**7.76**	**7.60**	**7.88**	**7.92**	**7.90**	**7.99**	**8.13**	**8.06**	**8.33**
Integrity	6.88	7.17	7.67	7.78	7.88	7.92	8.04	8.05	8.06	8.11	8.11	8.45	8.48
Ethics	6.98	7.42	7.75	8.12	8.02	8.13	8.07	7.95	8.03	7.97	8.14	8.49	8.39
Trust	7.13	6.91	7.30	7.59	7.70	7.47	7.75	7.85	7.85	7.88	8.07	8.06	8.30
Transparency	6.62	6.73	7.34	7.55	7.72	7.29	7.84	7.87	7.79	8.17	8.26	7.79	8.21
Accountability	7.24	7.13	7.61	7.84	7.88	7.64	8.08	7.84	8.06	8.12	8.22	8.16	8.48
Fairness	6.50	6.55	7.08	7.41	7.35	7.16	7.52	7.93	7.60	7.70	7.99	7.39	8.10

Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=16,391, NIA 2025).*

CHAPTER 5: PARLIAMENTARIANS' INTEGRITY INDEX

The Parliamentarians' Integrity Index measures parliamentarians' integrity, as evaluated by their voters and by parliamentarians themselves. It involves representativeness, oversight, legislative transparency, accountability, integrity, and corruption, as seen from the perspectives of citizens and parliamentarians. The International Parliamentary Union (IPU) requires its member countries to exhibit transparency, accountability, and integrity, without engaging in any corrupt practices or wrongdoing, while carrying out their representative, oversight, and legislative functions. Likewise, the Parliament of Bhutan (2008) is governed by the National Assembly Act of Bhutan (2008) and the National Council Act of Bhutan (2008), under which parliamentarians are required to safeguard the interests of the people and the nation with utmost integrity.

As illustrated in **Figure 38**, the overall Parliamentarian Integrity Index (PII) score stands at 7.15, placing it within the Satisfactory level. This overall performance is largely driven by the notably high score in Corruption (9.38), which falls within the Outstanding level and reflects a low incidence of corrupt practices. Other key dimensions, including Accountability (6.97), Transparency (6.95), Integrity (6.89), and Legislative Functions (6.89), also fall within the Satisfactory level, indicating generally acceptable performance across core parliamentary functions and responsibilities. However, the Oversight function, with a score of 6.58, is classified as Needs Improvement, highlighting concerns about the effectiveness of monitoring, scrutiny, and enforcement. Strengthening parliamentary oversight mechanisms would therefore be critical to enhancing institutional credibility and performance.

Similarly, the Representativeness score of 6.88 suggests that while engagement with constituents is generally effective, there remains scope for more inclusive, responsive, and participatory approaches to better reflect public interests.

As observed in the public sector, high performance in one area can obscure significant weaknesses elsewhere. The PII is bolstered by an Outstanding level in the Corruption component, indicating a very low prevalence of direct bribery or illegal payments. However, this apparent "clean" financial record masks functional fragility, particularly in the Oversight function, which received a Need Improvement level score.

This suggests that high integrity in financial conduct does not necessarily translate into institutional effectiveness. Despite the absence of overt corruption, the parliament's limited capacity to monitor the executive or to proactively advance legislative priorities undermines its constitutional mandate and overall impact on governance.

As a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Parliament of Bhutan is expected to uphold the principles of integrity, transparency, and accountability while representing citizens and drafting, formulating, endorsing, and implementing legislation in accordance with the law. The PII scores suggest that these standards are broadly met, while highlighting that improvements in oversight and legislative functions could further strengthen institutional integrity and governance outcomes.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 38 *Parliamentarians' Integrity Index Score*

Since its introduction, as illustrated in **Figure 39**, Parliamentarian Integrity has shown measurable improvement, with the score rising from 6.9 in NIA 2022 to 7.15 in NIA 2025. This progress reflects strengthened oversight mechanisms, improved legislative functions, and greater transparency. These developments demonstrate that integrity standards within Parliament have continued to advance compared to NIA 2022, further reinforcing accountability and public confidence in Parliamentarians.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,499 in NIA 2022 & n=1,505 in NIA 2025)*

Figure 39 *Parliamentarian Integrity Score for NIA 2022 & 2025*

NIA 2025 indicates mixed but predominantly positive trends across key components of PII (*refer* **Figure 40**). Oversight increased significantly from 5.86 to 6.53, reflecting enhanced scrutiny of government actions as parliamentarians more frequently question the executive and raise concerns about national issues. Legislative performance improved from 6.35 to 6.89, indicating greater effectiveness in lawmaking. Deliberations on bills have become more extensive, with parliamentarians consulting relevant stakeholders more frequently, and enacted laws are increasingly practical and implementable. Transparency increased from 6.68 to 6.95, suggesting improved public access to information and greater parliamentary openness. Integrity enhanced from 6.65 to 6.89, reflecting higher ethical standards, including impartial performance of public duties and exemplary law-abiding behaviour. Further, the corruption score increased slightly from 9.09 to 9.38, indicating ongoing efforts to prevent corruption, despite persistent concerns about vote-buying, payments, entertainment, and other forms of gratification.

However, Representativeness, which encompasses the articulation of citizens' concerns in Parliament, rational participation in debates, and the frequency of questions raised by parliamentarians, decreased slightly from 7.04 to 6.88. Similarly, Accountability declined marginally, from 7.02 to 6.97, suggesting that parliamentarians may not be sufficiently monitoring developmental activities or engaging with constituency issues. In contrast, most other components demonstrated notable improvement. Overall, the NIA 2025 results demonstrate progress in core functional and ethical areas and highlight a gradually maturing parliamentary integrity framework.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,499 in NIA 2022 & n=1,505 in NIA 2025)*

Figure 40 *Parliamentarian Integrity and its Components Scores Comparison for NIA 2022 & 2025*

5.1 REPRESENTATIVENESS FUNCTION AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

The representativeness function constitutes one of the three core mandates of parliament, alongside its legislative and oversight responsibilities. Through this function, parliamentarians act as intermediaries between the electorate and the state, ensuring that public and national interests are effectively articulated and addressed within parliamentary proceedings. The National Assembly Act of Bhutan (2008) and the National Council Act of Bhutan (2008) explicitly mandate that members of parliament perform their duties with accountability, competence, integrity, and accessibility. Members shall have a duty to be accessible to the people of the areas for which they have been elected to serve and to represent their interests conscientiously. As highlighted in the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Global Parliamentary Report (IPU, 2022), adequate parliamentary representativeness requires that Members of Parliament, as representatives of the community, are duty-bound to listen to the community and meet public expectations when making laws, investigating public policy issues, and holding the government to account.

Figure 41 illustrates the scores of the **Representativeness Component** and its survey items, including representing citizens' concerns/issues, speaking rationally during parliamentary discussions, and speaking frequency in parliamentary sessions. A representativeness score of 6.88 indicates a Satisfactory level of representation of constituents by parliamentarians in parliamentary proceedings. This is primarily influenced by lower scores for speaking rationally during parliamentary discussions (6.76) and for speaking frequency in parliament (6.81), suggesting that parliamentarians do not consistently engage in reasoned debate or actively participate in parliamentary discussions.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*
Figure 41 *Representativeness and its Survey Items*

Although a score of 7.05 (Satisfactory level) for representing citizens' concerns and issues in parliament suggests that parliamentarians reflect constituents' interests to a moderate extent, this level of representation appears constrained. It indicates that parliamentarians may not consistently or substantively raise public issues or effectively advocate for their constituents.

A majority of the respondents rated parliamentarians high in the survey items, such as raising concerns/issues in the parliament of national interest without personal interest (46%); listening to the people for suggestions concerning community issues (46%); and taking up issues raised by the people in the parliamentary sessions (43%), as shown in **Table 33.**

Table 33

Rating of Representativeness Survey Items

How would you rate parliamentarians in terms of the following?	Rating				
	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
Raising concerns/issues in the parliament of national interest without personal interest	3	11	29	46	11
Parliamentarians listen to the people for suggestions concerning community issues.	3	10	27	46	15
Parliamentarians take up the issues raised by the people in the parliamentary sessions.	3	12	32	43	10

***Note**. (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Further analysis indicates a notable divergence in perceptions: over 22% of parliamentarians rated their performance on these survey items "Very High", while fewer than 15% of voters gave the same rating to parliamentarians *(refer* **Annexure 8***)*. Nonetheless, Very Low ratings were uncommon, with fewer than 4% of respondents in both groups rating "Very Low".

5.2 OVERSIGHT FUNCTION AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

In Bhutan, parliamentary oversight is a cornerstone of democracy and good governance. Alongside the parliamentarians' representativeness and legislative mandates, it is through the oversight mechanisms of parliamentary committees that the executive and government are held accountable for their actions. However, **Figure 42** shows that parliamentarians are less effective in carrying out their oversight mandate, as the **Oversight Component** scored 6.58, indicating a Need Improvement level of integrity.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*
Figure 42 *Oversight Component and its Survey Items*

The relatively low Oversight score can be attributed primarily to the Need Improvement level (5.67) for moving motions in parliament. Although Satisfactory level scores were recorded for the frequency of questioning the government on national policies and issues (7.00) and for the relevance of questions directed to the executive or government (7.08), these strengths were insufficient to offset shortcomings in other oversight-related functions. This pattern suggests that while parliamentarians actively engage the executive through questioning, more formal and proactive oversight mechanisms, such as initiating parliamentary motions, are used less frequently, contributing to the lower overall oversight score.

As shown in **Table 34**, nearly half of the respondents (47%) rated parliamentary agreement with the recommendations of standing and ad hoc committees as medium, indicating limited alignment between committee outputs and broader parliamentary positions. This suggests that while committee recommendations are recognised, they do not consistently shape parliamentary consensus or result in concrete legislative action.

By contrast, 42% of respondents rated questions posed by parliamentarians to the executive and government as highly relevant, highlighting questioning as a comparatively stronger and more visible oversight tool. This indicates that parliamentarians are generally effective in engaging the executive on key policy and governance issues, even as other oversight mechanisms appear less influential.

Table 34

Rating of Oversight's Survey Items

How would you rate parliamentarians in terms of the following?	Rating				
	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
To what extent do parliamentarians agree with the recommendations of the standing or ad hoc committees of the parliament?	1	10	47	36	6
How relevant are the responses to the questions asked to the executives/ government?	1	8	41	42	8

***Note**. (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Further analysis, as presented in **Annexure 9**, shows a clear divergence between parliamentarians' self-assessments and voters' perceptions regarding agreement with committee recommendations. Parliamentarians primarily view their performance positively, with a majority rating their agreement with the recommendations of standing and ad hoc committees as High (32%) or Very High (50%). In contrast, voters tend to adopt a more Moderate (40%) to High (29%) perspective. The presence of notable "Don't Know" responses among voters further suggests limited public awareness of committee processes and parliamentary oversight activities.

A similar divergence is evident in perceptions of the relevance of questions asked of the executive or government. Parliamentarians largely rate this question favourably, with 31% giving a high rating and 15% a Very High rating, suggesting some recognition of scope for improvement even in self-assessments. Similarly, voters also rated this aspect as Medium (35%) to High (36%), indicating confidence in the substantive quality and policy relevance of the parliamentarians' oversight questioning.

5.3 LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

As outlined in the National Assembly Act of Bhutan (2008), parliament's legislative function is central to safeguarding national interests and fulfilling citizens' aspirations through the public scrutiny of policies, issues, bills, and other forms of legislation. The overall legislative function scored 6.89, which falls within the Satisfactory level *(refer* **Figure 43*)***, indicating moderately low performance in parliamentary lawmaking. Within this domain, stakeholder consultation during lawmaking scored 7.12 (Satisfactory level), suggesting a satisfactory effort to engage relevant actors and incorporate diverse perspectives. Parliamentarians also scored at a Satisfactory level on deliberations on bills (7.08), indicating that discussions are reasonably thorough.

However, the score of 6.48 for ensuring that enacted laws are practical and implementable falls within the Needs Improvement range, highlighting a potential gap between legislative intent and real-world application. This suggests a need to strengthen the translation of policy discussions into laws that are not only well-considered but also actionable and effective in practice.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*
Figure 43 *Legislative Component and its Survey Items*

A detailed examination of the legislative function of parliament, as presented in **Annexure 10**, reveals notable differences between parliamentarians' self-assessments and voter perceptions. Parliamentarians generally rate the thoroughness of bill deliberations highly, with 49% indicating "High" and 38% "Very High," and report frequent stakeholder consultation, with 38% engaging "Often" and 62% "Very Often." In contrast, only 13% rated their ability to ensure that enacted laws are practical and implementable as "Very High." In comparison, 56% rated it "High," reflecting awareness of the challenges of translating legislative deliberations into practical, actionable legislation. Voters, however, express a more moderate evaluation, the majority rated deliberations on bills as "Medium" (33%) or "High" (34%), stakeholder consultation as "Seldom" (33%) or "Often" (28%), and the implementability of laws as "Medium" (34%) or "High" (37%), with a notable proportion indicating "Don't Know" (10–

15%). This divergence underscores a perceptual gap between parliamentarians and the voters, suggesting that while parliamentarians view themselves as highly engaged and consultative, voters remain less confident regarding both the frequency of consultations and the practical outcomes of the legislative process. Although deliberations and stakeholder engagement are relatively intense, greater emphasis on ensuring the implementability of laws is necessary to enhance public confidence in parliamentary effectiveness.

5.4 TRANSPARENCY AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

As shown in **Figure 44**, the overall transparency of parliamentary functioning received a score of 6.95, indicating a Satisfactory level of integrity. Within this domain, citizens' opportunities to express their views and concerns to their representatives were rated 6.88 (Satisfactory level), indicating that public engagement mechanisms exist but could be improved. Parliamentarians scored slightly higher (7.02, Satisfactory level) in the frequency with which they disseminate parliamentary resolutions to citizens, reflecting a relatively proactive effort to communicate decisions and maintain accountability. Nonetheless, further measures are needed to enhance transparency and ensure more robust public access to parliamentary processes.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 44 *Transparency Component and its Survey Items*

In addition, as illustrated in **Figure 45**, 62.30% of respondents reported that parliamentarians provide citizens with updates on the status or progress of election pledges. In comparison, 37.70% indicated that such updates are not provided. This highlights that although most parliamentarians keep constituents informed about their electoral commitments, a significant proportion do not, revealing gaps in consistent transparency.



Note.*(n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 45 *Percentage of Parliamentarians Updating the Citizens on the Status of Election Pledges*

In terms of satisfaction *(refer* **Figure 46*)***, 69% of respondents expressed satisfaction (14.61% “Very Satisfied” and 3.52% “Satisfied”), 8.21% expressed dissatisfaction, and 23.13% remained neutral, with a small proportion (0.53%) reporting “Don’t Know.” This suggests that while most citizens view parliamentary reporting on election pledges positively, gaps remain in both the consistency and comprehensiveness of communication, highlighting the need for enhanced citizen participation, broader access to parliamentary outputs, and more consistent reporting to strengthen public trust and confidence in parliamentary performance



Note. *(n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 46 *The Percentage of Citizens Satisfied with the Extent to which Parliamentarians Keep them Informed about the Progress of their Election Pledges*

A deeper analysis of the transparency survey items, as rated by parliamentarians and voters, is presented in **Annexure 11.** The engagement of parliamentary committees with the public and relevant stakeholders is generally perceived positively, though notable differences exist between parliamentarians' self-assessments and voter perceptions. Among parliamentarians, 46% rated committee consultation as "High" and 38% as "Very High", with only 3% and 13% indicating "Low" or "Medium" consultation, respectively. Voters expressed a slightly more moderate view, with 39% rating consultation as "High", 43% as "Medium", and 12–14% reporting "Low" or "Very Low" consultation, while 12% indicated "Don't Know", suggesting that a significant proportion of the public remains uncertain about the extent of such engagement.

Regarding satisfaction with committee consultations, both parliamentarians and voters reported broadly positive assessments. Among parliamentarians, 13% were "Very Satisfied" and 56% "Satisfied". Similarly, 15% of voters were "Very Satisfied", 53% "Satisfied", 23% "Neutral", and 8% "Dissatisfied" or "Very Dissatisfied". The close alignment between parliamentarian and voter satisfaction indicates general approval of committee consultation practices. However, the presence of neutral and dissatisfied responses indicates opportunities to increase both the frequency and visibility of stakeholder engagement in committee proceedings.

5.5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

Figure 47 presents the scores for the **Accountability Components** and their survey items. The overall accountability score for parliamentarians is 6.97, indicating a Satisfactory level of accountability performance. Parliamentarians scored relatively high on adherence to codes of conduct, with a score of 7.41 (Satisfactory level), indicating that most comply with established ethical standards and formal codes. This reflects positively on institutional norms and ethical awareness. In contrast, the indicator assessing parliamentarians' active monitoring of developmental activities in their constituencies recorded a lower score of 6.52 (Need Improvement), indicating room for improvement in constituency-level monitoring and follow-up on development initiatives.



Note. *0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*
Figure 47 *Accountability Component and its Survey Items*

Regular attendance at parliamentary sessions enables parliamentarians to participate effectively in debates, monitor government performance, and fulfil their oversight responsibilities, all of which are key aspects of accountability. The results for satisfaction with parliamentarians' attendance show 47.51% "Satisfied" and 15.48% "Very Satisfied". Only 6.98% (1.53% "Very Dissatisfied" and 5.45% "Dissatisfied") were dissatisfied *(refer* **Figure 48***).*



Note. *(n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 48 *Satisfaction with the Attendance of the Parliamentarians in the Parliament Sessions*

However, a deeper analysis *(refer* **Annexure 12***)* of satisfaction with parliamentarians' attendance reveals an interesting contrast between parliamentarians' and voters' perceptions. Among parliamentarians, a majority (95%) expressed satisfaction with their attendance, 5% were neutral, and no respondents reported dissatisfaction. In comparison, voter satisfaction was lower, 62% "Satisfied" or "Very Satisfied", 26% "Neutral", 6% "Dissatisfied", and 5% did not know. While self-assessments reflect confidence in their participation, the comparatively lower voter satisfaction highlights the need for greater transparency, engagement, and visible accountability in parliamentary sessions to strengthen public trust.

The findings on adherence to the code of conduct reveal a generally positive perception, with notable differences between parliamentarians' self-assessments and voters' ratings. Among parliamentarians, the majority (79%) rated "High" or "Very High". In contrast, voters were slightly more cautious, with 64% rating as "High" or "Very High". Similarly, the majority of Parliamentarians (72%) rated themselves as performing at a "High" or "Very High" level in monitoring development activities in their respective constituencies. In contrast, voters' assessments were more Moderate, 32% gave a "Neutral" rating, while 31% rated Parliamentarians' monitoring efforts as "High". This disparity suggests a perceptual gap between Parliamentarians' self-assessments and voters' assessments, highlighting potential areas for improvement in communication, visibility, and the tangible outcomes of monitoring activities to align public perception with Parliamentarians' reported efforts.

5.6 INTEGRITY AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

The integrity of parliamentarians is essential to ensure that parliamentary functions, both legislative and oversight, are conducted effectively and remain trustworthy. Integrity violations or dishonesty can weaken parliamentary business and undermine Parliament's mandate, reputation, and credibility, ultimately affecting the nation's security and sovereignty, as well as the well-being of its citizens.

Figure 49 presents the Integrity Component and its survey items. Integrity Components received a score of 6.89 (Satisfactory level), indicating that Parliamentarians are primarily seen as upholding ethical standards. Specifically, performing public duties without fear or favour scored at Need Improvement level (6.30), suggesting that while impartiality is generally recognised, there may be occasional concerns about bias or external influence. In contrast, setting an example as law-abiding citizens received a Satisfactory level rating (7.48), highlighting strong recognition of Parliamentarians as role models in adhering to laws and regulations.



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean; (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*
Figure 49 *Integrity Component and its Survey Items*

When asked about Parliamentarians' ability to set an example as law-abiding citizens, most respondents expressed positive views *(refer* **Figure 50***)*. Specifically, 45% rated this attribute as "High" and 19% as "Very High", while 21% rated it "Medium". Only a small proportion perceived this quality as "Low" (9%) or "Very Low" (4%), and 3% were unsure. This indicates that most citizens view Parliamentarians as role models in adhering to laws and regulations, reinforcing the relatively strong integrity assessment score of 7.48. However, the presence of a notable middle segment suggests there is still room to further enhance public confidence and visibility in Parliamentarians' law-abiding conduct.



Note. *(n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 50 *Percentage of Parliamentarians Setting an Example as Law-abiding Citizens*

Further analysis *(refer* **Annexure 13***)* shows that parliamentarians were generally perceived positively for their integrity and ethical conduct, though some differences emerge between self-assessments and voters' perceptions. For performing public duties without fear or favour, 62% of parliamentarians rated themselves as "High" (36%) or "Very High" (26%). In comparison, voters gave a slightly lower combined rating of 53% ("High" 39%, "Very High" 14%), and a larger proportion of voters (23%) rated this attribute as "Medium" compared to 23% of parliamentarians. In terms of advocating or creating awareness of the country's laws during constituency visits, parliamentarians rated themselves Very Highly, with 81% scoring "High" (34%) or "Very High" (47%). In comparison, voters gave a slightly lower combined rating of 63% ("High" 45%, "Very High" 18%). Similarly, in setting an example as law-abiding citizens, both parliamentarians and voters gave strong ratings: 76% and 67% rated "High" or "Very High," and only a small minority rated "Very Low" or "Low."

5.7 CORRUPTION AND ITS SURVEY ITEMS

Figure 51 presents the Corruption Component score and its survey items. The score of 9.38 (Outstanding level) on the Corruption component indicates a high level of integrity, driven mainly by Outstanding level scores on the frequency-related survey items, including frequency and amount of payment in cash or kind (9.93 each), frequency of payment of entertainment (9.97), and frequency of payment of other forms of gratification (9.93). In addition, the amounts for entertainment (payment 9.99) and cash or kind (9.93) reflect a Very High level of integrity. These scores indicate a low prevalence of experienced corruption or low involvement of parliamentarians in corrupt acts/practices.

While direct experiences of corruption are low, perceptions of electoral corruption remain a concern. A Need Improvement score of 6.51 on the prevalence of payments in cash, kind, or services to gain voter support indicates that respondents view such inducements as relatively common. This suggests widespread concern that gifts, services, or other forms of electoral incentives may be used to influence voter behaviour, potentially undermining electoral fairness



***Note**. 0 = Highly Corrupt/Lowest level of Integrity and 10 = Highly Transparent/Very Clean;* (n=1,505, NIA 2025)

Figure 51 *Corruption Component and its Survey Items*

When asked whether parliamentarians give preferential treatment to their supporters, family, or relatives, respondents' ratings indicated mixed perceptions of impartiality *(refer* **Figure 52***)*. A substantial proportion rated "Very Low" (18.27%) or "Low" (36.21%), indicating that most parliamentarians are largely impartial. However, 18.80% rated it "Medium," and a combined 17.48% assigned "High" (14.29%) or "Very High" (3.19%) ratings, suggesting that a notable minority acknowledged that parliamentarians engage in practices that could be construed as preferential. Even moderate favouritism can erode public trust, as perceived partiality may undermine confidence in parliament's fairness.



***Note**. (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 52 *Parliamentarians give preferential treatment to their supporters/family/relative*

Table 35 presents respondents' perceptions of undue influence on parliamentarians in the law-making process, assessed across a range of potential sources. Overall, the findings indicate a predominant perception that parliamentarians are not commonly subjected to corrupt or improper influence. A substantial majority (46%) of respondents disagreed that illegal payments, such as bribery in cash or in kind, are used to influence parliamentarians during law-making. Similar disagreements were observed regarding other forms of bribery, including receptions, promises of future employment, and expensive gifts (44%), suggesting that both monetary and non-monetary inducements are perceived as relatively uncommon.

The perception that parliamentarians misuse their power for personal or vested interests is also widely rejected, with 45% of respondents disagreeing. This pattern reflects a generally upbeat assessment of parliamentarians' adherence to ethical standards and their legislative mandate. In addition, the majority of respondents disagreed that lobbying by groups or individuals (46%) or political campaign funding (45%) plays a significant role in shaping parliamentary decisions, indicating that external pressures from organised interests are not widely viewed as decisive in the law-making process.

Respondents further demonstrated low perceived prevalence of indirect or coercive forms of influence. Approximately half of respondents disagreed that parliamentarians are often influenced by false or misleading information (49%), and an even larger proportion rejected the use of threats, such as violence, smear campaigns, or negative rumours, to influence lawmakers (50%). These findings suggest confidence in parliamentarians' capacity to exercise independent judgment and resist both informational manipulation and intimidation.

However, responses to the statement *"There is no undue influence on parliamentarians in the law-making process"* reveal a more nuanced perspective. While 39% of respondents Agreed or Strongly Agreed with this statement, a notable proportion (36%) Disagreed or Strongly Disagreed, and 15% remained Neutral. This distribution indicates that, despite an overall positive assessment, a significant minority of respondents either question the complete absence of undue influence or remain uncertain about it.

Table 35

Perceptions of Undue Influence on Parliamentarians in the Law-making Process

For each statement below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree using the following scale:	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neutral	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total
Illegal payments (such as bribery in cash or kind) are commonly used to influence parliamentarians during law-making.	32	46	5	8	6	3	1	100
Parliamentarians are often influenced by other forms of bribery, such as being offered receptions, future jobs, or expensive gifts.	33	44	6	7	7	3	1	100
It is common for parliamentarians to misuse their power for personal or vested interests in the law-making process.	31	45	6	7	6	3	1	100
Lobbying efforts by groups or individuals play a significant role in influencing parliamentarians' decisions.	28	46	5	10	6	4	1	100
Political campaign funding is frequently used to gain influence over parliamentarians.	27	45	5	9	8	5	1	100
Parliamentarians are often influenced by false or misleading information when making laws.	27	49	6	11	5	3	0	100
Threats, such as acts of violence, smear campaigns, or negative rumours, are used to influence parliamentarians.	31	50	5	7	4	3	1	100
There is no undue influence on parliamentarians in the law-making process.	13	24	4	15	5	31	9	100

***Note**. (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

A deeper analysis *(refer* **Annexure 14)** reveals notable differences and similarities in the perceptions of parliamentarians and voters regarding undue influence in the law-making process. Across most statements, parliamentarians exhibit higher levels of disagreement than voters, suggesting greater confidence in the integrity of parliamentary decision-making. For instance, a large majority of parliamentarians (87%) disagreed that illegal payments are commonly used to influence them, compared to a lower, though still substantial, proportion of voters (76%). Similar patterns are observed in other forms of bribery, misuse of power for personal or vested interests, and the influence of false or misleading information, in which parliamentarians consistently report a more decisive rejection of such practices than voters do.

Differences are more pronounced in the case of structural and indirect forms of influence. While parliamentarians show greater agreement that lobbying efforts (36%) and political campaign funding (15%) can influence parliamentary decisions, voters are more sceptical, with lower agreement and higher proportions of neutral or "Don't Know" responses. This pattern suggests that voters may have limited awareness of these influence mechanisms or perceive them as less visible and less transparent, resulting in greater uncertainty about their actual impact.

Perceptions of coercive influences, such as threats, are largely dismissive among both groups, although voters again show slightly greater scepticism. Finally, the findings reveal a notable perception gap regarding the statement, "There is no undue influence on parliamentarians in the law-making process." A substantial proportion of parliamentarians express agreement (6%), whereas voters are more divided, with lower levels of agreement (35%) and higher degrees of neutrality and uncertainty.

When asked whether they had seen or heard of parliamentarians engaging in the exchange of favours or acts of extortion while performing their duties, only 5% of respondents answered "Yes." In contrast, the overwhelming majority (95%) answered "No" *(refer* **Figure 53***).*



Note. *(n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 53 *Percentage of Involvement of Parliamentarians in Exchange for Favours or Extortion While Performing Duties*

Of the 5% who said parliamentarians engage in exchange of favours and extortion while performing duties, perceptions of the frequency of such behaviour vary *(refer* **Figure 54***)*. Only 6% believe it occurs "Very Often", while 28% report it happens "Often". The largest share, 41%, said it appears "Seldom", and 25% said it occurs "Rarely". Notably, none of the respondents indicated that it never happens, and 1% were unsure.



Note.*(n=69, NIA 2025)*

Figure 54 *Frequency of Parliamentarians Engaging in the Exchange of Favours or Extortion*

When asked whether parliamentarians engage in private businesses, such as operating mines and quarries in collusion with private individuals or companies, an overwhelming 97% of respondents believe they do not *(refer* **Figure 55***)*. In comparison, only 3% think they do, suggesting that concerns about direct conflicts of interest in these types of businesses are minimal among the surveyed population.



Note. *(n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 55 *Percentage of Parliamentarians Engaging in Private Business*

When respondents were asked to what extent private business engagements negatively impact the integrity of parliamentarians, perceptions varied *(refer* **Figure 56***)*. Of the 3% who said parliamentarians engage in private business, 16% believe it happens "Very Often", 22% said "Often", and the largest share, 30%, consider it occurs "Seldom". Meanwhile, 14% believe it happens "Rarely", another 14% think it "Never" occurs, and 4% were unsure.



Note*. (n=50, NIA 2025)*

Figure 56 *The Extent to which Private Business Engagements Affect Parliamentarians' Integrity*

As shown in **Figure 57**, when asked whether parliamentarians were seen or if respondents had heard of parliamentarians misusing privileged information for personal gain, only 3% reported having seen or heard of such misuse. In comparison, 97% said they had not.



Note*. (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

Figure 57 *Percentage of Perceptions of Parliamentarians Misusing Privileged Information*

Respondents were asked how serious they consider the misuse of privileged information by parliamentarians *(refer* **Figure 58***)*. Among the 3% who reported having seen or heard of such misuse, the majority perceive it as a significant concern. Notably, 34% view it as very serious and 13% as extremely serious, indicating that such incidents are widely regarded as highly detrimental to parliamentary integrity. An additional 26% consider it moderately serious, and 21% perceive it as slightly serious, reflecting a spectrum of concern even among the few aware of such cases. Only 4% believe it is not serious at all, while 2% were unsure. This suggests that while direct exposure to misuse of privileged information is rare, those who witness it perceive a substantial threat to accountability and ethical standards in parliament.



Note. *(n=47, NIA 2025)*

Figure 58 *Degree of Seriousness of the Misuse of Privileged Information by Parliamentarians*

5.8 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PII AND COMPONENT SCORES BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARIANS AND VOTERS OF DIFFERENT EDUCATIONAL LEVELS

The comparison of the Parliamentarians' Integrity Index (PII) across respondent groups reveals clear perceptual differences between parliamentarians and the electorate, as well as subtle variations linked to education levels among voters (*refer* **Table 36**). The overall PII score is 7.15, while parliamentarians rate themselves significantly higher at 7.95, suggesting a more favourable self-assessment. In contrast, voters give lower evaluations, with scores ranging narrowly from 6.34 to 6.41 across education categories. This consistent gap suggests a perceptual divide between institutional self-evaluation and public assessment.

Across all core functions of the Parliamentarians, Representativeness, Oversight, Legislative, Transparency, Accountability, and Integrity, Parliamentarians consistently assign higher ratings than voters. The most pronounced gaps appear in Oversight (7.70 vs 5.47–5.74), Legislative performance (7.99 vs 5.62–5.86), and Transparency (8.17 vs 5.85–5.89).

These gaps indicate a potential "bubble" of institutional complacency, in which lawmakers' perceptions of effectiveness and integrity are misaligned with the experiences and expectations of the citizens they serve. Addressing this perception–reality gap is essential for strengthening public trust, improving accountability, and ensuring that parliamentary performance aligns with citizens' expectations.

When disaggregated by education level, voter ratings reveal important nuances. Voters with education levels between Class VII–XII gave slightly lower ratings for Oversight and Legislative functions than more-educated groups, suggesting that respondents with secondary education may hold more critical views of parliamentary effectiveness. Meanwhile, voters with Certificate–PhD qualifications show marginally higher scores in areas such as Representativeness and Integrity compared to lower-educated voters, though the differences are modest. This relative consistency across education categories indicates that scepticism toward Parliament's performance is not confined to a particular educational stratum but is broadly shared.

Further, the same pattern follows for the Corruption dimension. Parliamentarians rated themselves very highly on the Corruption component (9.52), indicating few incidents of Corruption. Voters across all education levels assigned Very High scores (9.21–9.33). The lower scores indicate a higher perceived prevalence and actual incidence of corrupt practices, meaning that respondents not only view such inducements as common but also believe they occur frequently. This highlights significant concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process and underscores the need for stronger preventive measures and oversight. Addressing these issues through stricter enforcement of electoral rules, enhanced monitoring mechanisms, and public awareness campaigns is essential to reduce vote-buying and reinforce public trust in democratic institutions.

Overall, while education level introduces slight gradations in perception, particularly among more educated respondents, who demonstrate somewhat differentiated assessments, the dominant pattern is uniform public caution. The relatively small spread between voter education groups suggests that perceptions of parliamentary integrity are shaped more by shared public experience and broader political narratives than by differences in educational attainment. The persistent gap between parliamentarians' self-ratings and voters' assessments, especially in oversight and transparency, underscores the need for strengthened accountability mechanisms, clearer communication of parliamentary functions, and more visible demonstration of institutional effectiveness.

Table 36

Comparative Analysis of PII and Component Scores between Parliamentarians and Voters of Different Educational levels

Index and Components	Overall PII	Parliamentarians	Voters (No Formal Education/NFE/ Monastic Education)	Voters (Pre-Primary-XII)	Voters (Certificate-PHD)
PII Score	7.15	7.95	6.31	6.41	6.40
Representativeness	6.88	7.59	6.13	6.18	6.34
Oversight	6.58	7.70	5.39	5.52	5.74
Legislative	6.89	7.99	5.78	5.86	5.62
Transparency	6.95	8.17	5.62	5.85	5.89
Accountability	6.97	7.72	6.19	6.25	6.19
Integrity	6.89	7.28	6.49	6.51	6.39
Corruption	9.38	9.52	9.18	9.31	9.21

***Note**. (n=39 Parliamentarians, n=1,466 Voters, NIA 2025)*

5.9 SUMMARY OF THE SCORES FOR PII

The sustainability of parliamentary integrity in Bhutan faces several interrelated risks. The parliament's low score (*refer* **Table 37**) in proactively raising motions (5.67) indicates an erosion of oversight, reflecting a reactive rather than proactive approach to holding the executive accountable. At the same time, while parliamentarians demonstrate strong personal integrity (7.48), their ability to perform duties impartially "without fear or favour" is lower (6.30), highlighting a gap between individual ethics and institutional conduct. Additionally, perceptions of electoral inducements and favouritism (6.51) threaten the legitimacy of the electoral process, even in the context of Outstanding scores for experienced corruption. Together, these dynamics suggest that without strengthened oversight, institutionalised ethical practices, and measures to address public perceptions, the credibility, effectiveness, and long-term sustainability of parliamentary governance may be undermined.

Strategically, these findings underscore the need for parliament to move beyond a focus on individual "cleanliness" to a focus on functional accountability. Priority reforms should include strengthening committee oversight, formalising dialogue with constituents, and addressing perceived practices of favouritism to bridge the gap between internal self-perception and public evaluation, thereby enhancing both institutional effectiveness and public confidence.

Table 37
Summary of Survey Items for PII

Survey Items	Score	level
Representativeness	**6.88**	Satisfactory
Representing concerns/issues of citizens in the parliament	7.05	Satisfactory
Speaking rationally during parliamentary discussion	6.76	Need Improvement
Frequency of speaking in the parliament	6.81	Need Improvement
Oversight	**6.58**	Need Improvement
Frequency of parliamentarians questioning the government on national policies/issues	7.00	Satisfactory
Frequency of parliamentarians moving the motion (raise the issue of national priorities) in the parliament	5.67	Need Improvement
Relevance of questions to the executives/government	7.08	Satisfactory
Legislative	**6.89**	Satisfactory
The deliberations on the bills are extensive and thorough	7.08	Satisfactory
Parliamentarians frequently consult relevant stakeholders during lawmaking	7.12	Satisfactory
Parliamentarians ensure that enacted laws are practical and implementable.	6.48	Need Improvement
Transparency	**6.95**	Satisfactory
Citizens have adequate opportunities to express their views and concerns to their representatives.	6.88	Satisfactory

Frequency of parliamentarians disseminating the resolutions of the parliamentary sessions to the citizens	7.02	Satisfactory

Accountability	**6.97**	Satisfactory
Parliamentarians largely abide by the codes of conduct.	7.41	Satisfactory
Parliamentarians actively monitor developmental activities in their constituencies	6.52	Need Improvement
Integrity	6.89	Satisfactory
Performing public duties without fear or favours	6.30	Need Improvement
Set an example as law-abiding citizens	7.48	Satisfactory
Corruption	**9.38**	Outstanding
Perception of payment in cash or kind or services to gain voter support	6.51	Need Improvement
Frequency of payment of cash/kind	9.93	Outstanding
Amount of payment of cash/kind	9.93	Outstanding
Frequency of payment of entertainment	9.97	Outstanding
Amount of payment of entertainment	9.99	Outstanding
Frequency of payment of other forms of gratification	9.93	Outstanding

***Note**. (n=1,505, NIA 2025)*

CHAPTER 6: GENERAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTION

Chapter 6 examines the perceptions of service users, service providers, parliamentarians, and the general public regarding corruption and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). Perceptions of corruption are assessed across multiple dimensions, including the seriousness of corruption, trends of corruption over the past five years, the prevalence of different forms of corruption, and the effectiveness of the ACC's efforts to combat corruption. The chapter concludes by outlining key anti-corruption strategies.

6.1 SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION

To assess general corruption scenarios, service users and providers in the Public Sector, as well as Parliamentarians and Voters, were asked to rate the seriousness of the country's corruption problem.

A total of 17,896 respondents participated in the survey, including 16,691 from the public sector (11,422 service users and 4969 service providers) and 1,505 respondents assessing parliamentarians (39 members of parliament and 1,466 general citizens/voters). Respondents were asked to provide their views on multiple dimensions of corruption, including its seriousness, trends, the prevalence of different forms of corruption, and the effectiveness of the ACC's efforts in combating corruption.

Figure 59 illustrates respondents' perceptions of the seriousness of corruption among External respondents, Internal respondents, Parliamentarians, and Voters. Overall, a substantial majority across all groups perceive corruption as a serious issue, with most rating it as either "Quite Serious" or "Very Serious." In particular, the proportion of respondents who consider corruption "Quite serious" is notably high across all categories, accounting for 61% among External respondents, 45% among Internal respondents, 54% among Parliamentarians, and 64% among Voters.

Perceptions of corruption as "Very Serious" are most pronounced among Internal respondents (39%), followed by Parliamentarians (31%). Lower proportions are observed among External respondents (18%) and Voters (15%). This suggests that internal stakeholders have comparatively stronger perceptions of the severity of corruption.

Regarding differences across respondent groups, Internal respondents report the highest level of concern, with nearly two-fifths (39%) describing corruption as "Very Serious," compared to 31% among Parliamentarians, 18% among External respondents, and 15% among Voters. Conversely, perceptions of corruption as "Not Serious" remain comparatively limited across all groups. However, this view is somewhat more common among Parliamentarians (15%) and External respondents (14%) than among Internal respondents (6%) and Voters (12%).

levels of uncertainty, reflected in the "Don't Know" category, are highest among Internal respondents (10%), followed by External respondents (8%) and Voters (9%). Notably, no Parliamentarians reported uncertainty regarding the seriousness of corruption.



Note. *(n=17,877, NIA 2025)*

Figure 59 *Seriousness of Corruption*

6.2 TREND OF CORRUPTION IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS

Respondents were asked about their perception of how corruption has changed in the country over the past five years *(refer* **Figure 60***)*. Overall, a notable proportion of respondents perceive corruption as having increased, particularly among Internal respondents (45%) and Parliamentarians (36%). External respondents also report a considerable share (33%), indicating an increase, while voters reflect a comparatively lower proportion (26%), suggesting a more moderate perception of worsening corruption among this group. Regarding perceptions of a decrease in corruption, Voters report the highest proportion (31%), followed closely by External respondents (29%) and Parliamentarians (28%). Internal respondents show the lowest proportion (17%) perceiving a decrease, indicating comparatively less optimism within this group. Perceptions that corruption has remained the same vary across respondent categories. Voters (29%) and Parliamentarians (28%) report the highest proportions holding this view, followed by External respondents (25%). In contrast, a smaller proportion of Internal respondents (15%) believe that corruption has remained unchanged.

Uncertainty regarding corruption trends, reflected in the *"Don't Know"* category, is most evident among Internal respondents (23%), followed by Voters (14%) and External respondents (13%). Parliamentarians show the lowest level of uncertainty (8%), suggesting a relatively clearer perception of corruption trends within this group.

Although direct experiences of corruption remain low, 40% of respondents perceive that corruption has increased over the past five years. This growing perception contributes to a trust deficit, which could gradually erode public confidence and undermine the legitimacy and credibility of public institutions. Addressing both actual misconduct and public perceptions is therefore essential to sustain institutional integrity and citizen trust.

Uncertainty regarding these trends, particularly pronounced among internal public officials, suggests a lack of clarity within the civil service about the effectiveness of internal controls. These findings underscore the need for strengthened oversight, improved internal governance, and enhanced communication to address both real and perceived risks to public sector integrity.



Note. *(n=17,877, NIA 2025)*

Figure 60 *Trend of Corruption in the Last Five Years*

Figure 61 illustrates the perceived trend in corruption in the country from 2012 to 2025. The proportion of respondents who believe corruption has increased is highest in NIA 2025 at 40%. Conversely, the share reporting that corruption has decreased is lowest in NIA 2025, followed by NIA 2019 (27%). The "Don't Know" responses also peak in NIA 2025 at 21%. Overall, the findings indicate a clear upward shift in perceptions of corruption, with more respondents viewing it as increasing and fewer perceiving a decline.



Note. *(n=9,066 in NIA 2012; n=10,814 in NIA 2016; n=13,869 in NIA 2019; n=12,641 in NIA 2022 and n=17,877 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 61 *Comparative Analysis of Corruption Trend*

6.3 PREVALENCE OF TYPES OF CORRUPTION

Under the Anti-Corruption Act of Bhutan (ACC, 2011), 35 corruption-related acts are identified and broadly grouped into 14 categories of corruption offences. **Figure 62** illustrates the overall prevalence of some of the most commonly occurring corruption offences. The largest share of respondents (39%) described corruption as "somewhat rampant," while 15% viewed it as "most rampant." In contrast, 19% believed that corruption is "not at all rampant," and a notable 27% indicated that they "do not know." Overall, these findings suggest that most respondents perceive corruption as widespread, whereas only a small segment considers it minimal.



Note. *(n=17,877, NIA 2025)*

Figure 62 *Rampancy of Corruption*

Respondents were asked to assess the rampancy of various types of corruption in the country (*refer* **Table 38**). Nepotism/favouritism emerged as the most widespread form, with 39% of respondents rating it as "Most Rampant," followed closely by misuse of office resources (23%) and misuse of authority (20%). Bribery was most frequently reported as "Somewhat Rampant," with 51% of respondents selecting this category, indicating that, while it is recognised, it may not be perceived as the most pervasive form of corruption. In contrast, possession of unexplained wealth and concealment of corruption proceeds had the highest proportions of "Don't Know" responses (41% and 42% respectively), suggesting uncertainty or limited visibility among respondents regarding these forms of corruption. Other offences such as embezzlement, false claims, misuse of privileged information, and failure to declare conflicts of interest were generally considered "Somewhat Rampant," reflecting moderate awareness of these practices.

In addition to the listed corruption offences, respondents highlighted other forms of corruption, including policy and systemic corruption, delays in administrative processes, and corruption involving sexual favours. These findings underscore both the prevalence of nepotism and favouritism in public sectors and the need for enhanced transparency, accountability mechanisms, and civic education to address less visible but equally harmful forms of corruption.

Table 38

Rampancy of Various Types of Corruption

How rampant are the following types of corruption in the country?	Most Rampant	Somewhat Rampant	Not At All Rampant	Don't Know	Total
Bribery	18	51	13	18	100
Embezzlement	13	44	18	25	100
Misuse of Authority	20	45	17	17	100
Failure to Declare Conflict of Interests	9	36	23	32	100
False Claims	11	35	26	27	100
Misuse of Privileged Information	9	35	22	34	100
Concealment of Corruption Proceeds	5	29	24	42	100
Misuse of Office Resources	23	46	16	15	100
Possession of Unexplained Wealth	5	28	25	41	100
Nepotism/Favouritism	39	41	5	14	100

Note. *(n=15,970, NIA 2025)*

This finding is corroborated by the FY 2024-2025 complaint data, which shows that the highest number of corruption reports was related to abuse of function (24.2%), followed by bribery and embezzlement, as shown in **Table 39.**

Table 39

Percentage of Corruption Reports by Types of Offences

Offences	Frequency	Percent
Abuse of Function	88	24.18
Abuse of privilaged info	1	0.27
Bribery	19	5.22
Conflict of Interest	5	1.37
Disproportionate Asset	1	0.27
Embezzlement	33	9.07
False Claim	3	0.82
Non Persuable complaint	197	54.12
Others	17	4.67
Total	**364**	**100.00**

Note*. (Analysis of corruption reports received in FY 204-2025)*

6.4 ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS

Figure 63 illustrates respondents' awareness of the ACC. Public perceptions of corruption are closely influenced by how the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is viewed. Awareness is heavily skewed toward its investigative role (47%), while its proactive efforts in education (31%) and prevention (27%) are far less visible. Although 85% of respondents generally consider anti-corruption efforts effective, the proportion rating the ACC as *"Doing Very Well"* has steadily declined from 2012 to 2025, suggesting waning confidence in its performance.

Despite generally high levels of awareness of the ACC across most stakeholder groups, a significant gap persists among the electorate. About 27% of voters report being unaware of the ACC, compared to near-universal awareness among internal public officials (98%), as well as high levels among parliamentarians (97%) and external respondents (88%). This disparity highlights a critical shortfall in reaching the general public and points to the need for more targeted outreach, stronger civic education efforts, and clearer communication of the ACC's role and achievements to enhance public trust and reinforce the legitimacy of anti-corruption initiatives.



Note. *(n=17,443, NIA 2025)*
Figure 63 *Awareness of ACC*

Respondents were asked to indicate the sources through which they had obtained information or heard about the ACC *(refer* **Figure 64***)*. Social media emerged as the most frequently cited source, accounting for 21.9% of total responses, followed by television (19.7%) and word of mouth (13.2%). Traditional print media, including newspapers and other published materials, accounted for 10.8% and 4.2% of responses, respectively, while radio accounted for 3.4%. Public engagement channels also played a notable role: public meetings or gatherings accounted for 10.5% of mentions, demonstrating the importance of direct interaction with stakeholders. Digital sources, such as websites, accounted for 11.7%, highlighting the value of online information dissemination.

Less commonly cited sources included reminders or notifications by the ACC office (4.4%), schools (0.09%), and visits to ACC offices (0.06%), while a very small proportion of respondents referenced other sources (0.01%).

These findings suggest that while modern digital platforms like social media and television are the most effective for reaching a broad audience, there remains an opportunity to strengthen awareness through targeted in-person engagements, printed materials, and institutional channels to ensure comprehensive outreach across all stakeholder groups, including voters, parliamentarians, external, and internal stakeholders.



Note. *(n=52,702, NIA 2025) *Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multiple-response item*

Figure 64 *Sources of Awareness on ACC*

Respondents were asked which aspects of the ACC's work they had heard about or seen information on *(refer* **Figure 65***)*. Investigation emerged as the most widely recognised function, accounting for 41.9% of all responses. In comparison, education and prevention were considerably less visible, at 30.3% and 27.9%, respectively.

The disproportionate awareness of investigative activities suggests a visibility bias in the ACC's outreach, in which reactive measures such as investigations overshadow proactive initiatives aimed at education and prevention. This imbalance raises concerns about the public's understanding of the ACC's comprehensive mandate, potentially limiting the effectiveness of preventive anti-corruption strategies. Enhancing communication and visibility of education and prevention programs is therefore essential to foster a more informed and engaged stakeholder base, and to shift the perception of the ACC from solely an enforcement body to a proactive institution addressing systemic corruption.



Note. *(n=31,962, NIA 2025) *Total indicates the sum of all the responses to a multiple-response item*

Figure 65 *Awareness of ACC Interventions*

Regarding ACC's efforts to combat corruption, there is generally a positive public perception. As shown in **Figure 66**, a clear majority of respondents (85%) believe these efforts are effective, with 28% rating them as "Doing very well" and 57% as "Doing fairly well". Only a small proportion (7%) feel that ACC is "Not doing well", while 9% of respondents were unsure.



Note. *(n=15,564, NIA 2025)*

Figure 66 *ACC's Efforts in Combating Corruption*

As shown in **Figure 67**, perceptions of the Anti-Corruption Commission's (ACC) efforts in combating corruption were broadly favourable across all categories of respondents, indicating a generally positive assessment of the institution's performance. Parliamentarians expressed the highest level of confidence in ACC's efforts, with half of the respondents (50%) rating its performance as "Doing very well". This was followed by voters (33%), external respondents (29%) and internal respondents (24%). This suggests a comparatively stronger endorsement of ACC's performance among political stakeholders and the electorate than among the public sector's internal clients.

Negative evaluations of ACC's performance were relatively limited and confined to small proportions across all respondent groups. The perception that ACC is not doing well was most pronounced among internal respondents (10%), followed by external respondents (6%). In contrast, only a small share of voters (3%) and parliamentarians (5%) expressed dissatisfaction with ACC's efforts. Overall, the low prevalence of negative ratings indicates that overt criticism of ACC's anti-corruption initiatives remains minimal. However, the relatively high levels of dissatisfaction among internal respondents may indicate contextual or operational challenges within institutional settings that warrant further exploration.



Note. *(n=15,564, NIA 2025)*

Figure 67 *Perceptions of ACC's Efforts by Internal and External Clients of the Public Sector, Voters, and Parliamentarians*

A further comparison of the perception of ACC's efforts across successive surveys (2012, 2016, 2019, 2022, and 2025) is presented in **Figure 68**. The proportion of respondents rating ACC's efforts as "Doing Very Well" in 2025 declined by 1% from 2022, 7% from 2019, 24% from 2016, and 33% from 2012. In contrast, the share of respondents indicating "Not Doing Well" increased to 7% in 2025, up from 5% in 2022 and 2019, 2% in 2016, and 5% in 2012, reflecting a gradual rise in negative assessments in recent years.

Conversely, the proportion rating ACC's efforts as "Doing Fairly Well" has shown a sustained upward trend, increasing by 1% from 2022, 7% from 2019, 16% from 2016, and 23% from

2012. Despite ACC's continued advocacy and sensitisation initiatives, uncertainty regarding its efforts has increased over time, as evidenced by the rise in "Don't Know" responses from 0% in 2012 to 9% in 2025.



***Note**. (n=9,066 in NIA 2012; n=10,814 in NIA 2016; n=13,869 in NIA 2019; n=12,641 in NIA 2022 and n=15,564 in NIA 2025).*

Figure 68 *Comparative Analysis of ACC's Efforts*

6.5 ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES

Figure 69 shows the perceptions of External and Internal clients of the Public Sector and of Parliamentarians and General Citizens, regarding strategies to combat corruption. As illustrated, 52% of internal respondents and 39% of external respondents perceived that ACC should prioritise prevention, while 24% and 26% of respondents, respectively, emphasised advocacy and education. Among parliamentarians, 24% favoured advocacy and education, 52% prevention, and 24% investigation. Similarly, voters/general citizens prioritised prevention (39%), followed by investigation (35%) and advocacy and education (26%).



***Note.** (n=10,331, NIA 2025)*

Figure 69 *Opinion by External and Internal Clients of Public Sector, Parliamentarians, and Voters on Strategies to Combat Corruption*

CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the NIA 2025 Report, the country demonstrates strong overall integrity performance (8.15, Good level), with particularly high scores in Public Sector Integrity (8.41, Very Good) and very low levels of experienced corruption. These results reflect a good institutional foundation and effective frontline service integrity.

However, several systemic and structural weaknesses require targeted reform to consolidate these gains and address perception gaps. Key areas of concern include accountability in service delivery (particularly efforts to accomplish duties and grievance handling), favouritism and perceived corruption, weaknesses in corruption-control systems, especially whistleblower protection, fairness in HR decisions and work assignments, transparency and consistency in ethical leadership, parliamentary oversight and representativeness, and corruption risks in mixed-mode (hybrid) service delivery processes.

While corruption levels remain low, the reform focus should now shift toward strengthening systems, enhancing transparency, reinforcing fairness, and building long-term public trust. Addressing these areas will require practical, implementable measures that improve procedural clarity, reduce discretionary risks, enhance internal safeguards, and increase citizen engagement.

The following sections outline targeted, actionable recommendations structured around priority reform areas, aimed at strengthening institutional resilience, deepening accountability mechanisms, and institutionalising a culture of integrity across both the executive and parliamentary domains.

7.1 STRENGTHENING INTERNAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS

The findings show that the Corruption Control Systems score has declined from 7.52 in NIA 2022 to 6.70 in NIA 2025, indicating a weakening of institutional mechanisms for preventing and controlling corruption. Strong internal governance systems form the foundation for integrity, accountability, and effective service delivery. Without robust internal controls, even agencies with low levels of direct bribery can be vulnerable to relational, subtle, or influence-based corruption, including favouritism, gifts, or informal reciprocity. Strengthening internal governance ensures that policies are consistently applied, risks are systematically managed, and staff behaviour aligns with ethical standards, reducing both actual misconduct and the perception of unfairness among stakeholders.

To strengthen internal governance mechanisms and improve the integrity of public service delivery, there is a need to:

7.1.1 ENHANCE CHECKS AND BALANCES

Strengthening checks and balances within public agencies is essential to reinforce internal governance and reduce opportunities for misuse of authority. This can be achieved by ensuring clear separation of duties, where critical functions such as approval, execution, and verification are handled by different officials. Establishing multiple layers of oversight, standardising procedures, and requiring proper documentation for decisions can limit excessive discretion and promote accountability. In addition, implementing robust mechanisms for gift disclosure, conflict of interest declaration, and management is crucial to ensure that officials act impartially and avoid situations that may compromise their integrity. Mandatory declaration of gifts, transparent reporting systems, and clear guidelines for identifying and managing conflicts of interest further strengthen ethical conduct within institutions. Such structural safeguards not only deter irregular practices but also enhance transparency and fairness in service delivery.

7.1.2 IMPROVE COMPLAINT AND FEEDBACK MECHANISMS

Effective complaint and feedback mechanisms are vital for identifying gaps in service delivery and addressing integrity concerns. Agencies should establish accessible, user-friendly, and responsive systems that allow citizens and employees to report grievances or provide feedback without barriers. Ensuring timely redress, clear communication on actions taken, and regular analysis of complaint trends can help institutions proactively address systemic issues. Strengthening these mechanisms will improve responsiveness, build public trust, and support continuous improvement in service delivery.

7.1.3 ENCOURAGE WHISTLEBLOWING WITH PROTECTION MECHANISMS

Promoting a culture of integrity requires encouraging individuals to report wrongdoing without fear of retaliation. Public agencies should establish formal whistleblowing frameworks that guarantee confidentiality, anonymity where appropriate, and legal or administrative protection for whistleblowers. Clear procedures for reporting, investigating, and acting on disclosures should be widely communicated to staff. By safeguarding those who speak up, agencies can uncover hidden risks, deter unethical behaviour, and strengthen overall institutional integrity.

7.1.4 CONDUCT REGULAR INTERNAL AUDITS AND COMPLIANCE CHECKS

Regular internal audits and compliance checks are critical to ensuring adherence to established rules, procedures, and ethical standards. Agencies should institutionalise periodic and risk-based audits to assess operational processes, identify vulnerabilities, and verify compliance with policies. Findings from these audits should be systematically reviewed, with corrective actions implemented and monitored for effectiveness. Strengthening internal audit functions will enhance accountability, improve operational efficiency, and contribute to sustained integrity in public service delivery.

7.2 STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

7.2.1 CLARIFY ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND STANDARDS FOR ALL KEY FUNCTIONS

Strengthening accountability begins with clearly defining roles, responsibilities, and performance standards across all levels of the organisation. Public agencies should develop and communicate detailed job descriptions, standard operating procedures, and codes of conduct to ensure that staff understand their duties and the expectations associated with their roles. Clear delineation of authority and responsibility reduces ambiguity, minimises overlaps, and enables effective monitoring of performance, thereby enhancing accountability and consistency in service delivery.

7.2.2 LINK ACCOUNTABILITY TO PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEMS

Accountability should be systematically integrated into performance appraisal systems to ensure that ethical conduct and adherence to rules are recognised and reinforced. Performance evaluations should incorporate measurable indicators related to integrity, compliance, and quality of service delivery, alongside traditional output-based metrics. By aligning accountability with career progression, incentives, and recognition, agencies can motivate staff to uphold high standards of professionalism and responsibility.

7.2.3 CONDUCT PERIODIC PERFORMANCE REVIEWS AND AUDITS

Regular performance reviews and audits are essential to assess whether officials are fulfilling their responsibilities in line with established standards. Agencies should institutionalise periodic evaluations that combine supervisory assessments, peer reviews, and data-driven performance analysis. Complementing these with targeted audits can help identify inefficiencies, deviations, or risks within processes. Continuous monitoring and feedback enable timely corrective actions and foster a culture of accountability and continuous improvement.

7.2.4 ENFORCE CONSEQUENCES FOR MISCONDUCT

A credible accountability system requires consistent and fair enforcement of consequences for misconduct. Public agencies should establish clear disciplinary frameworks that outline sanctions for various forms of non-compliance, misconduct, or abuse of authority. Ensuring that violations are promptly investigated and addressed in a transparent and impartial manner reinforces the seriousness of accountability measures. Consistent enforcement not only deters unethical behavior but also strengthens institutional integrity and public confidence.

7.3 ADDRESSING EMERGING FORMS OF "SOFT CORRUPTION"

7.3.1 ENHANCE E-SERVICES: "DIGITAL FIRST" FRAMEWORK

Adopting a "Digital First" approach can significantly reduce opportunities for soft corruption by minimising face-to-face interactions and discretionary decision-making. Public agencies should expand and streamline e-services to ensure end-to-end digital processing of applications, payments, and approvals. Integrating automated workflows, real-time tracking, and standardised requirements can limit informal influence, enhance efficiency, and promote consistency in service delivery.

7.3.2 TRANSPARENCY AND PROACTIVE DISCLOSURE

Improving transparency through proactive disclosure of information is critical to addressing subtle and informal forms of corruption. Agencies should regularly publish service standards, eligibility criteria, processing timelines, fees, budgets, procurements, and decision outcomes in accessible formats. Making such information readily available reduces information asymmetry, limits opportunities for favouritism, and empowers citizens to hold service providers accountable.

7.3.3 STRENGTHENING COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

Clear and reliable communication channels between service providers and users can help reduce misunderstandings and perceived biases in service delivery. Agencies should establish responsive helpdesks, digital query systems, and notification mechanisms that keep users informed at each stage of the service process. Timely and consistent communication reduces reliance on informal networks and discourages the use of personal connections to obtain information or expedite services.

7.3.4 STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND EDUCATION

Engaging stakeholders and raising awareness about fair service practices are essential to countering soft corruption. Public agencies should conduct outreach programs, awareness campaigns, and stakeholder consultations to inform citizens and service users about their rights, procedures, and grievance redress mechanisms. Building an informed user base reduces tolerance for preferential treatment and encourages demand for equitable and transparent services.

7.3.5 CONDUCT ETHICS AND INTEGRITY TRAINING

Regular ethics and integrity training for public officials is crucial to reinforce professional values and address subtle forms of unethical behavior. Training programs should focus on recognising and managing conflicts of interest, resisting undue influence, and upholding fairness in decision-making. Embedding integrity principles into everyday work practices will help cultivate a culture of accountability and reduce the normalisation of soft corruption within institutions.

CONCLUSION

The NIA 2025, the sixth assessment of its kind, has been conducted during the second year of the current government's tenure as part of its continued commitment to strengthening governance and public service delivery in Bhutan. The findings provide an important evidence base for the government to further enhance the quality, efficiency, and integrity of public services. Over the years, significant efforts have been made to improve service delivery through initiatives such as one-stop service centres, front desk information systems, community centres, and the expansion of digital and online services. These reforms have contributed to improved accessibility, transparency, and citizen satisfaction in public service delivery.
The findings reaffirm the government's continued efforts to promote good governance and build a corruption-resistant society, in line with national priorities and broader integrity frameworks. The results also contribute to ongoing national strategies aimed at strengthening transparency, accountability, and integrity consciousness across institutions, while enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of regulatory and oversight bodies, including the Anti-Corruption Commission.

The National Integrity Score is recorded at **8.16**, indicating a **Good level of integrity**. This reflects sustained progress in curbing overt and transactional forms of corruption, particularly direct bribery. However, the findings also highlight the need for continued improvement in the quality of service delivery, particularly by strengthening accountability mechanisms, enhancing transparency in decision-making, and fostering a stronger organisational culture rooted in integrity and professionalism.

The **External Integrity Score of 8.57** indicates a **Very Good level of integrity**, demonstrating that public-facing services are largely transparent, accessible, and fair. Citizens report minimal direct experience with corruption, supported by an **Outstanding** score in experienced corruption. However, concerns remain regarding accountability and perceived corruption, particularly in relation to criticism and informal influence in service delivery. These findings suggest the need to further strengthen supervision, monitoring, and enforcement of codes of conduct, as well as internal checks and balances to prevent abuse of functions.

The **Internal Integrity Score of 7.98** reflects a **Good level of integrity**, with strong performance in areas such as personnel management, work processes, and organisational culture. Nonetheless, critical gaps persist in corruption control systems, whistleblower protection, and elements of ethical leadership, including transparency, accountability, trust, and fairness. The findings indicate that while ethical leadership continues to play a significant role in sustaining integrity, there is an increasing reliance on individual conduct rather than fully institutionalised systems. This creates potential vulnerabilities, particularly in the face of leadership changes or inconsistent application of rules. Strengthening internal governance systems, promoting a culture that encourages reporting of wrongdoing, and ensuring protection for whistleblowers remain key priorities.

Furthermore, the assessment highlights an important shift in the nature of corruption risks from visible, transactional practices to more subtle, relational forms such as favouritism, informal influence, and non-monetary inducements. These emerging forms of "soft corruption" are less visible, more socially embedded, and more difficult to detect, requiring a recalibration of anti-corruption strategies beyond traditional enforcement approaches.

The **Parliamentarians' Integrity Index (PII) score of 7.15** indicates a **Satisfactory level of integrity**, making it the relatively weaker component of the overall integrity system. While the corruption component score remains **Outstanding**, reflecting low levels of direct bribery, there are notable gaps in oversight, legislative effectiveness, and accountability. A significant perception gap exists between parliamentarians' self-assessment and public perception, particularly in areas such as transparency and oversight. Concerns regarding favouritism, limited constituency engagement, and perceived electoral inducements further highlight the need to strengthen institutional accountability and reinforce public trust. As a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Bhutan's Parliament is expected to uphold high standards of transparency, accountability, and integrity in representing citizens and performing its legislative functions.

In addition, the NIA 2025 findings reveal a growing **perception-reality gap**, where public perceptions of corruption are increasing despite low levels of direct experience. Approximately 40% of respondents believe that corruption has increased over the past five years, indicating a widening trust deficit. This trend is further influenced by the perceived prevalence of nepotism and favouritism, as well as limited public awareness of preventive and educational efforts undertaken by anti-corruption institutions.

Overall, the findings suggest that Bhutan's integrity system is **externally robust but internally uneven**, with strong service delivery outcomes supported by ethical conduct and procedural clarity but constrained by gaps in internal accountability and institutionalisation. Therefore, the recommendations proposed in this report are expected to address both existing and emerging integrity challenges by strengthening internal control systems, enhancing accountability mechanisms, promoting ethical leadership, and addressing subtle forms of corruption. Continued emphasis on these areas will be essential to ensure that the gains achieved in public sector integrity are sustained, institutionalised, and resilient over the long term, thereby reinforcing public trust and the effectiveness of governance systems.

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GLOSSARY

Abuse of Authority: The abuse of authority is the improper use of a position of influence, power or authority by a staff member or non-staff personnel against another staff member or non-staff personnel or a group thereof.

Accountability: Accountability is defined as "proactive process by which public officials inform about and justify their plans of action, their behaviour, and results, and are sanctioned accordingly" Ahmad (2008).

Bribery: The act of taking or receiving something with the intention of influencing the recipient in some way favourable to the party providing the bribe.

Collusion: Secret agreement or cooperation especially for an illegal or deceitful purpose.

Conflicts of Interest: Arises when an individual with a formal responsibility to serve the public participates in an activity that jeopardises his or her professional judgment, objectivity, and independence.

Corruption: Measures whether respondents perceived corruption. It also assesses whether respondents made/received payments in cash, kind, entertainment, or other forms of gratification to public officials during the service delivery process or to gain voter support. The corruption index comprises two components: experienced corruption and perceived corruption.

Corruption Control Systems: Assesses whether agencies have implemented anti-corruption measures, such as whistleblowing and internal control systems, and whether those involved in corrupt acts are appropriately addressed.

Disproportionate Assets: Refers to the asset of a person acquired at or around the time the person is alleged to have committed an act of corruption and whose value is disproportionate to one's lawful sources of income at or around that time and for which there is no reasonable or satisfactory explanation.

Dzongkhag: District

Embezzlement: Fraudulent taking of public property/fund for personal gain.

Ethics: Leadership ethics refers to the moral principles and values that guide leaders' behaviour and decision-making in the workplace and other organisations. It encompasses the standards of integrity, responsibility, accountability, fairness, and respect that leaders are expected to uphold in their interactions with employees, stakeholders, and society.

Ethical Leadership: demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making.

External Client: Service users or citizens who avail services from an agency.

External Integrity: It refers to service users' (external clients') perceptions and experiences of service providers' integrity in the delivery of public services. It is assessed based on how the public perceives and experiences the ethical conduct of these institutions.

Fairness: Fairness in leadership is the demonstration of fair and just behaviour by leaders in their care, actions, and decisions regarding how to treat their employees.

Favouritism: A normal human inclination to prefer acquaintances, friends, and family over strangers

***Gewog*:** Lowest administrative unit in Bhutan's three-tiered governance system. A group of villages makes up a *Gewog* and is translated as a block.

Index: A statistical measure of the integrity score of the public agencies and its services.

Integrity: The degree to which public officials of an institution discharge their public duties fairly and transparently as well as in compliance with the laws, rules, and regulations without engaging in misconduct and corruption.

Integrity Score: A score generated through a set of formulae based on the perception and experience of citizens about the effectiveness of service delivery.

Internal Client: Service providers or employees of an agency responsible for providing services.

Integrity Culture: Assesses organisational culture from the perspective of employees performing their duties and validates the presence of corruption control systems within the agencies. It comprises Organisational Culture and a Corruption Control System.

Internal Integrity: It refers to the integrity level of public agencies as assessed by their own employees or public officials (internal clients). It consists of three key components: the Work Integrity Index, Integrity Culture Index, and Ethical Leadership Index.

Nepotism: A form of favouritism that involves family relationships.

Organisational Culture: The cultural characteristics within an organisation that support performing one's duties transparently, without pursuing private interests, accepting or soliciting bribes, favouring certain sections of society, or engaging in corruption.

Organisational Integrity Plan: A comprehensive action plan to develop integrity programs and manage integrity matters in an organisation.

***Thromde*:** Municipality

Transparency: Transparency refers to open decision-making based on sufficient information so that other agencies and the general public can assess whether the relevant procedures are followed, consonant with the given mandate.

Trust: Trust is defined as an employee's general reliance on a leader's word, promise, verbal statement, written statement, or deeds (Rotter, 1971)

Upper Cut-Point: Converted score for position and amount of corruption proceeds (out of 10).

Work Integrity: The Work Integrity assesses perceptions and experiences of routine organisational functions, such as Personnel Management, Budget Execution, and Fairness in the Assignment of Work

ANNEXURE

ANNEXURE 1 *Service List of Selected Agencies*

SN	Agency	Services
1	**Autonomous Agency**	**Services**
1	Gerab Nyed-Yon Limited	Investment
		HR Services
		AFD Services
2	Bhutan Health Trust Fund	HR Services
		AFD Services
3	Bhutan Olympic Committee	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Government Clearance
4	Bhutan Trust Fund for Environmental Conservation	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Program Grant disbursement
5	Centre for Bhutan Studies and GNH Research	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Publication Distribution
6	National Pension & Provident Fund	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Payment of retirement benefits
		Credit facilities to NPPF members and employees of NPPF
		Allotment of housing
		Maintenance, design and drawing for housing loan
7	National Statistics Bureau	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Survey clearance
		Public user file

8	Royal Monetary Authority	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Cash Counters for exchange of Fresh Ngultrum Currencies and INR Currency in Thimphu
		Issuance of Vehicle Ownership Change loan clearance certificates mostly through online
		Issuance of National Payment Gateway license and e-money
9	National Land Commission Secretariat	Issuance of Proof of Ownership/Lagthram
		Approval of land conversions
		Approval of land transactions/conveyances
		Land Exchange Services
		Land Substitution Services
		Geospatial and Mapping Services
		Land Realignment Services
		Land Dispute settlement & land Issues Resolution
		Case follow-up re-cases forwarded by ACC
		Legal advice
		HR Services
		AFD Services
10	Royal Bhutan Police	Traffic services
		Issuance of security clearance (Hard Copy)
		Issuance of security clearance (Online)
		AFD Services
11	Bhutan Chamber of Commerce & Industry	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Concern /NOC/ Authorisation letter
		Exhibition and events management
		Business delegations
		Training
12	Government Technology (GovTech)	HR Services
		AFD Services
13	Office of the Attorney General	HR Services
		AFD Services

14	National Centre for Hydrology and Meteorology (NCHM)	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Coordination of research and publications
		Special weather forecast services based on requests for localised/specific areas
		Aviation meteorological services for air navigation (operation of flights)
		Hydrological data and information services
		Flood forecasting, advisories and warning services
15	Druk Holding & Investments	HR Services
		AFD Services
16	Office of the Vice Chancellor	Research grant services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
		Conference Hall booking
17	National Medical Services	Procurement of goods
		Mobilisation of medical supplies
		Emergency Ambulance services
		Patient referral services
2	**Corporation**	**Services**
1	Bhutan Board Product Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
2	Bhutan Broadcasting Services Corporation Limited	HR Services
3	Bhutan Postal Corporation	AFD Services
		HR Services
4	Bhutan Power Corporation Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
5	Kuensel Corporation Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Advertisement
6	National Housing Development Corporation Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Allotment of houses to civil servants
		Maintenance of the house

7	State Trading Corporation of Bhutan Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
		TATA
		Eicher
		SLM
		Petroleum product
		Green tax
8	Farm Machinery Corporation Limited	Hiring services
		HR Services
9	Natural Resources Development Corporation Limited	Timber-related services (Production/Extraction; sales of logs, sawn timber, firewood, joinery products like flooring and panelling, furniture, and seedlings)
		Sand (surface collection and degraded sand)
		Stone (boulders, aggregated stone, and river bed materials like a mixture of sand and pebbles)
		Transportation services for supply of sand from the Sha region
		HR Services
		AFD Services
10	State Mining Corporation Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
11	Food Corporation of Bhutan Limited	Facilities of the auction services to the farmers
		HR Services
		AFD Services
12	Druk Air Corporation Limited	HR Services
		Complaint Handling
		Ticket refund
13	Credit Information Bureau of Bhutan	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Issuance of Credit Report
14	Punatshangchhu-II Hydroelectric Project Authority	HR Services
		AFD Services
15	Bhutan Lottery Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services

16	Royal Securities Exchange of Bhutan Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Stock exchange
17	Bhutan Hydropower Services Limited	HR Services
18	Bhutan Livestock Development Corp. Limited	HR Services
19	GIC Bhutan Reinsurance Co. Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
20	Druk Green Power Corporation Limited (and KHEL)	HR Services
		AFD Services
21	Bhutan Tourism Corporation Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
3	**CSOs**	**Services**
1	Bhutan Association of Women Entrepreneurs (BAOWE)	AFD Services
		Entrepreneurship training
2	Association of Bhutanese Tour Operators	AFD Services
3	Lhomon Society / Samdrup Jongkhar Initiative	HR Services
		Mindfulness Programs
		Zero-Waste Craft Training to Youth & Women
		Conducts Trainings on Organic Agriculture Practices
		Preservation and Promotion of Local Knowledge, Wisdom and Best Practices
4	Financial Institutions Association of Bhutan	HR Services
5	Royal Society for Protection of Nature	HR Services
		AFD Services
6	Construction Association of Bhutan	AFD Services
		Trainings services
7	Association of Bhutanese Industries	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Training on Financial and Project Management by BTI
8	Guide Association of Bhutan	Training of Trainers for focal person of Asset Declaration
		Eco-tourism training

9	Bhutan Ecological Society	HR Services
		AFD Services
10	Loden Foundation	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Logistics & Camp; transportation
		Start-up Funding
4	**Constitutional Office**	**Services**
1	Anti-Corruption Commission	HR Services
		Complaint Registration Service
2	Election Commission of Bhutan	Election services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
3	Royal Audit Authority	Online audit clearance
		HR Services
4	Royal Civil Service Commission	Short-term training for civil servants
		HR Services
5	**Financial Institutions**	**Services**
1	Bhutan Development Bank	Loan services (Industrial loan, Housing, business loan and recovery loan)
		HR Services
		AFD Services
2	Bhutan Insurance Limited	Fire insurance
		Motor insurance
		Engineering insurance
		Loan recovery services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
3	Bhutan National Bank Limited	HR Services
		AFD Services
		Fund-based
		Non-fund based
		Credit card
		Debit card
		Fix the deposit account
		Recurring deposit account

		Saving account
		Opening of account
		Updates documents and other details for account opening
4	Bank of Bhutan Limited	Credit services (Fund-based and non-fund)
		Deposit Services
		HR Services
		AFD services
5	Druk Punjab National Bank Limited	Credit services (fund-based and non-fund-based)
		HR Services
6	Royal Insurance Corporation of Bhutan	Life Insurance
		General insurance claims
		Loan services
		Credit facilities
		Life Insurance claims
		Private Provident Fund
		HR Services
		AFD Services
7	T-Bank Ltd.	Credit Services (fund-based and non-fund-based)
		ATM and Card services (Credit card, debit card and prepaid card)
		Banking Services (Current Account, FD+ Scheme, Fixed Deposit Account, Foreign Currency Account, Piggy Bank Recurring Deposit and Savings Account)
		HR Services
		AFD Services

6	Ministry	Services
1	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock	Veterinary Clinical Services
		Livestock Project Environmental Clearance; Technical Clearance
		Liquid Nitrogen, Bovine Semen Supply and Technical Services
		Veterinary Laboratory referral Services, Epidemiology services, veterinary medicine and vaccines supply, specialised services to manage feral and aggressive dogs (dog population management)
		Provide technical advice on commercial farm establishment and proposal development
		Support establishment of peri-urban and urban farms
		Assess organic farmers and issue the LOAS certificate for organic products
		Produce and supply mother spawn for oysters and spawn for shiitake mushrooms
		Liquid Nitrogen, Bovine Semen Supply and Technical Services
		Veterinary Laboratory referral Services, Epidemiology services, veterinary medicine and vaccines supply, specialised services to manage feral and aggressive dogs (dog population management)
		Provide technical advice on commercial farm establishment and proposal development
		Support establishment of peri-urban and urban farms
		Assess organic farmers and issue the LOAS certificate for organic products
		Produce and supply mother spawn for oysters and spawn for shiitake mushrooms
		Technical advice and services on mushroom spawn and mushroom production
		Produce and supply planting materials at affordable prices
		Provide technical advices and services related to pests and disease management
		Provide technical advices and services related to soil/land management
		Testing of privately imported farm machinery for certification
		Provide technical advice and services related to post-production/harvest technologies
		Facilitate and support the promotion of enterprises in the agriculture and livestock sector of the country

		HR Services
		E-payment (Expenditure)
		Revenue Receipt
		Annual Tendering (EGP) for quotation
		Supply of goods and equipment
		Air Ticketing quotation
2	Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources	HR Services
		Issuance of water abstraction permit/approval
		Energy Services
		Issuance of Environmental Clearance for surface collection and dredging activities
		Issuance of permits for surface collection of minerals
		Issuance of permits for surface collection of sand, stones and boulders
		Issuance of permit for short-term quarry lease/mining
		Issuance of permit for stock lifting and Export of Minerals
		Reviewing of the projects and issuance of Environmental Clearances
		Renewal of Environmental Clearances
		Forestry Clearance
		Forest Research Clearance
		Fishing Permit
		Export Permit (NWFP)
		Import permit
		CITES Certificate / CITES Permit
		Non-Wood Forest Produce (NWFP) permit
		Park Permit
		Rural Timber Permit for new house construction
		Rural Timber Permit for renovation of house
		Replacement of timber
		Permit for firewood in the rural area
		Permit for fencing posts
		Permit for flag poles (dead case)
		Permit for other constructions (such as Livestock shelters, makeshift shacks, farm guards, watch towers, machinery shed or storehouses) in rural areas

		Permit for removal of timber and non-wood forest produce from private registered land
		Export approval of timber from SRFL
		Export approval of timber
		Timber allotment for handicrafts, incense, etc.
		Import Permit for HFC
		Timber Transport
3	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade	Issuance of passports/travel documents
		HR Services
		AFD Services
4	Ministry of Education and Skills Development	Student loan scheme for tertiary education
		Nomination and Selection of teachers for STT training
		HR Services
		Marksheet and Certificate
5	Ministry of Health	Food Safety Licensing
		Food Testing Services
		Third-party GAP certification
		Third-party Product certification
		Sorig Wellness Services to ensure quality of wellness, proposal and issuance of provisional approval
		Timely notify public and authorities on the disease outbreak event of national and international concern
		Monitoring and auditing of overall healthcare quality and safety
		Issuance of Technical Authorisation for Private Selective Healthcare Services
		HR Services
		AFD Services

6	Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport	Technical backstopping for approval of rural/ urban building permit (Drawing and design)
		HR Services
		Registration of Motor Vehicle
		Issuance of Roadworthiness Certificate (RWC) for new vehicle
		Renewal of Road Worthiness Certificate (RWC)
		Renewal of Vehicle Registration Certificate
		Vehicle Ownership Transfer
		Issuance of Learner License
		Renewal of Learner License
		Replacement of Learner License
		Conduct Driving Test
		Printing & Issuance of Driving License
		Endorsement of Driving License
		Registration of new contractor
		Cancellation of Contractor Registration firm
		Renewal of consultant registration certificate
		Cancellation of consultant registration certificate
		Marksheet and Certificate
		Offense
		Pre-departure bus inspection
		Vehicle Cancellation
		Vehicle Permit
7	Ministry of Finance	Assessment and refund of tax services
		Tax appeal services
		Import validation (Inspection services)
		HR Services
		AFD Services

8	Ministry of Home Affairs	Birth Registration
		CID Replacement/Renewal
		Spouse Information Update
		Issuance of Household information
		Issuance of a work permit
		Entry permit/ route permit and visa
		HR Services
		AFD Services
9		HR Services
		AFD Services
		Change in CEO/Director
		Change in object clause
		Change in authorised capital
		Change in paid-up capital
		Share Transfer
		Share transmission
		Change in registered office
		Name change of the company
		Name Approval
		Incorporation Services
		Charge creation
		Issue of the Acknowledgement letter for Annual returns
		Registration Services (Trademark, Patent, Design) and Advisory Services to walk-in Clients
		Copyright Registration Services
		Consumer grievance redressal service; redressal of issues between consumers and businesses
		Endorsement of Internal Service Rules
		Tourism product proposal (clearances and recommendations)
		Approval and license issuance for new Medium and Large Industrial project proposals
		Approval for the upgradation of industrial projects to medium and large scale
		Approval for major changes of license such as : a. Relocation of industries b. Change in the activity of industries

		Change of license facilitation, such as: a. Establishment name change b. Ownership change
		Re-issuance of license after system cancellation of the expired license
		Capacity building of the CSIs
		Support services in terms of core machinery and equipment for the Informal Sectors
		Issuance of FDI Registration Certificate
		Approval for recommendation for Business Guest Visa/Permit
		Issuance of a recommendation for an investor card
		Enhancement of project cost
		Location changes and addition of new activity
		Seek clearance for business guest visa/permit
		Process for Business Guest Visa/Permit approval
		Issuance of Value Added Certificate for availing fiscal incentives (Sales Tax and Customs Duty exemption for import of raw materials & packaging materials)
		Issuance of Provisional Letter of Interest
		Construction Drawing Approval
		Transfer of land ownership, business activity change, additional business and ownership changes
		Renewal of Environment Clearance (EC)
		Issuance of new Environmental Clearance (EC)
		Upgradation of project scale, ownership, and location change
		Career Guidance Sessions
		Worker approval
		Amendment of internal service rules
		Dispute settlement
		YELP support services
		(Employment Service Centre Referrals and Placement)
		Entrepreneurship Trainings Provided
		Radio Communication Apparatus License issuance, renewal of license, cancellation of license, change of area of operation and name, issuance of any additional support if necessary)
		Radio communication spectrum license (issuance of new license, renewal of license, cancellation of license, change of area of operation and name, issuance of any additional support in case it is necessary)

		Issuance of online reality show permits
		Cable Television Services (issuance of new license, renewal of license, cancellation of license, issuance of any additional support in case it is necessary)
		Internet Service Providers Services (issuance of new license, renewal of license, cancellation of license, issuance of any additional support if necessary)
		Standardisation
		Product Certification
		Product Testing
		Material Testing
		Calibration
		Ease of doing business through issuance of business licenses with support from Regional Offices
		Endorsement of Internal Service Rules
		Routine Inspection
7	**Dzongkhag**	**Services**
1	Zhemgang Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		CID / Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Lease GRF land for commercial agriculture farm
		Farmers' capacity building
		Extension services
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Electric fencing services
		HR Services

2	Wangdiphodrang Dzongkhag Administration	Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Conversion of Kamzhing to Khimsa
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Inputs: Procurement & Distribution
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Electric fencing services
		Approval of commercial and mega fishery, poultry and piggery farms
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		HR Services
3	Tsirang Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Changing the head of household
		CID / Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Processing the relationship certificate
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Registered land exchange with GRF
		Conversion of the wetland to Kamzhing
		Land transaction
		Realignment of plots boundaries as per the realignment guidelines
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/ Mani Dungkhor construction
		Site inspection services
		Handing over work
		Approval of house construction

		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Farmers capacity building
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Extension services
		Land conversion
		Electric fencing services
		Approval of commercial and mega fishery, poultry and piggery farms
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Water and sewerage services
		Approval of the construction of building structures
4	Trongsa Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		CID / Special Residence Permit card processing
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Land transaction
		Contract bills verification
		Site inspection services
		Approval of house construction
		Farmers capacity building
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Extension services
		Land conversion
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Electric fencing services
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Selection of farmers for study tours/capacity building
		School admission services (new admissions and transfers)

		Nomination of youth/students for programs
		HR Services
5	Thimphu Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining of Household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); census up-gradation (UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Omission case services
		Land transaction
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Contract bills verification
		Approval of house construction
		Approval of drawings and design
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Rural Water Supply and sanitation services
		Farmers' capacity building
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Extension services
		Land conversion
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Electric fencing services
		Approval of commercial and mega fishery, poultry and piggery farms
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Selection of farmers for study tours/capacity building

		School admission services (new admissions and transfers)
		Verification of bills
		Nomination of teachers for workshops and trainings
		Nomination of youth/students for programs
		Priority Sector Lending Credit Application
		HR Services
		AFD Services
6	Trashigang Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Land transaction
		Realignment of plot boundaries as per the realignment guidelines
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Rural Water Supply and sanitation services
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		School admission services (new admissions and transfers)
		Priority Sector Lending Credit Application
		Water and sewerage services
		Collection of waste services
		HR Services
		AFD Services

7	Tashi Yangtse Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Processing the relationship certificate
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Lease of GRF land for Tsamdro and Sokshing
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Realignment of plot boundaries as per the realignment guidelines
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Approval of house construction
		Approval of drawings and design
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services
		Farmers' capacity building
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Electric fencing services
		Approval of commercial and mega fishery, poultry and piggery farms
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Selection of farmers for study tours/capacity building
		School admission services (new admissions and transfers)
		Nomination of teachers for workshops and trainings
		Priority Sector Lending Credit Application
		Water and sewerage services
		Collection of waste services
		Approval of the construction of buildings/ structures
		HR Services
		AFD Services

8	Sarpang Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Processing the relationship certificate
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); census up-gradation (UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Registered land exchange with GRF
		Conversion of wet land to Khimsa
		Land transaction
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services
		Farmers' capacity building
		HR Services
		AFDServices
9	Samdrup Jongkhar Dzongkhag Administration	Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Lease GRF land for a commercial agriculture farm
		Land transaction
		Conversion of Kamzhing to Khimsa
		Realignment of plots boundaries as per the realignment guidelines

		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Extension services
		Land conversion
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Verification of bills
		Nomination of teachers for workshops and trainings
		HR Services
		AFD Services
10	Samtse Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Obtaining of Household and family details
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Conversion of the wetland to Khimsa
		Conversion of wet land to Kamzhing
		Land transaction
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Conversion of Kamzhing to Khimsa
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Site inspection services
		Approval of house construction
		Approval of drawings and design
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Extension services
		Land conversion
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs

		Water and sewerage services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
11	Punakha Dzongkhag Administration	Changing the head of household
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Omission case services
		Land transaction
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Selection of farmers for study tours/capacity building
		HR Services
		AFD Services
12	Pemagatshel Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Processing the relationship certificate
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Omission case services
		Land transaction
		Realignment of plot boundaries as per the realignment guidelines
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Contract bills verification
		Site inspection services

		Approval of house construction
		Approval of drawings and design
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services
		Farmers' capacity building
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Land conversion
		Electric fencing services
		Approval of commercial and mega fishery, poultry and piggery farms
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		School admission services (new admissions and transfers)
		Nomination of teachers for workshops and trainings
		Nomination of youth/students for programs
		Priority Sector Lending Credit Application
		Water and sewerage services
		Collection of waste services
		Approval of the construction of buildings/structures
		Approval of drawings/designs
		HR Services
		AFD Services
13	Paro Dzongkhag Administration	Obtaining household and family details
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Conversion of the wetland to Khimsa
		Conversion of the wetland to Kamzhing
		Land transaction
		Approval of house construction
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Land conversion
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Other veterinary services (Deworming/Clinical/Sterilization)

		Verification of bills
		Priority Sector Lending Credit Application
		HR Services
		AFD Services
14	Mongar Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining of Household and family details
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Registered land exchange with GRF
		Conversion of wet land to Khimsa
		Land transaction
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Selection of farmers for study tours/capacity building
		Water and sewerage services
		Collection of waste services
		Approval of the construction of building/ structures
		HR Services
		AFD Services
15	Lhuntse Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID

		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Contract bills verification
		Handing over work
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Farmers' capacity building
		Extension services
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Water and sewerage services
		Collection of waste services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
16	Haa Dzongkhag Administration	Obtaining household and family details
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Conversion of Kamzhing to Khimsa
		Realignment of plot boundaries as per the realignment guidelines
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Site inspection services
		Approval of house construction
		Approval of drawings and design
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Farmers' capacity building
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs

		Water and sewerage services
		Collection of waste services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
17	Gasa Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Changing the head of household
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Registered land exchange with GRF
		Lease GRF land for a commercial agriculture farm
		Land transaction
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Handing over work
		Approval of house construction
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Selection of farmers for study tours/capacity building
		AFD Services
		HR Services
18	Dagana Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		Obtaining household and family details
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Processing the relationship certificate
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate

		Land transaction
		Realignment of plot boundaries as per the realignment guidelines
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Farmers' capacity building
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Land conversion
		Approval of commercial and mega fishery, poultry and piggery farms
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Other veterinary services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
19	Chukha Dzongkhag Administration	Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Processing the relationship certificate
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Conversion of the wetland to Khimsa
		Conversion of the wetland to Kamzhing
		Land transaction
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Site inspection services
		Handing over work
		Approval of house construction
		Approval of drawings and design

		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Inputs Procurement & Distribution
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Electric fencing services
		Approval of commercial and mega fishery, poultry and piggery farms
		School admission services (new admissions and transfers)
		HR Services
		AFD Services
20	Bumthang Dzongkhag Administration	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Obtain approval for house construction
		Land transaction
		Approval of Lhakhang Construction
		Approval of Chortens/Mani Dungkhor construction
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads, Projects, Forestry activities, Mining and quarrying, Power transmission lines, Tourism and General
		Farmers capacity building
		Allocation of Machine to Gewogs
		Electric fencing services
		Approval of commercial and mega fishery, poultry and piggery farms
		Supply and distribution of livestock inputs
		Technical Clearance
		Nomination of teachers for workshop and trainings
		Water and sewerage services
		Collection of waste services

		Approval of the construction of building/ structures
		Recruitment: (Operational, GSP and ESP as per delegated authority)
		HR Services
		AFD Services
8	**Hospitals and BHUs**	**Services**
1	Jigme Dorji Wangchuk National Referral Hospital	Approval and referral of patient outside
		Issuance of medical certificate
		Ambulance services
		AFD Services
2	Eastern Regional Referral Hospital, Mongar	Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
3	Central Regional Referral Hospital, Gelephu, Sarpang	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Patient diet services
4	Bumthang Hospital	OPD services
5	Chhukha Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
6	Daga Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
7	Gasa Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates

8	Haa Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
9	Lhuntse Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
10	Paro Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
11	Pema Gatshel Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
12	Punakha Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
13	Samdrup Jongkhar Hospital	OPD services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
14	Samtse Hospital	OPD services

15	Sarpang Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
16	Trashigang Hospital	OPD services
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
17	Trashiyangtse Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
18	Trongsa Hospital	OPD services
19	Tsirang Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
		Issuance of Medical Certificates
		Patient diet services
20	Wangdue Phodrang Hospital	OPD services
		Ambulance services
		Referral of Patient to JDW National Referral Hospital
21	Zhemgang Hospital	OPD services
9	**Judiciary**	**Services**
1	Supreme Court of Bhutan	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Extra-territorial jurisdiction services
		HR services
		AFD Services
2	High Court of Bhutan	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction (client list of civil cases)
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate (for a foreigner)
		Execution of judgment

3	Bumthang Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarization, like notarization of documents, translation, etc.
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
4	Chukha Dzongkhag Court	Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation, etc.
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
5	Dagana Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
6	Gasa Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation, etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Issuance of marriage certificate
7	Haa Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation, etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Issuance of marriage certificate
8	Lhuntse Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
9	Mongar Dzongkhag Court	Issuance of marriage certificate
10	Paro Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate

11	Pema Gatshel Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation, etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
12	Punakha Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Appeal services
		Execution of judgment
13	Samtse Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation, etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
14	Sarpang Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation, etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
15	Samdrup Jongkhar Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation, etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
16	Thimphu Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Appeal services
		Execution of judgment

17	Trashi Yangtse Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarization, like notarization of documents, translation, etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
18	Trashigang Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
19	Trongsa Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation , etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
20	Tsirang Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Public notarisation, like notarisation of documents, translation, etc. (For Thimphu Dzongkhag Court only)
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
21	Wangdue Phodrang Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Issuance of marriage certificate
22	Zhemgang Dzongkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Issuance of marriage certificate
23	Gelephu Dungkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Appeal services
		Issuance of marriage certificate
24	Lhamoi Zingkha Drungkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment

25	Thrimshing Drungkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Issuance of marriage certificate
26	Phuntsholing Drungkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
27	Sombaykha Drungkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Issuance of marriage certificate
		Execution of judgment
28	Tashi Choling Drungkhag Court	Administration of Justice: Case adjudication of the original/ territorial jurisdiction
		Issuance of marriage certificate
10	**Thromde**	**Services**
1	Thimphu Thromde	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Urban land transaction
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads & Project
		Solid waste services
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Issuance of Occupancy Certificates
		School admission services (new admissions and transfers)
		Youth Services (Nomination of youth/students for programs)
		Sewerage services
		Vacuum tanker services
		Water Connection services
		HR Services
		AFD Services

2	Phuentsholing Thromde	Survey and demarcation services
		Approval of building construction
		Approval and lease of urban land
		Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Solid waste services
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Issuance of Occupancy Certificates
		Water Connection services
		Biometric for NDI
		Flat Transition
		State Land Lease
		HR Services
		AFD Services
3	Gelephu Thromde	Urban land transaction
		Obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC) for Roads & Project
		Solid waste services
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Issuance of Occupancy Certificates
		Sewerage services
		Vacuum tanker services
		Water Connection services
		Bill payment for suppliers (goods)
		Bill payment for contractors (Construction works)
		Bill payment for catering services
		HR services
		ADF services

4	Samdrup Jongkhar Thromde	Approval of building construction
		Changing the head of household
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Lease GRF land for commercial agriculture farm
		Urban land transaction
		Renewal of Environmental Clearance
		Issuance of Occupancy Certificates
		Sewerage services
		Water Connection services
		HR Services
11	**RUB Colleges**	**Services**
1	College of Natural Resources	College mess management services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
2	College of Science and Technology	College mess management services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
3	Gedu College of Business Studies	College mess management services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
4	Gyelpozhing College of Information and Technology	College mess management services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
5	Jigme Namgyal Electrical College	College mess management services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
6	Paro College of Education	College mess management services
		HR Services
		AFD Services

7	Sherubtse College	College mess management services
		HR Services
		AFD Services
8	Samtse College of Education	College mess management services
		HR Services
12	**Gewog**	**Services**
1	Bumthang (Chhumig)	Obtaining of Household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for sand and stone collection
		Approval for fire wood collection
2	Chukha (Bjachhog)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Conversion of the wetland to Khimsa
		Conversion of the wetland to Kamzhing
		Rural land transaction
		Approval of rural timber
		Life insurance
		Livestock services
		Rural tax collection (revenue collection/donation)
		AFD Services
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services

3	Dagana (Tseza)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		Obtaining household and family details
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for sand and stone collection
		Approval for fire wood collection
		Approval for rural house construction
		Life insurance
		Loan assessment and approval
		Community centre services (loan processing, loan repayment, etc.)
4	Gasa (Khatoed)	Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Rural land transaction
		Approval of rural timber
		Loan assessment and approval
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services
5	Haa (Gakiling)	Census transfer within Gewo, Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Conversion of the wetland to Khimsa
		Rural land transaction
		Approval for sand and stone collection
		Approval for rural house construction
		Loan assessment and approval
		Emergency response in case of disaster
		Community centre services (loan processing, loan repayment, etc.)

6	Lhuentse (Minjey)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Rural land transaction
		Livestock services
		Rural tax collection (revenue collection/donation)
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services
7	Mongar (Khengar)	Birth Registration
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkha, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for fire wood collection
		Approval for rural house construction
		Alternative dispute resolution (Mediation)
		AFD Services
8	Paro (Sharba)	Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval of private and community forests
		Approval for rural house construction
		Emergency response in case of disaster
		Community centre services (loan processing, loan repayment, etc.)
9	Pemagatshel (Yurung)	Birth Registration
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Conversion of the wetland to Kamzhing
		Approval of rural timber

		Approval for sand and stone collection
		Approval for fire wood collection
		Approval for rural house construction
		Life insurance
		Livestock services
		Rural tax collection (revenue collection/donation)
		AFD Services
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services
10	Punakha (Toedpaisa)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Obtaining household and family details
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Lease GRF land for a commercial agriculture farm
		Approval of rural timber
		Rural tax collection (revenue collection/donation)
		AFD Services
11	Samdrup Jongkhar (Wangphu)	Birth Registration
12	Samtse (Dophuchen)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining of Household and family details
		Census transfer within Gewog, Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for rural house construction
		Life insurance
		Livestock services

13	Sarpang (Chhudzom)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Conversion of the wetland to Khimsa
		Rural land transaction
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Approval for rural house construction
14	Thimphu (Maedwang)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Rural land transaction
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for fire wood collection
		Approval for rural house construction
		Life insurance
		Loan assessment and approval
		Livestock services
		Rural tax collection (revenue collection/donation)
		AFD Services

15	Trashigang (Bartsham)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Omission case services
		Rural land transaction
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for sand and stone collection
		Approval for fire wood collection
		Life insurance
		Loan assessment and approval
		Livestock services
		Rural tax collection (revenue collection/donation)
		Agriculture services
		AFD Services
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services
16	Trashiyangtse (Khamdang)	Birth Registration
		Changing the head of household
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Obtaining household and family details
		Replacement of the CID/ SRP cards
		Name change and date of birth correction in CID
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag, or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for sand and stone collection
		Approval for fire wood collection
		Approval for rural house construction
		Life insurance
		Livestock services
		Rural tax collection (revenue collection/donation)

		Community center services (loan processing, loan repayment, etc.)
		Procurement of works (contract works and community contract)
		Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Services
17	Trongsa (Langthil)	Birth Registration
		CID /Special Residence Permit card processing
		Census transfer within Gewog or Dzongkhag or Inter-Dzongkhag
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Conversion of the wetland to Kamzhing
18	Tsirang (Tsirang Toed)	Birth Registration
		Death Reporting
		Obtaining household and family details
		Census appeal cases (census Drop-Out cases (DO); Census Up-gradation(UG); Absconded (AB); Emigrated (EM)
		Obtaining ownership certificate
		Obtaining clearance certificate for land mortgage
		Obtain approval for rural house construction
		Lease GRF land for a commercial agriculture farm
		Rural land transaction
		Land acquisition and substitution of registered land
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for sand and stone collection
		Approval for fire wood collection
		Loan assessment and approval
19	Wangdue (Phobji)	Birth Registration
		Changing the head of household
		Approval of rural timber
		Approval for fire wood collection
		Approval for rural house construction
		Loan assessment and approval
20	Zhemgang (Goshing)	Birth Registration
		Rural land transaction
		Life insurance

13	Schools	Services
1	Bumthang – Ura Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		School mess management services
2	Chukha – Kamji Middle Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (uniform, shoes, bedding, etc.)
		School mess management services
3	Dagana – Gesarling Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		School mess management services
4	Gasa – Bjishong Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		School mess management services
5	Haa – Gongzim Ugyen Dorji Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		Procurement of goods (stationery, library books)
6	Lhuentse – Autsho Middle Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		Procurement of goods (stationery, library books)
7	Mongar – Kidheykhar Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
8	Paro – Drukgyel Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (uniform, shoes, bedding, etc.)
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		Procurement of services (canteen)
		Procurement of goods (stationery, library books)
9	Pemagatshel – Dechheling Lower Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		School mess management services
10	Punakha – Tashidingkha Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		Procurement of goods (stationery, library books)
		School mess management services
11	Samdrup Jongkhar – Orong Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (stationery, library books)
		School mess management services
12	Samtse – Dorokha Lower Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)

13	Sarpang Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		School mess management services
14	Thimphu – Yangchen Gatshel Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		School mess management services
15	Trashigang – Bartsham Central School	School mess management services
16	Trashiyangtse – Ramjar Middle Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		School mess management services
17	Trongsa – Sherubling Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (uniform, shoes, bedding,etc.)
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
		School mess management services
18	Tsirangtoe Middle Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (stationery, library books)
		School mess management services
19	Wangdue – Gaselo Higher Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)
20	Zhemgang – Buli Middle Secondary School	Admission in schools
		Procurement of goods (mess items)

ANNEXURE 2 *Assessment Framework and Weight Distribution for External Integrity Index Public Sector Integrity Index, Components, and its Survey Items*

The table below presents the assessment framework and weights and survey items used for each component for External Integrity. It broadly comprises the survey items and components of the Corruption Index and the Corruption Risk Index.

Index & Component		Survey Item	Assessment Method
Corruption Index (0.4830)	Perception (0.3870)	Favours for specific individuals (0.4000)	Individual respondent
		Mediation or solicitation for undue advantage (0.2000)	Individual respondent
		Pursuing private interest, ignoring public ones (0.2000)	Individual respondent
		Engaging in sexual favours (0.2000)	Individual respondent
	Experience (0.6130)	Frequency of payment in cash/kind offered (0.2460)	Integrated organisation
		Amount of payment in cash/kind offered (0.2270)	Integrated organisation
		Frequency of entertainment offered (0.1820)	Integrated organisation
		Amount of entertainment offered (0.1890)	Integrated organisation
		Frequency of other forms of gratifications offered (0.1506)	Integrated organisation
Corruption Risk Index (0.5170)	Transparency Index (0.3170)	Openness of work (0.5547)	Individual respondent
		Established procedures are user-friendly (0.4453)	Individual respondent
	Accountability Index (0.2000)	Misuse of authority (0.6488)	Individual respondent
		Efforts to accomplish duties (0.3512)	Individual respondent

ANNEXURE 3 *Assessment Framework and Weight Distribution for Internal Integrity Index Public Sector Integrity Index, Components, and its Survey Items*

The table below presents the assessment framework and weights and survey items used for each component of *Internal Integrity* are. It comprises the Integrity **Culture Index**, the **Work Integrity Index**, and the **Ethical Leadership Index,** each with corresponding components and survey items.

Index & Component		Survey Item		Assessment Method
Integrity Culture Index (0.3290)	Organisational Culture (0.6310)	Transparency in the performance of duties (0.3584)		Individual respondent
		Mediation and undue solicitation within the organisation (0.2282)		Individual respondent
		Ignoring official duty to pursue private interest (0.1034)		Individual respondent
		Accepting payment in cash or kind or gratifications (0.1034)		Individual respondent
		Performing duties based on personal relationships (0.1034)		Individual respondent
		Misuse of privileged information for personal gain (0.1034)		Individual respondent
	Corruption Control System (0.3690)	Protection of whistle blowers (0.3220)		Individual respondent
		Appropriateness of disciplinary measures and punishment against corrupt acts (0.3810)		Individual respondent
		Adequate checks and balances to control corruption (0.2970)		Individual respondent
Work Integrity Index (0.3270)	Personnel Management (0.4130)	Experience (0.6090)	Frequency of payment in cash or kind (0.2460)	Integrated organisation
			Amount of payments in cash or kind (0.2270)	Integrated organisation
			Frequency of entertainment offered (0.1820)	Integrated organisation
			Amount of entertainment or gratifications (0.1890)	Integrated organisation
			Frequency of gratification offered (0.1560)	Integrated organisation
		Perception (0.3910)	Perception of payments in cash or kind or entertainment or gratifications (0.5000)	Individual respondent
			Fairness in decisions on HR matters (0.5000)	Individual respondent

	Budget Execution (0.3470)	Experience (0.6060)	Frequency of unlawful or unjustifiable execution of the budget for personal gains (0.2630)	Integrated organisation
			Amount of budget used for personal gains (0.2370)	Integrated organisation
			Frequency of unlawful or unjustifiable execution of budget to favour families and friends (0.2630)	Integrated organisation
			Amount of budget used to favour families and friends (0.2370)	Integrated organisation
		Perception (0.3940)	Perception of misuse of budget for personal gains (1.000)	Individual respondent
	Fairness in the Assignment of Work (0.2400)	Experience (0.6000)	Frequency of unreasonable work instruction (1.000)	Integrated organisation
		Perception (0.4000)	Perception of employees being adequately tasked (0.2350)	Individual respondent
			Perception of fair assignment of work (0.4130)	Individual respondent
			Perception of disadvantages of not complying with unreasonable work instructions (0.3520)	Individual respondent
Ethical Leadership Index (0.3440)	Integrity (0.1729)		Demonstrating integrity in leaders' conduct (0.3333)	Individual respondent
			Promotion of ethical and moral values by leaders (0.3298)	Individual respondent
			Role of leaders in taking serious action against rules/regulations violations (0.3369)	Individual respondent
	Ethics (0.1647)		Leaders ensure that employees conduct themselves in an ethical way (0.4983)	Individual respondent
			Leaders educate the employees on the consequences of unethical behaviour (0.5017)	Individual respondent
	Trust (0.1667)		Leaders strive towards maintaining trust with the employees through consistency in their words and actions (0.5000)	Individual respondent
	Transparency (0.1650)		Leaders communicate openly with the employees (0.4866)	Individual respondent
			Leaders are transparent in their decision-making (0.5134)	Individual respondent

	Accountability (0.1646)	Leaders emphasise strengthening accountability in the organisation (0.4995)	Individual respondent
		Leaders take responsibility for their actions (0.5005)	Individual respondent
	Fairness (0.1661)	Employees in the organisation are fairly treated (0.3433)	Individual respondent
		Leaders are fair in taking actions against misbehaving employees (0.3331)	Individual respondent
		Leaders give fair and equal importance to the professional growth of employees (0.3236)	Individual respondent

ANNEXURE 4 *Assessment Framework and Weight Distribution for Parliamentarians' Integrity Index, Components, and its Survey Items*

The table below presents the assessment framework and weights and survey items used for each component for **Parliamentarians' Integrity.** It consists of 21 survey items and seven components.

Index and Component	Survey Item	Assessment Method
Representativeness (0.1730)	• Representing concerns/issues of citizens in the parliament (0.3330)	Individual respondent
	• Speaking rationally during parliamentary discussion (0.3340)	Individual respondent
	• Frequency of speaking in the parliament (0.3330)	Individual respondent
Oversight (0.1320)	• Frequency of parliamentarians questioning the government on national policies/issues (0.3240)	Individual respondent
	• Frequency of parliamentarians moving the motion in the parliament (0.3480)	Individual respondent
	• Relevance of questions to the executives/ government (0.3280)	Individual respondent
Legislative (0.1570)	• The deliberations on the bills are extensive and thorough (0.3430)	Individual respondent
	• Parliamentarians frequently consult relevant stakeholders during lawmaking (0.3290)	Individual respondent
	• Parliamentarians ensure that enacted laws are practical and implementable (0.3290)	Individual respondent
Transparency (0.1490)	• Citizens have adequate opportunities to express their views and concerns to their representatives (0.4970)	Individual respondent
	• Frequency of parliamentarians disseminating the resolutions of the parliamentary sessions to the citizens (0.5030)	Individual respondent
Accountability (0.1330)	• Parliamentarians largely abide by the codes of conduct (0.5060)	Individual respondent
	• Parliamentarians actively monitor developmental activities in their constituencies (0.4940)	Individual respondent
Integrity (0.1410)	• Performing public duties without fear or favours (0.5030)	Individual respondent
	• Set an example as law-abiding citizens (0.4970)	Individual respondent

Corruption (0.1160)	• Perception of payment in cash or kind or services to gain voter support (0.1100)	Individual respondent
	• Frequency of payment of cash/kind (0.1510)	Integrated organisation
	• Amount of payment of cash/kind (0.2185)	Integrated organisation
	• Frequency of payment of entertainment (0.1510)	Integrated organisation
	• Amount of payment of entertainment (0.2185)	Integrated organisation
	• Frequency of payment of other forms of gratification (0.1510)	Integrated organisation

ANNEXURE 5 *Calculation of Integrity Scores*

The highest possible score for integrity parameters is 10 points, with higher scores indicating greater transparency or a higher level of integrity, and the lowest score is 0, indicating the lowest level of integrity or the highest level of corruption.

Integrity scores are produced by multiplying each survey item/index (component)/External or Internal Integrity **Score** by its corresponding weight.

The methodology to generate integrity scores is as follows:

- First, the score for each survey item is multiplied by its weight, and the products are added up to derive the index (factor) score.
- Second, the score for each index or component score is then multiplied by its weight, and the products are added up, generating the Public Sector or Parliamentarians' Integrity score; and
- Finally, the **National Integrity** score is derived by multiplying the public-sector and parliamentarian integrity scores by their respective weights and then summing the products.

1. The Formula for Integrity Measurement

1.1 Formula for External Integrity Score

$$TIi = Ai \times W(Ai) + Bi \times W(Bi) + Ci \times W(Ci)$$

$$TIi = \ i\ Agency's\ External\ Integrity\ Score$$
$$Ai = \ Corruption\ Index\ Score \quad W(Ai) = Weight\ of\ Corruption\ Index$$
$$Bi = \ Transparency\ Index\ Score \quad W(Bi) = Weight\ of\ Transparency\ Index$$
$$Ci = \ Accountability\ Index\ Score \quad W(Ci) = Weight\ of\ Accountability\ Index$$

1.2 Formula for Internal Integrity Score

$$TIi = Ai \times W(Ai) + Bi \times W(Bi) + Ci \times W(Ci)$$

$$TIi = \ i\ Agency's\ Internal\ Integrity\ Score$$

$$Ai = \ Integrity\ Culture\ Index\ Score \quad W(Ai) = Weight\ of\ Integrity\ Culture\ Index$$
$$Bi = \ Work\ Integrity\ Index\ Score \quad W(Bi) = Weight\ of\ Work\ Integrity\ Index\ \ Ci$$
$$= \ Ethical\ Leadership\ Index\ Score \quad W(Ci)$$
$$= Weight\ of\ Ethical\ Leadership\ Index$$

1.3 Formula for Parliamentarians' Integrity Score

$$TIi = \ i\ Parliamentarians\ \ Integrity\ Score$$
$$Ai = \ Representativeness\ Score \quad W(Ai) = Weight\ of\ Representativeness$$
$$Bi = \ Oversight\ Score \quad W(Bi) = Weight\ of Oversight\ Ci$$
$$= \ Legislative\ Score \quad W(Ci) = Weight\ of\ Legislative$$
$$Di = \ Transparency\ Score \quad W(Di) = Weight\ of\ Transparency\ \ Ei$$
$$= \ Accountability\ \ Score \quad W(Ei) = Weight\ of\ Accountability\ \ Fi$$
$$= \ Integrity\ Score \quad W(Fi) = Weight\ of\ Integrity$$
$$Gi = \ Corruption\ Score \quad W(Gi) = Weight\ of\ Corruption$$

1.4 Formula for Score Calculation by Index

$$C_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \quad (Xi \times Wi)$$

$$Ci = \ i\ Index\ Scores \qquad Wi = Weight\ by\ Survey\ Item$$

$$Xi = \ Score\ by\ Survey\ Item \qquad n = Number\ of\ Survey\ Items$$

1.4 Formula for Score Calculation by Index

$$C_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \quad (Xi \times Wi)$$

$$Ci = \ i\ Index\ Scores \qquad Wi = Weight\ by\ Survey\ Item$$

$$Xi = \ Score\ by\ Survey\ Item \qquad n = Number\ of\ Survey\ Items$$

1.5 Weight of Target Service (Work)

In assessing integrity, the same weight was assigned to each service, regardless of its nature or the agencies' mandates. In the absence of objective criteria or data to assign exact weights to each item, this assessment assigned equal weight to each item to generate an organisational integrity score.

1.6 Calculation of Scores for Each Survey Item

To generate the integrity score, the score for each survey item was calculated first. Different score calculation methods were used for individual respondent assessment and integrated organisation assessment. The score for each survey item using the different methods was as follows:

1. Individual Respondent Assessment:

It is called individual respondent assessment because scores are derived from the individual respondents.

Score Calculation:

Survey items of the individual respondent assessment were rated on a 7-point scale ("Strongly Disagree", "Disagree", "Slightly Disagree", "Neutral", "Slightly Agree", "Agree" and "Strongly Agree") and 5-point scale ("Very Often", "Often", "Seldom", "Rarely" and "Never") from which the respondents were asked to choose only one response. The Parliamentarian Integrity also uses a 5-point scale ("Very Low", "Low", "Medium", "High" and "Very High"). The full score for the survey item is 10. All survey items for external integrity, except for the experience of corruption and internal integrity, the experience of corruption in personnel management, budget execution, and fairness in assignment of work, fall under this category. Similarly, all survey items of Parliamentarians' Integrity, except the five survey items in the corruption component, used this 5-point scale.

➢ Calculation of Scores for Individual Respondents

First, the scores for individual respondents were generated by converting the scores of each response from a 7-point or 5-point scale to a 10-point scale. The formula to convert 7-point and 5-point scales to a 10-point scale is as follows:

Formula to convert a 7-point scale into a 10-point scale and scores assigned to each scale

$$10\text{-point score} = (7\text{-point score} - 1 / 6) \times 10$$

Score Conversion for Internal and External Integrity

Response	Scale	10-point Score Conversion	
		Positive Item	Negative Item
Strongly Disagree	1	0.00	10.00
Disagree	2	1.67	8.33
Slightly Disagree	3	3.33	6.67
Neutral	4	5.00	5.00
Slightly Agree	5	6.67	3.33
Agree	6	8.33	1.67
Strongly Agree	7	10.00	0.00

Formula to convert a 5-point scale to a 10-point scale and scores assigned to each scale

$$10\text{-point score} = (5\text{-point score} – 1 / 4) * 10$$

Score Conversion for Parliamentarians' Integrity

Response	Scale	10-point Score	
		Positive Item	Negative Item
Very Often/Very Low	1	0.00	10.00
Often/Low	2	2.50	7.50
Seldom/Medium	3	5.00	5.00
Rarely/High	4	7.50	2.50
Never/Very High	5	10.00	0.00

Negative and positive items have been assigned different scores. For example, on a 7-point scale, for a positive item, if the response is negative (e.g., "Strongly Disagree" = 1-point on a 7-point scale), then the score is 0; 10 for "Strongly Agree". For a negative item, the score is calculated the other way around. The same scale is used for the responses in PII.

- **Calculation of Scores for Each/Service Work by Averaging Individual Respondents' Scores**

Survey item A's score for each work/service is generated after the calculation of scores for each respondent. Scores for each work/service are generated by averaging the individual respondents' scores for each work/ service.

- **Calculation of Scores for Each Survey Item by Averaging the Scores for Each Work/ Service**

The average scores for each work/service generate a score for survey item A. For example, the score for survey item A is calculated by adding the scores for work/service a, work/service b, and work/service c, then dividing the aggregate by 3 (the number of work/services).

2. Integrated Organisation Assessment (IOA)

IOA-type items are survey items that ask about the experience of corruption/frequency of payments/size of payments, rather than using a 7-point or 5-point scale. Survey items that fall under this category comprise the experience of corruption in **External Integrity** survey items and the experience of corruption regarding personnel affairs/management, budget execution, and the fairness of work assignments in **Internal Integrity** survey items. For **PII**, the five survey items pertaining to the frequency and amount of the corruption component fall under this category.

Score Calculation:

Individual respondents' experience/frequency/amount of payments in cash or kind, entertainment, and gratifications are aggregated by the agency. Then the formula is applied to derive scores for each agency (scores for individual respondents are not produced).

➢ **Calculation of Agencies' Total Frequency and the Total Amount of Corruption Experience**

First, the total frequency and the total amount of the agencies' experience of corruption (gratuities/ entertainment/ convenience, illegal and unfair execution of the budget, undermining the fair performance of duties, etc.) are calculated using the formula given below:

➢ **Calculation of Agencies' Average Frequency and the Average Amount of Corruption**

After the total frequency/total amount of payments were calculated, the average frequency and amount of payments were generated based on these totals. The average frequency and amount of payments are generated by dividing the total frequency or the total amount by the total number of respondents.

In this case, the respondents refer to the total number of survey respondents and is not limited to those who reported experiencing corruption.

➢ **Calculation of Scores for Each Survey Item**

Scores for survey items in the integrated organisation assessment are calculated by using the average frequency of payments by applying the formula given below:

- The score calculation formula for *External Integrity* for IOA-type survey items

UCP_1= the value at 95% of cumulative gamma distribution of the average frequency of offers by the organisation

UCP_2= the value at 95% of the cumulative gamma distribution of the average size of the offers by the organisation

- The score calculation formula for *Internal Integrity* IOA-type survey items
  - UCP_1= value is equivalent to 95% of cumulative gamma distribution of the average frequency of offers across all organisations assessed by the survey.
  - UCP_2 = value is equivalent to 95% of the cumulative gamma distribution of the average amount of offers for all agencies assessed by the survey.

The values or numbers shown as 95% or 97% on a graph have virtually no statistical meaning. Thus, they are regarded as zero (0). Hence, UCP exists.

ANNEXURE 6 *Comparison of Scores Across Different Service Channels*

Index, Components and Survey Items	Online	Walk In	Mixed Mode
National Score	**8.20**	**8.33**	**7.63**
External	**8.58**	**8.64**	**7.74**
Transparency	**8.40**	**8.36**	**8.10**
Openness of work/ established procedure for service	8.44	8.43	8.21
Established procedures are user-friendly	8.35	8.26	7.96
Accountability	**7.37**	**7.59**	**7.09**
Misuse of authority	7.69	7.93	7.33
Efforts to accomplish duties	6.78	6.95	6.64
Corruption	**9.20**	**9.26**	**7.77**
Experienced Corruption	***9.96***	***9.98***	***7.89***
Frequency of cash or kind offered	9.94	9.96	9.98
Amount of cash or kind offered	9.98	9.99	9.98
Frequency of entertainment offered	9.94	9.96	9.86
Amount of entertainment offered	9.97	9.98	9.95
Frequency of gratification offered	9.97	9.99	9.98
Perceived Corruption	***8.00***	***8.12***	***7.57***
Favours for specific individuals/Favouritism	7.47	7.56	6.97
Mediation/solicitation for undue advantage (Seeking favour/bribe)	8.46	8.52	8.06
Pursuing private interest, ignoring public ones	7.80	7.96	7.31
Engaging in sexual favours	8.79	9.03	8.54

Note. *0 = highly corrupt/lowest level of integrity and 10 = highly transparent/very clean; (n = 11,422, NIA 2025)*

ANNEXURE 7 *Percentage Rating of Representativeness's Survey Items by Parliamentarians and Voters*

	Ratings	Representing concerns/ issues of citizens in the parliament	Raising concerns/ issues in the parliament of national interest without personal interest	Speaking rationally during parliamentary discussion	Frequency of speaking in the parliament	Parliamentarians listen to the people for suggestions concerning community issues.	Parliamentarians take up the issues raised by the people in the parliamentary sessions.
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	Very Low	0	3	3	0	0	3
	Low	5	5	8	3	3	3
	Medium	18	21	26	7	5	10
	High	36	38	41	45	46	59
	Very High	41	33	23	45	46	26
	Don't Know	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	Very Low	2	3	1	2	3	2
	Low	11	11	7	19	10	11
	Medium	29	27	26	33	26	31
	High	43	43	48	34	45	40
	Very High	10	10	12	5	14	9
	Don't Know	5	6	6	8	3	6
	Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Note. *(n=39 Parliamentarians; 1,466 Voters, NIA 2025)*

ANNEXURE 8 *Percentage Rating of Oversight's Survey Items by Parliamentarians and Voters*

To what extent do parliamentarians agree with the recommendations of the standing or ad hoc committees of the parliament?							
	Very Low	**Low**	**Medium**	**High**	**Very High**	**Don't Know**	**Total**
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	0	0	18	32	50	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	1	8	40	29	4	18	100
How relevant are the responses to the questions asked to the executives/government?							
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	3	8	41	31	15	3	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	1	8	35	36	6	15	100

***Note**. (n=39 Parliamentarians; 1,466 Voters, NIA 2025)*

ANNEXURE 9 *Percentage Rating of Legislative's Survey Items by Parliamentarians and Voters*

How extensive and thorough are the deliberations or discussions on the bills in the parliament?							
	Very low	**Low**	**Medium**	**High**	**Very high**	**Don't know**	**Total**
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	0	3	10	49	38	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	2	9	33	34	8	15	100
To what extent do parliamentarians ensure that laws enacted are implementable/practical?							
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	3	5	21	56	13	3	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	1	10	34	37	7	10	100
How often do the parliamentarians consult with relevant stakeholders in the course of legislation/law making?							
	Never	**Rarely**	**Seldom**	**Often**	**Very often**	**Don't know**	**Total**
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	0	0	0	38	62	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	4	17	33	28	3	15	100

***Note**. (n=39 Parliamentarians; 1,466 Voters, NIA 2025)*

ANNEXURE 10 *Percentage Rating of Transparency's Survey Items by Parliamentarians and Voters*

To what extent do committees consult the public/stakeholders during their proceedings?

	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High	Don't Know	Total
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	0	3	13	46	38	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	2	12	43	39	5	12	100

To what extent do committees consult the public/stakeholders during their proceedings?

	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Don't Know	Total
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	13	56	23	8	0	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	15	53	23	7	1	1	100

***Note**. (n=39 Parliamentarians; 1,466 Voters, NIA 2025)*

ANNEXURE 11 *Percentage Rating of Accountability's Survey Items by Parliamentarians and Voters*

How satisfied are you with the attendance of the parliamentarians in the parliament sessions?

	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Don't Know	Total
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	54	41	5	0	0	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	14	48	26	6	2	5	100

	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High	Don't Know	Total
To what extent do the parliamentarians abide by the codes of conduct?							
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	3	5	13	33	46	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	0	5	25	48	16	5	100
To what extent do parliamentarians monitor the developmental activities in their constituencies?							
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	0	0	28	41	31	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	6	18	32	31	9	4	100

***Note**. (n=39 Parliamentarians; 1,466 Voters, NIA 2025)*

ANNEXURE 12 *Percentage Rating of Integrity's Survey Items by Parliamentarians and Voters*

	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High	Don't Know	Total
Performing public duties without fear or favour.							
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	5	10	23	36	26	0	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	8	15	20	39	14	5	100
Advocating or creating awareness on the laws of the country during their constituency visits							
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	3	0	11	34	47	5	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	4	9	21	45	18	3	100
Set an example as law-abiding citizens.							
Rating of Parliamentarians by Parliamentarians	0	3	18	38	38	3	100
Rating of Parliamentarians by Voters	1	6	23	46	21	4	100

***Note**. (n=39 Parliamentarians; 1,466 Voters, NIA 2025)*

ANNEXURE 13 *Percentage of Respondents Perceiving Undue Influence on Parliamentarians in the Law-making Process*

For each statement below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree using the following scale:	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neutral	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Total
Illegal payments (such as bribery in cash or kind) are commonly used to influence parliamentarians during law-making.	MPs	**51**	33	3	0	3	0	0	10	100
	Voters	29	**42**	5	8	5	3	1	8	100
Parliamentarians are often influenced by other forms of bribery, such as being offered receptions, future jobs, or expensive gifts.	MPs	**54**	26	3	5	10	0	0	3	100
It is common for parliamentarians to misuse their power for personal or vested interests in the law-making process.	MPs	**63**	24	5	3	3	3	0	0	100
Lobbying efforts by groups or individuals play a significant role in influencing parliamentarians' decisions.	Voters	25	**42**	5	9	5	3	1	11	100

Political campaign funding is frequently used as a means to gain influence over parliamentarians.	MPs	**41**	18	0	23	5	10	0	3	100
	Voters	24	**42**	5	7	7	5	1	10	100
Parliamentarians are often influenced by false or misleading information when making laws.	MPs	**37**	**37**	5	13	8	0	0	0	100
	Voters	24	**44**	5	10	5	2	0	10	100
Threats, such as acts of violence, smear campaigns, or negative rumours, are used to influence parliamentarians.	MPs	5	11	4	13	5	**27**	**7**	11	100

Note. (n=39 Parliamentarians; 1,466 Voters, NIA 2025)

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" I will not be corrupt and I will not tolerate corruption in others."

- His Majesty The King

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